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DEC 3 0 2013
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T. CRAWFORD, oePVTY

Attorney for Defendants/C ounterclaiman ts

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE,
husband and wife, REAL HOMES, L.L.C.
and REAL PROPERTIE S, L.L.C., an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiffs/Cou nter Defendants,
vs.
DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN,
and TRADESMA N CONTRACT ORS
AND CONSTRUC TION L.L.C., an Idaho
Limited Liability Company,
Defendants/Counterclaim ants.
IN THE ALTERNAT IVE
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE,
husband and wife, and REAL
PROPERTIES , LLC, an Idaho limited
lin.bility company,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 09-11855
CLOSING ARGUMENT AND
RESPONSE TO ALTERNAT IVE
PLAINTIFF S/
COUNTERD EFENDANT S'
POST-TRIA L BRIEF AND
OPENING ARGUMENT

)
)
)
)
)
)
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1

Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants,
vs.

DEJ\11'US SALLAZ, GLEJ\1N TREFREN,
and TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS
AND CONSTRUCTION L.L.C., an Idaho
Limited Liability Company,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

INTRODUCTION
Each party has submitted their opening final arguments, and Post-trial Briefing, as it
relates to the pending motions advanced during trial, and as it supports the authority each party
would suggest provides the basis for the appropriate relief requested in this matter. The Plaintiffs
having a right to "open and close" arguments, and the Counterclaimants, having that same right
to "open and close" with respect to the allocution of their respective claims, and therefore do
present this response in accordance with their right of such further allocution.

It appears Plaintiffs have chosen to make Defendants' claims their primary target in this
case, as they have withheld any argument or analysis concerning "Count V" of their Complaint
until the last part of their briefing, starting on page 21 under paragraph 5.
Because Plaintiffs have chosen to make Defendants' claims their primary target in the
post-trial memorandum they submitted to the Court in this case, the Defendants will first submit
a rebuttal to those claims, followed by a response to Plaintiffs' arguments on their Count V
claims, and then close this memorandum with a further reply to the Plaintiffs' arguments on the

CLOSING ARGUMENT AND RESPONSE TO ALTERNATIVE
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Defendants/Counterclaimants' motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence, and on
statute

frauds

statute of limitations issues.

Rebuttal Argument On The Defendants' Counterclaims

At some point in time, this Court will be required to simply look at the evidence
presented at trial, disregard the animosity and hostility that seems to permeate this case whenever
the occasion presents itself, and to make a detennination based only upon that evidence.
The irrefutable fact remains that Mr. Rice obtained control of $630,000.00 worth of
property, by the payment of only $63,402.82. Whether this was pursuant to a written contract;
pursuant to an inducement for a bigger and better deal yet to be made; or pursuant to a
combination of those events by which an attorney and a land developer were induced into
conveying their $630,000.00 worth of property to Mr. Rice, for which those two individuals have
received, to date
to Mr. Sallaz

nothing as to Mr. Trefren, and only $5,000.00 (and that's only a "maybe") as

is for this Court to ascertain and decide.

What now becomes most fascinating is that Alternative Plaintiffs request a judgment for
$5,000.00 against Mr. Sallaz (pg. 2 of the Post-Trial Brief), yet, based upon sworn trial
testimony, Mr. Rice has denied having paid the $5,000.00 pursuant to the Agreement, as he
insists on calling it a loan, yet somehow Plaintiffs' attorneys think they can get to the $5,000.00
that was "probably" or "most likely a personal loan", according to Mr. Rice.
First, Plaintiffs wanted to dismiss their case, and have wanted to do so ever since August,
2010.
Secondly, they say they got the four parcels by agreeing to stop the foreclosure action,
yet failed to discuss, let alone disclose the fact they failed to assume any of
CLOSING ARGUMEN T AND RESPONSE TO ALTERNATIVE PLAINTIFFS/
COUNTER DEFENDA NTS'
TRIAL BRIEF AND OPENING ARGUMEN T

debt on Smith,

J

of interest, they are faced with their filed pleading where they acknowledged a commitment
to

so in their "verified pleadings", even saying they did so

Count V, par.

yet in

truth, having never done so, and failed to address or even mention that fact, either way, at trial.
Thirdly, they "alleged" in their pleadings they paid Mr. Sallaz $5,000.00, though now, at
trial, have denied paying Mr. Sallaz anything under the "Purchase and Sale Agreement," but
rather chose to claim he made a personal loan, stating that to be the case in the various
depositions before trial, and then later at trial, but now in their Argument, only to find they want
this $5,000.00 paid back under a theory of "unjust enrichment", despite Mr. Rice's testimony it
was a loan, and never paid as part of the transaction in dispute.
Fourthly, they "allege" in their verified pleadings a contract was made, in which a breach
occurred over certain representations and warranties regarding title and marketability, yet they
failed to mention any of that in their case in chief, and don't even mention the word "damage" or
"loss", as they knew none existed. The introduction contained in Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Brief,
rather than addressing the evidence in this case, instead was designed to reflect a continuing
animosity and a complete lack of regard for what took place at trial.
The Plaintiffs' bold broad-based accusations contain the following, to which the
Defendants now respond:
1. "This litigation arose out of Dennis Sallaz' false representations regarding the facts."
Nothing could be further from the truth. There was never a "misrepresentation" by either
of these Defendants; there was always a full disclosure of all documents that existed, and
everyone had full knowledge about the occasion and opportunity upon which Ms. Baird
undertook to fraudulently engage for her own financial gain. Furthermore, each
CLOSING ARGUMENT AND RESPONSE TO ALTERNATIVE PLAINTIFFS/
COUNTERDEFENDANTS' POST TRIAL BRIEF AND OPENING ARGUMENT
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of properties were inspected, researched, reviewed and the facts from all directions were
,v'-""'"'"'"

into, intensely and extensively, by all parties, including the D.L. Evans

persom1el,

Jim Runnell, who undertook title searches, lot book reports, and caused policies of title insurance
to be ordered and issued, all of which was taking place throughout and during the summer, fall
and winter of 2005, long before the Agreement came into being on January 6, 2006. Every facet
of these properties and the dispute with Ms. Baird was revealed and reviewed during that time
frame, and long before the January 6, 2006, when ultimately the Purchase Agreement was
entered into.
At some point in time, during those four years, and in the subsequent period from
November 6, 2009 to August 3, 2010, Mr. Rice had made up his mind to disregard his
obligations, and take another course of action.
2. That "Mr. Sallaz, a licensed attorney, falsely informed the Rices."
That is a grossly false statement. As noted above, all details about Ms. Baird's claim
were disclosed by Mr. Sallaz and by Mr. Trefren to Mr. Rice prior to the execution of the
Purchase and Sale Agreement. In addition, Mr. Rice conducted his own due diligence and relied
upon a title report and his banker to disclose the title condition of the properties purchased
pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement. As the Court will recall, when asked if he wanted
to rescind the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Mr. Rice testified during Mr. Sallaz's divorce
proceedings and was emphatic that he was getting a really good deal on a business venture and
he was not interested in rescinding the contract. He knew what it was and liked it.

CLOSING ARGUMENT AND RESPONSE TO ALTERNATIVE PLAINTIFFS/
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3. That "Real Properties, LLC expended approximately $90,000.00 in improving and
caring for the subject properties only to discover that Mr. Sallaz' ex-wife, Renee Baird, claimed
an interest in Real Homes, LLC and the subject properties."
There was no testimony to actually demonstrate how or when any funds were expended
by Mr. Rice to improve any of the properties, but whatever he did, it was with full knowledge of
all facts, from everyone's perspective.
4. That "Mr. Sallaz then induced the Rices and Real Properties, LLC, to file this lawsuit
against him and his ex-wife, Renee Baird, as well as Glen Trefren, based on false information."
All facts were well known and digested throughout by all from 2004 on, and the
Complaint was prepared, crafted, drafted and filed by Messrs. Becker and Runft, having
confirmed what course of action they wanted to take against Ms. Baird. They were fully aware
of all information available, and even elected to place some of that information they had at their
disposal within some of the allegations in their pleadings.

Mr. Rice verified the pleadings

drafted by Messrs. Runft and Becker.
At trial, he disavowed the contents of the verified complaint. Evaluating Mr. Rice's
credibility is within the discretion of this Court and all evidence prior to Mr. Rice's recent
testimony reveals that Mr. Rice understood the terms and conditions of the Purchase and Sale
Agreement, thought it was a great deal, and had no intention of rescinding it. However, Mr. Rice
materially breached the Agreement when he failed and refused to pay the amounts due under the
Agreement. Only after it became clear that he could not prevail upon a claim for breach of
contract, did Mr. Rice decide to claim ignorance of the very Agreement upon which he obtained
title to property, v1hich he has since utilized as security in other real estate transactions,
CLOSING ARGUMENT AND RESPONSE TO ALTE:Ri"/\l'ATIVE PLAINTIFFS/
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rent upon, and subsequently transferred to another entity which he controls, for no consideration.
Unfortunately, Plaintiffs' "introduction" in their Post-Trial Briefing is neither factually
supported, nor found to have any basis upon any evidence presented at trial.
Count V was stated as an "alternative" claim, in order to assure recovery on their quiet
title action. Clearly, Plaintiffs got title to the property, and their title was never threatened, as
confirmed by and through the "settlement" with Ms. Baird. As to the final part of Plaintiffs'
introduction, they state Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren argued claims of ownership and oral contracts
at trial that were not even disclosed in the discovery responses.
Typically, discovery "responses" are tailored to address the question, not designed to be a
treatise about your claims or the theory of the case. If they wanted more detail, they could have
(and apparently should have) undertaken oral depositions, so the details, circumstances,
inducements, and minutia that you always find will enshroud any case of substance or
complication, can be explored in some length. That was what we found to be necessary with Mr.
Rice.

The

evidence

before

the

court

will

provide

a

right

to

relief to

these

Defendants/Counterclaimants either pursuant to an adequate remedy at law, or by an implied
contract, either in fact or in law, in which case the Court will provide to them either the value of
the service or goods they provided (a net market value of $566,597.18, as of January 6, 2006, or
the market value of the benefit which Mr. Rice received, and has retained within his various
LLC's, which benefit has a market value of $566,597.18, as of January 6, 2006, as well).
Moreover, given the testimony of Mr. Rice that he personally, not Real Properties, LLC,
paid the $63,402.82, and that he subsequently transfened the properties obtained for no
consideration to a separate LLC he controls, judgment should be entered against Mr. Rice,
CLOSING ARGUMENT AND RESPONSE TO ALTERNATIVE PLAINTIFFS/
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individually, for the full amount. See Idaho Code 30-6-304 "This subsection pertains to the
equitable doctrine of "piercing the veil" -i.e., conflating an entity and

owners to hold one

liable for the obligations of the other. The doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" is wellestablished, and courts regularly (and sometimes almost reflexively) apply that doctrine to
limited liability companies. In the corporate realm, "disregard of corporate formalities" is a key
factor in the piercing analysis. In the realm of LLCs, that factor is inappropriate, because
informality of organization and operation is both common and desired.
This subsection does not preclude consideration of another and equally effective key
piercing factor-disregard by an entity's owners of the entity's economic separateness from the
owners." Id. at Note 2. If the court finds there is an adequate legal remedy to make
Counterclaimants whole under Idaho law, they will receive the sum of $181,597.18, together
with pre- and post-judgment interest and attorney fees. If this Court determines there is no
adequate legal remedy in law, due to the "failure" of having a "meeting of the minds" in the
creation of this Agreement, the court must then determine if it is unjust and inequitable for Mr.
Rice to keep the value of the service or goods, or the market value of the benefit he has retained,
and not be required to compensate the sellers therefore, a factor that must be analyzed by the
Court when considering granting a relief under the theory of an implied contract in fact or law.
Obviously, Mr. Rice should have embraced the enforceability of the Purchase and Sale
Agreement, as he would have substantially reduced his liability to be just that of the balance
owing under the contract obligation he entered into with them. Instead, his decision to repudiate
the contract, by saying he never read it, and saying there was never a meeting of the minds as to
any of the terms and conditions, has left him exposed to the duty of the court to do equity, when
CLOSING ARGUMENT AND RESPONSE TO ALTERNATIVE PLAINTIFFS/
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no adequate remedy at law is available, such that, instead of a contract balance identified above,
required to

the reasonable value of the service or goods he received and retained

( quantum meruit), or the market value of the benefit he has received and retained (unjust
enrichment), which, in either case, from a reasonable analysis of the evidence, is $566,597.18,
together with interest and attorney fees under either of those equations.
5. That "the conduct of Mr. Sallaz was frivolous and an award of attorney fees incurred
since September, 2010 is warranted under Idaho Code§ 12-121."
That statement in the introduction lacks both common sense and logic, as well as a
complete disregard for the reason why the suit was brought in the first place. The selected date,
"since September, 201 O," can only refer to the Baird settlement, which took place on either
August 2nd or 3rd, 2010. Clearly, Mr. Sallaz would not agree to dismiss the suit, not without
being paid what was due under the Agreement, as now it was almost four years; Mr. Rice had not
paid "any" of the obligations he has agreed to assume; clearly, there was nothing frivolous about
Mr. Sallaz wanting Mr. Rice to honor the terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement; nothing
frivolous about wanting him to pay the balance he owed and had agreed to pay; there was no
expressed reason or disclosed any justification why that could not be done, and especially at that
moment once the settlement was announced by Mr. Runft, as now, nothing stood in the way.
Once again, and it is important for this Court to take note, the settlement with Ms. Baird
transferred absolutely nothing by way of any interest transferred in behalf of Real Homes, LLC;
all Ms. Baird signed by way of a "deed" was a quitclaim deed, the sole effect of which was to
"release" any "right, title or interest" she may otherwise personally claim in or to any of the
properties. She did not execute a deed of conveyance on "behalf' of Real Hornes, LLC.
CLOSING ARGUME NT AND RESPONSE TO ALTERNATIVE PLAINTIFFS/
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The only "conveyance" from Real Homes, LLC was that which came solely from the
sellers, through the deeds executed by Mr. Trefren, which he did on behalf of Real Homes, LLC,
and also he did as to the interests then held by Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC.
What becomes frivolous at this point in time

September, 2010

was Mr. Rice's failure and

refusal to honor the contract terms and to pay the balance owing under the purchase price, which
represented the principal sum of $181,597.18, with substantial interest accruing. He had already
failed or otherwise refused to assume the balance owing to D.L. Evans bank in conjunction with
the Smith property; had failed to pay the balance owing to Perry Harding; and had refused to
complete the course of action he had committed to do, as he chose not to take title to and assume
and pay what was owed on 15584 Riverside property, knowing full well that "assumed debt"
would be deducted from the purchase price.
In short, the "frivolous" conduct would only be that undertaken by Mr. Rice and Mr.
Becker, each of whom chose to orchestrate a new direction for a new and deceitful purpose, to
disclaim what was owed under the Purchase Agreement. Yes, the word "frivolous" has some
application here, but the application and focus by Plaintiffs in their "introduction" is misdirected
and misguided, and no doubt there will be a supporting basis in this Court's decision for granting
and award of attorney fees to Defendants/Counterclaimants, as they have requested in these
proceedings.
B.

Response to Plaintiff's Arguments on Their Count V Claim

Certainly the Plaintiffs had expressed a desire to dismiss their case in its entirety after
they had settled with Ms. Baird, and no doubt they wanted to dismiss the Complaint as Mr. Rice
got everything he wanted out of Ms. Baird, but the landscape had changed dramatically in terms
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the performance forthcoming from Mr. Rice, relative to his obligations and commitments to
Sallaz and

At

moment in time Mr. Rice had committed numerous acts, or

otherwise failed to perform various commitments, each of which were inconsistent with his
agreement with them including the following:
1.

Mr. Rice had failed to assume and pay the obligation associated with the Smith

parcel, refened to as the obligation to "D.L. Evans Bank" the encumbrance refened to and
identified in paragraph 2a (pg. 1) of the Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 41).
2.

January 6, 2008 had come and gone, and by August 2, 2010, the balance of the

purchase price was long overdue under the Purchase Agreement, and another 2 2/3 's years had
lapsed since the balance became due upon the Purchase and Sale Agreement, with nothing being
paid. Despite this, Mr. Rice took full advantage of titles to four parcels he had acquired in the
Purchase Agreement; used those parcels to secure all of the funds needed to purchase outright
the "Melba" property, as well as finance others, yet failed in his commitment to pay the debt he
agreed to assume under the Purchase Agreement against the Smith parcel, as was owed to D.L.
Evans Bank. His failure to do that had caused need for Mr. Sallaz to pay that debt himself, as he
had personally guaranteed that obligation, and it had come due and needed to be paid during that
time.
Mr. Rice simply chose to breach his commitments, once he got title and the foreclosure
sale was cancelled, and abandoned all remaining terms of the Purchase Agreement.

These

Defendants would wholeheartedly agree that Plaintiffs had no cause of action whatsoever against
these Defendants at any time, and the focus of the Complaint, at all times only, was to remove
the Lis Pendens falsely asserted by Ms. Baird. It was accomplished to Mr. Rice's satisfaction by
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of the settlement agreement with Ms. Baird on August 3rd, 2010, and as a result of
there was no basis in fact or in law for Plaintiffs' Complaint to proceed forward.
Let me repeat the statement Mr. Becker presents to us on page 3 of his Post-Trial
briefing; "Plaintiffs tried to dismiss the entirety of this case after they settled with Ms. Baird".
That statement is so telling that it could almost be called a "Freudian slip", as it reveals several
very significant and telling factors: Plaintiffs knew they had no cause of action to go forward
against these Defendants; Plaintiffs' attorneys knew they had no legal or factual basis to go
forward with any "meritorious" claim against these Defendants.
The continuation of Count V in the Complaint was being pursued for reasons "other"
than a meritorious claim against these Defendants; continuing the advancement of Count V
represents a clear breach of both the fiduciary and affirmative duty of good faith and fair dealing
in their contractual transaction between these parties, as it was being pursued to advance a nonexistent claim, over a non-existent damage that could never be established in fact or in law, and
was being done to defeat the existence of a valid and binding contract and the required
performance of Mr. Rice, and was being done in a manner that was orchestrated and designed to
eliminate his obligations and inducements created with these Defendants over a transaction
where he obtained title to four parcels of property worth $630,000.00 on January 6, 2006.
Despite the fact Plaintiffs never attempted to identify any particular breach upon which
they were relying, let alone any particular theory of a damage, or even any suggested damage
amount, or even a damage concept in their case in chief, we now see these Plaintiffs still
suggesting to the court: "the maturation of this claim depends on the court's findings of several
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addressed above - mainly the actual ownership of Real Homes, LLC, as of January 6,
2006." See Plaintiffs Post-Trial Brief page 21 regarding "Count V of complaint".
Because Plaintiffs were persistent in going forward with the presentation of Count V of
their Complaint, and the malicious use of deceptive evidence of Ms. Baird to defeat the contract
they before alleged existed, it may be of some interest to look at the allegations that actually
formed the "basis" of Count V of the Complaint, commencing at paragraph 81 of their pleading.
It begins by stating that: Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren, and Real Homes, LLC "breached the

Purchase and Sale Agreement". That allegation serves to claim a "Purchase Agreement" does
exist; that there were warranties, representations and statements about property ownership,
marketable title, and ownership interests, which, obviously, must have been understood and read
by Plaintiffs, so as to thereafter be able to allege in paragraph 85 of their Complaint, the various
other following allegations:
a)

pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Alternative Plaintiff expended
$63,402.82 to have extinguished the debt owing on 15580 Riverside Rd., Canyon
County, Idaho and prevent a foreclosure of the same;

b)

Alternative Plaintiff paid the balance of a mortgage at $50,351.04 on the property
known as 714 Smith Ave., Nampa, ID and advanced $10,000.00 toward repairs
and improvements;

c)

pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Alternative Plaintiffs expended
$5000.00 as an advance payment to Dennis Sallaz;

d)

Alternative Plaintiff purchased lumber and materials which they have been unable
to use to improve the subject properties in an amount to be proven at trial but
believed to be in excess of $30,000.00

e)

Alternative Plaintiff expended money in managing, maintaining, improving, and
paying property taxes on the subject properties in an amount to be proven at trial
but believed to be in excess of $84,000.00.
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one at a time, in response to each paragraph:
Paragraph a: At trail, Alternative Plaintiffs denied the existence of the Purchase and Sale
Agreement; claimed the $63,402.82 was the only amount to be paid, yet failed to identify an
agreement to support upon what basis $630,000.00 worth of real estate is being conveyed.
Paragraph b: There was a balance owed to D. L. Evans Bank concerning 714 Smith Ave.
That obligation was identified in the Agreement by reference being made to D.L. Evans Bank in
the Purchase and Sale Agreement, but Alternative Plaintiffs never paid that encumbrance, be it
$50,351.04 or $30,000.00, or any other figure. The significance of their allegation, however, is
the fact that Plaintiffs specifically "identified" a sum they knew was owing, and it was
"identified" by Plaintiffs because they understood they had to assume and pay it, and they knew
it before they filed their complaint on November 6, 2009, and fully understood it was their
obligation to pay it under the Purchase Agreement, but having then not paid it, at trail they made
no attempt to address it at all, as they knew Mr. Sallaz had satisfied that obligation because of his
personal guarantee of that obligation, and they were now instead stressing their complete
ignorance of the contents of the Agreement, as Mr. Rice claimed he never read the Agreement.
Paragraph c: Plaintiffs alleged the $5,000.00 was paid to Mr. Sallaz pursuant to the
Purchase and Sale Agreement, yet we saw Mr. Rice actually testify at trial, under oath, as an
adverse witness, in a way completely inconsistent with that allegation, stating it was "probably"
or "more likely" a loan to Mr. Sallaz, and not paid under the Purchase Agreement.
Paragraphs d and e: There is no showing made that any amount was spent to improve,
manage, maintain, or pay taxes on these properties, as the Plaintiffs realize such testimony would
serve only to be "irrelevant" to their position no\v

when they had already abandoned their
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breach of contract claim, producing evidence, instead, only to demonstrate there could not be a
and never attempting to prove the nature of any breach, or any resulting damage.
Of further interest, within the Opening Final Argument presented by Alternative
Plaintiffs in their Post-Trial Brief: they would suggest now that, based upon the "contingent
language" in the Complaint, Alternative Count V should be construed as a "claim for unjust
emichment" against Dennis Sallaz and Glenn Trefren in their individual capacities (see pg. 21 of
the Post-Trial Brief).
It would appear impossible to develop an unjust enrichment claim against Mr. Trefren, as

he received nothing but lies and failed promises from Mr. Rice, be it under the Purchase and Sale
Agreement, or be it under the larger development venture he was induced to accept as the reason
to complete the Purchase Agreement. Similarly, it would be difficult to develop an unjust
emichment claim against Mr. Sallaz, as the testimony presented from Mr. Rice was that he
"probably or most likely" loaned that money to Mr. Sallaz, and it was not paid pursuant to any
Purchase and Sale Agreement.
Without any attempt by Plaintiffs to amend the pleadings under Rule l 5(a) I.R.C.P.
similar to the fashion in which our motion was made, and without any credible evidence to
demonstrate a sum of money was paid that was not owed, the Alternative Plaintiffs make it
impossible to get an "implied contract in law" remedy out of the facts of "their" case, as they
denied a contract could exist, and it appears as though they are not really sure upon what
pretense the $5000.00 was tendered. For them to be seeking unjust enrichment, now out of a
claim that moments before were seeking a breach of an express contract, initially identified in
Count V of the Complaint, but now to be "construed" by some "distinct language in the
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Complaint" to allow for such consideration by the court, when their shifted focus and objective
had then become to defeat

form of an Agreement,

one to ponder their understanding

of their case, and the evidence they elected to put forward. When it comes to the question:
"whether an adverse party is put on notice of the claims brought against it" (pg. 22 of the PostTrial Brief), the only "notice" these Defendants had about a "claim" by Plaintiffs against any
Defendants was the allegations contained in the Complaint, wherein those allegations were
clearly to the point: there "was" a contract, and it was "known" to exist by all parties, and known
to be that contract that was "attached to the Complaint", and is referred to as the "Purchase and
Sale Agreement". Essentially, Plaintiffs want to go from a contention an agreement exists, and
that Defendants breached it, to the idea that there was never any agreement for the sale of
anything, or any agreement to do anything, but nonetheless, Mr. Sallaz somehow got $5,000.00,
and although they are willing to testify it involved some unrelated loan, they now think they
want it back, as they think it would be unjust for Mr. Nallaz to keep it, though it might have
actually been a loan, and never paid under the terms of the Agreement, as, after all, they argue no
such agreement exists. Now that's stretching an equitable doctrine beyond its limits, and into the
realm and depth of the bad faith Plaintiffs' case has actually and truly come to offer.
C.

Effects Of Motion To Amend Pleadings To Conform To The Evidence

Alternative Plaintiffs perceived the Motion to Amend made by Defendants/
Counterclaimants to relate only to Mr. Trefren's claim being made by him to recover the value of
his services, upon a theory other than that of a general contractor, a11d those provisional
requirements that are otherwise reflected in §54-5217 Idaho Code. Apparently Plaintiffs'
attorneys did not fully comprehend the thrust of the motion, as it was intended to render
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Court with subject matter jurisdiction to avail itself of all the issues and claims advanced by
Defendants/Counterclaimants, so as to come within the purview of all available legal and
equitable forms of recovery and rights to relief.
The thrust of the motion goes to each of the equitable doctrines and legal remedies that
should be made available to these Defendants/Counterclaimants, so as to allow them to recover
upon each of the available rights to relief, "as this Court may deem to be proper and just under
the circumstances".
As the evidence demonstrates, Mr. Trefren engaged his services in the nature of a
superintendent and construction manager, pursuant to his perception and understanding he was
involved in a three-way profit splitting arrangement that was represented to include these four
parcels of property, along with the Melba property, and any other properties, which were then in
the process of being acquired through loans advanced by D .L. Evans Bank, upon the use of the
four parcels as collateral to get the funds to make these purchases.
Mr. Trefren was acting in good faith in accordance with the promise that there would be
the development of those, and other acquired properties, obtained by Mr. Rice, and it was Mr.
Rice, himself, who proposed the arrangements that he made with Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren,
which included not only acquisition of the property as addressed in the Purchase Agreement, but
also the greater, more expanded development venture that Mr. Rice had induced them to believe
they were to embark upon as well.
They had each agreed among the three of them to start with the Smith parcel, as it had the
greatest potential for completion and sale upon the market, from which funds would be generated
to continue the development process as envisioned by the parties. Mr. Trefrcn's services could
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be seen as having been undertaken as a part of, or as an extension of,
given the inducement he was led to believe he would

paid

Purchase Agreement
profits that would be

coming also from those parcels, as part of the greater development venture he was promoted by
Mr. Rice to believe, as Mr. Rice obviously wanted Mr. Trefren to continue to be engaged in the

development that had already been started, and to continue his services in the direction of
finishing the houses, as there were three more out on Riverside still up on cribbing that needed to
be finished. Messrs. Trefren, Sallaz, and Rice were either partners or joint-venturers, and codevelopers of these properties as a commercial venture, and therefore all three should or could be
considered to be exempt from any regulation under the Contractor Registration Act under the
provision of LC. § 54-5205(2)(m) (owners of commercial property who themselves perform
maintenance, repair, alteration, or construction work on their own properties). If they were
supposed to share in profits, they would have some interest in the ownership of the venture to
which they had agreed.
Mr. Trefren was rendering his services either under the guise of the development venture,

or under one sort or another of a contract that should be implied in fact, or a contract that should
be implied in law, and his right to recover the "value" of his "services" is best formulated under
the equitable doctrine of an implied contract in fact, as he is entitled to recover the reasonable
value of his services pursuant to the theory of recovery under quantum meruit, as described in
more detail in our initial memorandum.
The scope of the motion, however, is not just limited to Mr. Trefren's ciaim for his
services; it was also intended to encompass the appropriate relief to be considered by the Court
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regard to the original transaction by which Mr. Rice obtained title to $630,000.00 worth of
he can walk away

avoid paying what he is obligated to

The pleadings filed by Counterclaimants alleged a claim for recovery upon unjust
enrichment, a right to recovery envisioned under a contract implied in law.

The right for

recovery under quantum meruit, envisioned under a contract implied in fact, is an equitable
principle as well, one in which the evidence has presented the Court the need to consider that
equitable remedy also, and to that end, the pleadings were thought best to be amended, so as to
avail this Court of that equitable principle in its consideration as well, though, in truth, the "value
of the goods" received by Plaintiffs, under the quantum meruit theory, is probably synonymous
with the "benefit received by the recipient", as in each case it would reasonably appear that the
"value" in the one, and the "benefit" in the other, is the same: a net "value" or "benefit" of
$566,597.18 as of the relevant point in time the implied contract came into existence, that being
January 6, 2006.
Consequently, the amendment to the pleadings is designed to coincide the evidence to the
claims and issues presented, and to grant the relief to which the law and principles of equity
require. In that sense, it affects each and every aspect of the evidence that supports a recovery,
whether it be upon a legal remedy, or upon an equitable principle recognized under Idaho law.
D.

Whether An Oral Contract For The Development Venture Violates The Statute Of
Frauds
Alternative Plaintiffs have expressed a concern that the "larger development venture"

comes within the statute of frauds, §9-505 Idaho Code. The language contained in the statute,
however, appears not to apply to the "development venture" as it does not constitute a "lease" or
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a "sale" of "real property", as there was never envisioned a "conveyance" of any property was to
made to either of these venture partners. The interest

had in the venture went to a share

in the profits, not in the physical act of holding title to any of the property they were causing to
be developed.
E.

Statute Of Limitations As To The Development Venture

Alternative Plaintiffs have brought forth the concern over the statute of limitations
pertaining to the larger development venture promoted by Mr. Rice, and have raised concerns
over the application of §5-217 Idaho Code. Before any statute of limitations can be applied to a
transaction, it must be determined "when" a "cause of action" accrued. It must be remembered
that none of the parcels or lots have ever been sold, so there is no profits to date generated from
which to share or fail to share. There have been no profits identified or disclosed to date by Mr.
Rice, so, if there are no profits reportedly generated, and none available to distribute, then it
would appear we do not have a basis to give rise to a "cause of action" for anyone to sue the
other, as Mr. Rice appears to have put the project on hold, until this dispute is finalized.
It does not appear reasonable to believe Mr. Trefren should have sued Mr. Rice, or any of

his LLC entities, under a theory that there has been a breach of their oral venture agreement by
these Defendants, until such time it has been determined a profit has been generated, and Mr.
Rice failed or refused to disperse equally, that determined profit, to and among the three of them.
Mr. Rice has admitted he still has the properties in Ada Properties, LLC, one of his LLC entities,
and that he claims they are each "free and clear".
He also now says he would take $300,000.00 for them, but he has NEVER told anyone
he has made a profit through his involvement with them. Since a "profit", as we understand the
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term to require, has never come to pass, a legal scholar could conclude there has been no accrual
a "cause of action" from which a breach of contract claim could be successfully brought
against Mr. Rice, or any of these "Plaintiffs" or any of his LLC's, upon a pretense he has failed
to disperse, equaily, the "profits" from the development of these properties.
Given the evidence, Mr. Rice has paid NOTHING to acquire the Smith parcel, and
although he has paid some amount for "labor and materials", as funds were deposited into Mr.
Trefren's account to pay those costs he incurred for the labor he hired, and the materials he
bought, the evidence does not identify any amount that was actually spent. What was alleged in
the Complaint was never presented in any form in their case in chief with any of their evidence.
Mr. Rice, however, disclaimed the truth of the verified complaint, thus rendering any reliance
upon the same dubious. Possibly he has kept the taxes current, as he says they are "free and
clear", but that also has never been a clear fact, as the phrase has never been defined.
Another, and a more encompassing, though equitable, manner upon which to formulate a
remedy for these Counterclaimants would be to render a decision that declares Counterclaimants
entitled to the equitable remedy under a theory of an implied contract, such that
Counterclaimants are awarded $566,597.18 as a right ofrecovery under either theory, be it under
quantum meruit or be it under unjust enrichment, as the reasonable value of the "goods" equals
or equates to the market "value" of the "benefit" received by Mr. Rice (and his LLC's), and once
that determination is made, then this court can afford Mr. Rice the limited option to "discharge"
his obligation under that judgment or award by returning each of the four parcels of property to
the Counterclaimants, thereby deeding the property back to them in the same manner and fashion
upon which they received it, that being the execution of similar, but now being re-conveyance
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returning the property as described and as is reflected by the contents of Exhibits E, F, G,

The Court will recall Mr. Rice testified he would accept $300,000.00 for all four parcels,
but it must also be kept in mind he "holds" title to these properties in Ada Properties, LLC. His
re-conveyance of those properties must also include a release or quitclaim deed from Ada
Properties, LLC as one of the Grantors in these re-conveying deeds. If we take Mr. Rice at his
word that (at least to his present way of thinking) that these properties are worth only
$300,000.00, then he would be most happy to satisfy a debt of $566,597.18 with the surrender of
property he has valued to be worth only $300,000.00, in the present market.
Upon such a resolution, Mr. Trefren would then be able to receive and recover the full
value of his service for what he has coming for his performance in the construction and
supervision he did at 714 Smith Ave., as he would have found it to be included within the
recovered assets, and he would then have the distinct opportunity (and ability) to resolve that
issue with Mr. Sallaz, as the title conveyed back to Counterclaimant(s) would include both the
names of Real Homes, LLC, Glenn Trefren, and Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC,
as their interest formerly so appeared in the deeds of conveyance (Exhibits E,F,G, and H) by
which title was conveyed.
By virtue of that equitable remedy being utilized to resolve this dispute by the Court, the
Court would also conclude in its factual findings and legal conclusions that there was no
conveyance of the "ownership interest" reflected in the Purchase Agreement, as it would be
regarded as a non- enforceable agreement, as an equitable remedy was utilized to resolve this
dispute, and that precludes application of a legal remedy for the enforcement of the transaction.
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From the effects of that, it would be determined Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren did not convey their
"m;vnership interests" to Real Properties, LLC. That "transa t~woufd- be-4ec11 1_red, in all
respects, unenforceable, null and void, and of n

ffect. That serves justice to the A ~ e - "

Plaintiffs, as they have been advocating a positi n they have intended to denounce and defeat the
existence of an enforceable contract for some period o · e now.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of December, 2013.

·vemon K. Smith
Attorney for Dennis J. Sallaz
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband and
wife, and REAL
PROPERTIES, L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability
company,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

VS.

)

DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN
TREFREN, and TRADESMAN
CONTRACTORS and CONSTRUCTION,
L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability company, and
REAL HOMES, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.
And Related Counterclaims

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
CV-2009-11855-C

)
)
)

INTRODUCTION
This matter having come before the court trial on November 20, 21, 22, and 25, 2013;
and the Plaintiffs having been represented by Mr. J. Kahle Becker and Mr. Gabriel J. McCarthy;
and the Defendant Dennis J. Sallaz having been represented by Mr. Vernon K. Smith; and the

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
- 1-

Defendants Glenn Trefren and Tradesman Contractors having been represented by Mr. Iver J.
and the court having considered the file and record in this action; the
presented; the arguments and briefing of counsel; the Post trial Memorandum filed December 20,
2013; the Final Argument and Authority to Support Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of
Alternative Plaintiffs Count V, And Motion to Amend Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence
Presented on Counterclaims, filed December 20, 2013; and Alternative
Plaintiff/Counterd efendant's Post Trial Brief, filed December 20, 2013; and the Closing
Argument and Response to Alternative Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Post Trial Brief and
Opening Argument, filed December 30, 2013; together with the applicable law; this court does
hereby render its memorandum decision as follows.

BACKGROUND
By verified Complaint filed November 6, 2009, Plaintiffs sought relief against
Defendants on various claims, including declaratory relief (Count I), judgment quieting title to
certain real property located in Canyon County (Count II), damages for unjust enrichment
(Counts III, IV, and VI), and damages for breach of contract (Count V). As of the date of this
Order, Plaintiffs' only remaining claim is for breach of contract, as set forth in Count V of the
Complaint. Count V was originally asserted as an "alternative" claim, with its own caption.
Since Count Vis Plaintiffs only remaining claim, the above caption represents the status of the
parties on such claim.
Defendant Sallaz filed his Answer with Affirmative Defenses on January 10, 2011.
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On July 6, 201

Defendants Trefren and Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC

filed their Amended Answer

Counterclaim, pursuant to an

of this court,

and the court ordered such Answer filed nunc pro tune to December 30, 2010. The Counterclaim
includes three separate counts, two for damages for breach of contract and one based upon unjust
enrichment.
Plaintiffs filed their "Answer to Defendants Glenn Trefren's Tradesman Contractors and
Construction, LLC.'s Counterclaim" on July 25, 2012.
On November 20, 2013, the parties commenced trial before the court on Count V of the
Complaint and Defendants Trefren and Tradesman's counterclaims.

MOTIONS TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS
Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC and Counterclaimants both seek an order, pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 15(b), granting leave to amend their claims to conform to the evidence adduced at trial.
I. Standard of Decision

Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court is not limited to deciding the
case on the issues as framed by the pleadings. MK. Transp., Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349,
612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980). "However, the court's authority under I.R.C.P. l 5(b) and,
consequently, I.R.C.P. 54(c), to determine a case upon unpleaded theories is limited by the
proviso in I.R.C.P. l 5(b) that for the court to consider unpleaded issues those issues must have
been 'tried by express or implied consent of the parties ... .' Although I.R.C.P. 15(b) permits a
comi to base its decision on a theory fully tried by the parties, an issue not tried by either express
or implied consent cannot be the basis for the decision. See, e. g., 6 Wright & Miller Fed.
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Practice & Procedure, Civil s 1493 ( 1971 ). " Id "Implied consent to the trial of an unpleaded
is not established

because evidence

to that issue was

without

objection. At least it must appear that the parties understood the evidence to be aimed at the
unpleaded issue." Id. (quoting MB! Motor Co., Inc. v. Lotus/East, Inc., 506 F.2d 709, 711 (6th
Cir. 1974)).

It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether the parties consented to
the trial of an issue. Lynch v. Cheney, 98 Idaho 238,241,561 P.2d 380,383 (1977). In making
a discretionary determination, this court must: (1) correctly perceive the issue as one of
discretion; (2) act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) reach its decision by an
exercise ofreason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d
993, 1000 (1991).
II. Plaintiff's Motion
Count V of the Complaint ("Breach of Contract in the Alternative) includes the following
allegations by Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC:
81. In the alternative, if this Court declares the purchase and sale agreement invalid or
unenforceable and does not quiet title to the above referenced assets and property in Real
Properties, LLC, Alternative Defendants Glenn Trefren, Dennis Sallaz, and Real Homes,
L.L.C. breached the Purchase and Sale Agreement by failing to convey good and
marketable title to Real Properties, LLC.
82. In the Purchase and Sale Agreement "Exhibit C" Alternative Defendants Glenn Trefren,
Dennis Sallaz, and Real Homes, L.L.C. warranted that they had authority to transfer good
and marketable title to Real Homes, L.L.C. and all its assets.
83. Alternative Defendants Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz made ce1iain statements and
representations that they were owners and managers of Real Homes, L.L.C.
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84. Alternative Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC purehased Real Homes, L.L.C. based upon
Alternative Defendants'
representations, and statements.
85. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Alternative Plaintiff Real Properties,
LLC suffered the following damages:
a.

Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Alternative Plaintiff expended
$63,402.82 to extinguish the debt owing on 15580 Riverside Rd, Canyon County,
ID and prevent a foreelosure sale of the same.
b. Alternative Plaintiff paid the balance of a mortgage of $50,351.04 on the property
known as 714 Smith Ave. Nampa, ID and advanced $10,000 toward repairs and
improvements;
c. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Alternative Plaintiff expended
$5,000 as an advance payment to Dennis Sallaz;
d. Alternative Plaintiff purchased lumber and materials which they have been unable
to use to improve the subject properties in an amount to be proven at trial but
believed to be in excess of $30,000.
e. Alternative Plaintiff expended money in managing, maintaining, improving and
paying property taxes on the subject properties in an amount to be proven at trial
but believed to be in excess of $84,000.
86. Alternative Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC is entitled to and hereby requests a money
judgment for the above referenced damages including prejudgment interest.
Plaintiff now contends that, "[b ]ased on the contingent language in the Complaint,
Alternative Count V should be construed as a claim for unjust enrichment against Dennis Sallaz
and Glenn Trefren in their individual capacities," based on I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l) and the fact that
"Idaho is a 'notice pleading' jurisdiction." However, as noted above, the issue is not whether the
alleged claim is a valid claim of relief, but whether the parties tried the claim by consent.
The unjust enrichment claim Plaintiff seeks to asse1i is distinctly different from the
breach of warranty claim asserted in Count V. In fact, based upon the evidence adduced at trial,
Roy Rice, rather than Real Properties, LLC, would be the proper Plaintiff on the unjust
enrichment claim, because Mr. Rice testified numerous times that he personally paid whatever
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sums were paid to Defendants Sallaz and Trefren pursuant to the Agreement. This testimony is
with the

Mr. Rice filed

support of Plaintiffs prior

Summary

Judgment on Count V. In fact, in its Order on such motion, this comi noted:
In Paragraph 29 of his Affidavit, Mr. Rice states: "Due to exigent circumstances, namely
an impending foreclosure, the funds utilized for the Real Homes/Real Properties
transaction were my personal funds." This contradiction in Plaintiffs own evidence
precludes the court from granting summary judgment in favor of Real Properties on its
breach of contract claim because the evidence is insufficient to establish that Real
Properties suffered any damage resulting from the alleged breach of the Agreement.
Plaintiff had ample notice and time to properly assert a claim for unjust enrichment prior
to the commencement of the trial in this action and Plaintiff has not identified any basis in the
record supporting a conclusion that Defendants consented to try the alleged unjust enrichment
claim.

III. Counterclaimants' Motion
In their Amended Answer and Counterclaim, filed July 6, 2012 nunc pro tune to
December 30, 2010, Glen Trefren and Tradesman asserted three claims for relief: (1) Damages
for breach of the January 6, 2006 Purchase Agreement for Sale oflnterest in Real Homes, LLC,
asserted by Trefren on his own behalf and as assignee of "all right ... title and interest" of
Defendant Sallaz in the Agreement (Count I); Damages for breach of a contract between
"Plaintifffs" and Trefren and Tradesman "for goods and services to be used in the maintenance
and improvements of the properties at issue in this litigation" (Count II); and restitution
damages, based upon unjust enrichment, again, apparently asserted by Trefren only, "as a result
of Defendant's transfer of all right, title and interest in and to Real Homes, LLC and all property
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owned by Real Homes, LLC, and Plaintiffs failure to pay and subsequent breach of the Purchase
III).1

In his post-trial Motion to Amend Pleadings, Counterclaimant Trefren seeks leave to
amend Count III so as to seek quantum meruit damages on the facts pled and, allegedly, proved
(the Motion makes a number of sweeping factual assertions, especially regarding the values of
various properties, with no citation to the record):
Given the circumstances of this case, should the Court find the express contract to
be unenforceable for any reason, the court must necessarily find the existence of a factual
basis to apply an implied contract in fact or an implied contract in law, for which the
reasonable value of the benefit received by Mr. Rice must be paid to these "sellers."
Because Defendants/Counterclaimants alleged the equitable remedy of unjust
emichment, under the theory of an implied contract in law, it was deemed necessary to
move the Court to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence presented, by
Counterclaimants in the case, so as to enable this Court to have the full availability of all
equitable doctrines, including quantum meruit (a contract implied in fact) as well as the
pleaded relief under an unjust emichment claim (a contract implied in law).
Final Argument and Authority to Support Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of Alternative
Plaintiffs' Count V, and Motion to Amend Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence Presented
on the Counterclaims, p. 26.

Counterclaimant correctly notes that "[b]oth quantum meruit (implied-in-fact contracts)
and unjust emichment (implied-in-law contracts) are 'measures of equitable recovery.'" Clayson
v. Zebe, 153 Idaho 228, 234, 280 P.3d 731, 737 (2012) (quoting Farrell v. Whiteman ( Farrell I),
1

Count III mistakenly states that Trefren seeks the equitable remedy of rescission for Plaintiffs alleged unjust
enrichment - "the contract and all property transfers should be set aside with the parties being returned to their prePurchase Sale Agreement positions." As Trefren clearly states in his post-trial Motion to Amend, he intended to
state a claim for restitution based upon unjust enrichment in Count III ("Because Defendants/Counterclaimants
alleged the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment, under the theory of an implied contract in law," Final
Argument and Authority to Support Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of Alternative Plaintiffs' Count V, and
Motion to Amend Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence Presented on the Counterclaims, p. 26), the
appropriate remedy on such claim would be the amount of any benefit Real Properties unjustly retained. Gray v.
Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378,389,210 P.3d 63, 74 (2009).
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146 Idaho 604, 612, 200 P.3d 1153, 1161 (2009)). However, Trefren has not made a primafacie
remedy of quantum

is available to him on the

this

case. The remedy of quantum meruit is based upon the principle that "one who provides services
should receive the compensation he or she deserves." Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885, 894, 934
P.2d 951, 960 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Shacocass, Inc., v. Arrington Const. Co., 116 Idaho 460,
464, 776 P.2d 469,473 (Ct.App.1989)). It is used to compensate a person who has performed
services at the request of another, and recovery is based on an implied-in-fact contract. Id. The
measure for recovery required for a claim in quantum meruit is the reasonable value of services
rendered, not the actual benefit realized and retained. Id This is an objective measure and is
proven by evidence demonstrating the nature of the work and the customary rate of pay for such
work in the community at the time the work was performed. Id Since the implied-in-fact
contract allegedly at issue in Count III is not one for the provision of goods and services, there is
no basis for the court to apply the equitable remedy of quantum meruit. In addition, even if the
implied-in-fact contract remedy applied here, Trefren has not identified evidence in the record
demonstrating the reasonable value of the property he provided to Real Properties, LLC or Roy
Rice under the alleged contract. In addition, even if the implied-in-fact contract remedy applied
here, Trefren has not identified any evidence in the record demonstrating the reasonable value of
the property-his member interest in Real Homes, LLC-which he provided to Real Properties,
LLC or to Roy Rice under the alleged contract.
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
21,

13, at the close

Plaintiffs' evidence, Defendants moved for

dismissal of Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4I(b).
The court reserved ruling on Defendants' motion, noting the number of documents
entered in the first day and a half of this case and the legal issues, both direct and indirect, that
appear to be implicated on Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. At the conclusion of the trial, the
comi granted the parties leave to address the Motion to Dismiss in written submissions.
I. Standard of Decision

I.R.C.P. 41 (b), in an action tried by the court without a jury, permits the defendant to
move for involuntary dismissal of the plaintiff's case, at the close of the plaintiffs evidence, "on
the ground that on the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief." In response to
such motion, the court may: (1) decline to render any judgment until the close of all the
evidence; or (2) determine the facts and law, based upon findings as provided in I.R.C.P. 52(a),
and render judgment against the plaintiff.
[W]hen a defendant moves for an involuntary dismissal at the close of the
plaintiffs presentation in a non-jury case, the court sits as a trier of fact and is not
required to construe all evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Sorenson v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708, 571 P.2d 769 (1977);
I.R.C.P. 4l(b); See Stratton v. Stratton, 87 Idaho 118,391 P.2d 340 (1964). Thus, in
rendering a judgment pursuant to the defendants' motion for dismissal under I.R.C.P.
41 (b ), the trial court is not as limited in its evaluation of the plaintiffs case as it would be
in a motion for directed verdict. The court is not to make any special inferences in the
plaintiffs favor nor concern itself with whether plaintiff has made out a prima facie case.
Instead, it is to weigh the evidence, resolve any conflicts in it, and decide for itself where
the preponderance lies. Keenan v. Brooks, 100 Idaho 823,825,606 P.2d 473,475
(1980).
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Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Claim

The Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC (Agreement), dated
January 6, 2006, and admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit 41, includes the following provisions:
WHEREAS, Sellers each hold 100% ownership interest in Real Homes LLC,
which is all of the ownership interest therein, an LLC formed and recorded with the Idaho
Secretary of State on January 19, 2001, and
WHEREAS, it is the mutual desire of the parties hereto that Sellers shall sell to
the Buyer all of said Ownership Interest and all right, title and interest in and to all real
property owned by Real Homes, LLC as sort forth on Exhibit A attached hereto.

****

IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between the parties as follows:
1.
Sellers hereby agrees to sell to Buyer and Buyer hereby agrees to purchase
from the Sellers, all of said Ownership Interest owned by Sellers, being all of the
Ownership Interest thereof, subject to the terms and conditions herein set forth.
2.
It is understood and agreed that the total purchase price for said
Ownership Interest shall be the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand and no/100 Dollars
($250,000), lawful money of the United States of America, to be paid by the Buyer to the
Seller as follows:
(a)

Buyer shall assume all recorded encumbrances against all real properties
owned by Real Homes, LLC; including, but not limited to, D.L. Evans
Bank, Perry Harding, CPA, and Canyon County Property taxes and Buyer
shall hold Sellers harmless therefrom.

(b)

Said encumbrances include that certain Note and Deed of Trust held by
Saxton Fruit Farms dated 02/13/2001 which is in default and set for
foreclosure sale on January 6, 2006, and Buyer agrees to pay same in full
prior to sale.

(c)

The balance of said purchase price after payment of the title encumbrances
shall then be paid by Buyer to Sellers in two equal cash shares from the
net proceeds from sales, income or other disposition of any or all of the
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said properties herein. In any event said payment shall be made no later
than 24 months from the date hereof.
Provided, however, that Buyer agrees to give Seller Dennis J. Sallaz an
advance of $5,000.00 as partial payment on his Attorney fees due to Jim
Bevis prior to April 10, 2006.
3.

Sellers represent, warrant and agree with the Buyer as follows:

(a)

That the Ownership Interest which is being sold herein constitutes l 00%
of the Ownership of Real Homes, LLC;

(b)

The Sellers have good and marketable title to said Ownership Interest
being sold and transferred hereunder with absolute right to sell, assign and
transfer same to Buyer free and clear of all liens, pledges, security
interests or encumbrances and without breach of any agreement to which
he is a party.

(c)

The Sellers covenant that all real properties owned by Real Homes, LLC
and being transferred herein are free and clear of all encumbrances not
listed herein.

(d)

Real Homes, LLC has free and clear title to said real properties and Sellers
shall execute any and all documents requested by Buyer to transfer all
interest therein to Buyer.

(e)

Time is agreed to be of the essence of this Agreement and the performance
thereof.

The Agreement was executed by Real Properties, LLC, by Eugene L. Rice as Manager,
by Glenn Trefren and Dennis L. Sallaz, as "Co-owners," and by Real Homes, LLC by Glenn
Trefren as "Co-owner."
It appears, from the express language of the Agreement ("If possible, the intent of the

parties should be asce1iained from the language of the agreement as the best indication of their
intent." Opportunity, L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602,607, 38 P.3d 1258, 1263 (2002)), as
confirmed by the evidence rrdduced at trial, that the intent of the parties was to transfer the
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member interests of Trefren and Sallaz in Real Homes, LLC, representing one hundred percent
member interests

to Real Properties,

consideration

the

payment of $250,000.00 by Real Properties, LLC, together with an attendant transfer of all real
property owned by Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC, for which no payment was
required.
B. The Claim

As noted previously, Count V alleges:
81. In the alternative, if this Court declares the purchase and sale agreement invalid or
unenforceable and does not quiet title to the above referenced assets and property in Real
Properties, LLC, Alternative Defendants Glenn Trefren, Dennis Sallaz, and Real Homes,
L.L.C. breached the Purchase and Sale Agreement by failing to convey good and
marketable title to Real Properties, LLC. 2
82. In the Purchase and Sale Agreement "Exhibit C" Alternative Defendants Glenn Trefren,
Dennis Sallaz, and Real Homes, L.L.C. warranted that they had authority to transfer good
and marketable title to Real Homes, L.L.C. and all its assets.
83. Alternative Defendants Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz made certain statements and
representations that they were owners and managers of Real Homes, L.L.C.
84. Alternative Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC purchased Real Homes, L.L.C. based upon
Alternative Defendants' warranties, representations, and statements.
85. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Alternative Plaintiff Real Properties,
LLC suffered the following damages:
a. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Alternative Plaintiff expended
$63,402.82 to extinguish the debt owing on 15580 Riverside Rd, Canyon County,
ID and prevent a foreclosure sale of the same.
b. Alternative Plaintiff paid the balance of a mortgage of $50,351.04 on the property
known as 714 Smith Ave. Nampa, ID and advanced $10,000 toward repairs and
improvements;
2

It would appear that Paragraph 81 should state that the claim is contingent on the court finding the Agreement
valid and enforceable, since the claim asserted in Count V is based upon the breach of certain warranties contained
in that Agreement.
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c. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Alternative Plaintiff expended
$5,000 as an advance payment to Dennis Sallaz;
d.
Plaintiff purchased lumber and materials which
have
unable
to use to improve the subject properties in an amount to be proven at trial but
believed to be in excess of $30,000.
e. Alternative Plaintiff expended money in managing, maintaining, improving and
paying property taxes on the subject properties in an amount to be proven at trial
but believed to be in excess of $84,000.
86. Alternative Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC is entitled to and hereby requests a money
judgment for the above referenced damages including prejudgment interest.
Based on the express language of Count V, Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC seeks damages
for Defendants' alleged breach of the warranties in the Agreement that Defendants had good and
marketable title to the membership interests in Real Homes, LLC and the absolute right to
transfer those interests. In the context of this action, this breach of warranty claim "sounds in
contract." Lewis v. CEDU Educational Services, Inc., 135 Idaho 139, 145, 15 P.3d 1147, 1153
(2008) ("breach of express warranty sounds in contract, and this claim is directly related to the
terms and provisions within the contract.").

It is important to note that Plaintiff did not assert a claim for damages for fraud or a claim
for rescission of the Agreement. Instead, Plaintiff seeks an award of damages to protect its
"expectation interest," or the benefit of the bargain, under the contract. Brown v. Yacht Club of
Coeur D'Alene, LTD., 111 Idaho 195, 198, 722 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 344 (1979)).
The elements of a claim for breach of contract are: (a) the existence of a contract; (b) the
breach of the contract; (c) the breach caused damages; and (d) the amount of those damages.
Mosel! Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., Inc., 297 P.3d 232,241 (2013). A breach of contract is
non-performance of any contractual duty of immediate performance. Buku Properties v. Clark,
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1

Idaho 828, 83 3 (2012). More specifically, a breach of contract consists of a failure, without
excuse, to perfonn any promise which forms the whole or part of a contract."
The burden of proof for showing the existence of a contract and breach is on the plaintiff

Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 747, 9 P.3d 1204, 1213 (2000). The
plaintiff also has the burden of proving causation and damages.
At trial, Plaintiff undertook to prove one specific issue: That Defendants Trefren and
Sallaz breached the warranties in the Agreement regarding: (1) their ownership of one hundred
percent of the membership interest in Real Homes, (2) their possession of good and marketable
title to such interest; and (3) their right to sell such interest, because Renee Baird, not Sallaz and
Trefren, owned the sole membership interest in Real Homes, LLC. Alternative
Plaintiffs/Co unterdefenda nts' Post Trial Brief, p. 21 ("The maturation of this claim depends

on the Court's findings on several issues addressed above- namely the actual ownership of Real
Homes, LLC as of January 6, 2006."); p. 25 ("The evidence demonstrated that the actual
member/mana ger of Real Homes, LLC (Renee Baird) has already settled this case with
Alternative Plaintiffs on behalf of Real Homes, LLC .... ").
III. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Defendants have moved to dismiss Count V, at least in part, because Plaintiff failed to

prove,primaf acie, that Renee Baird was a member of Real Homes, LLC at the time the
Agreement was executed. Final Argument and Authority to Support Motion for
Involuntary Dismissal of Alternative Plaintiffs' Count V, and Motion to Amend Pleadings
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to Conform to the Evidence Presented on the Counterclaims, p. 10 ("Renee Baird was never
a

IV.

of
Membership Interests: Idaho Law

Limited liability companies (LLCs) "are hybrid business entities, with attributes both of
corporations and partnerships. They provide their equity holders or 'members' with the liability
shield of corporations while giving them the benefit of partnership tax treatment." In re Avalon
Hotel Partners, LLC, 302 B.R. 377 380 (Bankr.D.Or.2003) (citing Blakemore, "Limited

Liability Companies and the Bankruptcy Code: A Technical Review," 13 Am. Bankr.Jnst. J 12
(1994)). Idaho LLCs are currently governed by the provisions of the Idaho Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act (Uniform Act), Idaho Code section 30-6-101 et seq., which became
effective July 1, 2008. Prior to enactment of the Uniform Act, Idaho LLCs were governed by the
Idaho Limited Liability Company Act (LLC Act), Idaho Code section 53-601 et seq. The LLC
Act remained in effect until June 30, 2010. Between June 1, 2008, and June 30, 2010, the
Uniform Act governed: (1) Idaho LLCs formed on or after July 1, 2008; and (2) LLCs formed
before July 1, 2008, that elected to be subject to the Uniform Act. There is no evidence in the
record that Real Homes, LLC was ever governed by the provisions of the Uniform Act during
the period relevant to the claims asserted in this action.
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 53-601(10), a "member" of an LLC is "a person or
persons who have been admitted to membership in a limited liability company as provided in
section 53-640, Idaho Code .... " Pursuant to Idaho Code section 53-640(l)(a), a person may
become a member of a limited liability company by "acquiring a limited liability company
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directly from the limited liability company, upon compliance with an operating

"
A "limited liability company interest" is "the interest that can be assigned under section
53-636, Idaho Code, and charged under section 53-637, Idaho Code." LC. § 53-601(7). "A
limited liability company interest may be issued in exchange for cash, property, services
rendered, gurantee of an obligation of the limited liability company, a promissory note or other
obligation to contribute cash or property or to perform services, or other valuable consideration."
I.C. § 53-626.

V. Plaintiff's Evidence
Plaintiff relied primarily upon the testimony of Renee Baird, together with certain
documents introduced into evidence during Baird's testimony, to prove that Renee Baird was the
only member of Real Homes, LLC at the time the Agreement was executed.
Ms. Baird testified that Real Homes, LLC was formed in January 2001 to purchase and
sell real property. Ms. Baird also testified that she "owned" Real Homes, LLC:
Q.

You owned the company?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Were there any other owners of the company?

A.

No.

Q.

You were the 100 percent owner?

A.

Yes.
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Ms. Baird was not asked, and did not testify, whether her interest in the company was
in exchange for cash, property, services rendered, gurantec of an obligation of the limited
liability company, a promissory note or other obligation to contribute cash or property or to
perform services, or other valuable consideration, as required by LC. § 53-626. In fact, Ms.
Baird testified that Defendant Sallaz "made" her the owner:
Q.

Why were you made the owner?

A.

In the course of the way Dennis has always practiced in business, he does

not put himself on the corporations or LLC or whatever. We were maITied, and so he put
me on as 100 percent. And it was - it was 50/50. I mean, it's the way I always looked at
it he wasn't on it, but we made the decisions together.

Q.

He was from the beginning going to be part of the - the company?

A.

Yeah. Making - yes.

During the course of her testimony, Ms. Baird also identified Plaintiffs Exhibit 24 as a
true and coITect copy of the operating agreement for Real Homes, LLC. Ms. Baird testified that
she signed the operating agreement on January 19, 2001, and that Exhibit 24 represents the
complete operating agreement that she signed:
Q.

Ms. Baird, how many pages is the operating agreement?

A.

It appears all the pages are here. And 21 pages.

On cross-examination, Ms. Baird was asked:
Q.

And on page 2, is that where it says that you are the 100 percent member?

A.

Yes.
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Paragraph 2.1, on page 2 of Exhibit 24, includes the following:
2.1
Names, Addresses and Initial Contributions. The names and addresses of
the initial members of the LLC, and the agreed value of their respective initial capital
contributions and initial percentage ownership interests in the LLC (the "Sharing Ratios")
are as stated in the chart below . . . . Each of the members as his initial contribution

has contributed his undivided one-half (1/2) interest in and to those certain two
parcels of commercial real estate, more particularly described in on Exhibit A
attached hereto, together with all appurtenances, and any existing leases, contracts or
agreements relating thereto.
Name and address

Agreed Value of Contribution

Sharing Ratio

Renee Baird
1000 S. Roosevelt
Boise, Idaho 83 705

$50,000

100%

(emphasis added).
However, there is no real property description attached to Exhibit 24, which Ms. Baird
testified was a complete copy of the operating agreement for Real Homes, LLC. Plaintiff did not
ask Ms. Baird, and she did not testify, regarding whether she ever contributed any interest in
commercial real estate to Real Homes, LLC.

VI. Analysis
As Idaho Code section 53-640(1) provided at all times relevant to this action, a person
could become a member in a limited liability company by acquiring a limited liability interest
directly from the company upon compliance with an operating agreement. Pursuant to Idaho
Code section 53-626, a limited liability company interest could be issued in exchange for cash,
property, services rendered, guarantee of an obligation of the company, a promissory note or
other obligation to contribute cash or property or to perform services, or other valuable
consideration.
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According to Plaintiff's Exhibit 24, the operating agreement of Real Homes, LLC

those certain two parcels of commercial real estate, more particularly deseribed in on Exhibit A
attached hereto," in exchange for an interest in the LLC.
Plaintiff did not elicit any testimony from Ms. Baird explaining the clear contradiction
between the above language regarding the initial contribution of "each member" and her
assertion that she was the only member of Real Homes, LLC. In addition, Plaintiff did not
adduce any evidence that Ms. Baird actually contributed, or that she was able to contribute, the
real property interest described in the operating agreement. Finally, Plaintiff failed to adduce any
evidence that Ms. Baird actually provided any of the forms of consideration identified in section
53-626 in exchange for her claimed membership interest in Real Homes, LLC.
Based on the lack of any evidence that Ms. Baird provided consideration in exchange for
her claimed interest in Real Homes, the court concludes that Plaintiff has not established that Ms.
Baird was a member, much less the only member, of Real Homes, LLC at the time of execution
of the Agreement. Since Plaintiff based its Count V breach of contract claim on establishing that
Ms. Baird was the only member of Real Homes, LLC, the court also concludes that Plaintiff
failed to prove all the required elements of its Count V breach of contract claim and Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Count V must be granted. 3

3

For the same reason, even if the court had granted Plaintiff's Motion to Amend to include a claim for unjust

enrichment based upon the facts alleged in Count V, Plaintiffs claim would still be properly dismissed on the

evidence.
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COUNTERCLAIM COUNT I
In Counterclaim Count I, Glenn Trefren, on his own behalf and as assignee of Defendant
Sallaz, seeks damages for breach of the Agreement:
102. That Defendant's [sic] did transfer all right, title and interests in and to all
property owned by Real Homes, LLC, and Plaintiffs [sic] have only paid the the
$63,402.82 Note and Deed of Trust and the $5,000.00 advance, for a total of $68,402.82,
but failed and/or refused to pay any of the remainder, leaving a balance owed of
$181,597.18, and is breach [sic] of the Purchase and Sale Agreement as a result thereof.
Real Homes, LLC is not a party to the counterclaim and has not asserted any claim with
respect to the real property transferred to Real Properties, LLC pursuant to the Agreement.
As noted previously, to support a recovery on Count I, Trefren had to prove: (a) the
existence of a contract; (b) the breach of the contract; (c) the breach caused damages; and (d) the
amount of those damages. Masell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., Inc., 297 P.3d 232,241
(2013).

A. Existence of a Contract
When consideration supports a distinct and common understanding of the parties, the
understanding becomes an enforceable contract. Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91 Idaho 605,607,
428 P.2d 524, 526 (1967). A promisee's bargained-for action or forbearance, given in exchange
for a promise, constitutes consideration. Id. (citing Restatement, Contracts,§ 75 (1932)).
The express language of the Agreement, together with the evidence adduced at trial, is
sufficient to establish that Real Properties, LLC and Sallaz and Trefren had a distinct and
common understanding that Sallaz and Trefren would transfer their member interests in Real
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Homes, LLC, and Real Homes, LLC would transfer all real property it owned4 , to Real
return for payment of $250,000.00 to Sallaz and Trefren.
On the issue of consideration, Sallaz and Trefren promised to transfer their member
interests in Real Homes, LLC in return for the promise of payment by Real Properties, LLC.
With respect to the member interests in Real Homes, LLC, in contrast to the testimony of Ms.
Baird elicited by Plaintiffs in support of their breach of contract claim, Counterclaimants
provided sufficient unrebutted evidence, in the form of testimony by both Sallaz and Trefren,
that they contributed valuable consideration in support of their member interests to satisfy the
requirements of Idaho Code section 53-626. For instance, Sallaz testified:
Q.

And that refers to members, contributions, and interests?

A.

Oh, yeah. That was mandatory

****
A.

Well, of course it was Glenn and I. We were the owners. We did the

whole thing. It was my money.

Q.

And in terms of the agreed value of contribution, do you see that, 25,000

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Is that where you put in cash and Glenn put in the equivalent value of

each?

materials?
4

There was conflicting evidence adduced at trial as to whether one specific parcel of prope1ty, generally referred to
as "15584 Riverside," was owned by Real Homes, LLC at the time of the Agreement and/or transferred by Real
Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC pursuant to the Agreement. The court need not determine that issue to resolve
the claims in this action.
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A.

Well, yeah. And plus he did have a little cash that we were spending at
together. So

point getting

- he had a good, strong

grand as well as my

cash.
Q.

And was it ever intended to have fewer than two members?

A.

Never.

Q.

And was it ever intended to have more than two members.

A.

Absolutely not. It was our deal. We built it and we're going to sell it.

And we're going to split 50/50, win or lose.

5

Trefren provided similar testimony regarding his and Sallaz's contributions to Real
Homes, LLC. In light of this testimony by both Trefren and Sallaz that they were the only
members of Real Homes, that they each had a fifty percent interest, and the nature and agreed
value of their contributions ("An 'operating agreement' is any agreement, written or oral among
all the members as to the conduct of the business and affairs of a limited liability company.) LC.
§ 53-601(11) (emphasis added)), the court concludes that Treferen has established that there was
consideration supporting the mutual understanding of the parties as set forth in the Agreement.

5

This testimony was given in response to questions regarding Defendant's Exhibit A, which Mr. Sallaz testified was
a "form operating agreement" that he created. Exhibit A was never admitted into evidence, so it would be improper
for the court to rely on it as substantive evidence in this decision. See Cro!lard v. Crollard, 104 Idaho 189, 190, 657
P.2d 486, 487 (Ct. App. 1983) ("Answers to interrogatories are not part of the pleadings and are not considered
evidence unless introduced as such at trial. ... It has been held that error sufficient to reverse a judgment occurs
when a judge has used interrogatories that have not been introduced into evidence, to establish a fact by inference.").
Exhibit A was marked for identification during Defendants' cross-examination of Renee Baird, Defendants offered
Exhibit A for Admission, and the cowt sustained an objection to its admission. Exhibit A was never again offered
for admission and was not admitted into evidence. However, counsel for both Plaintiffs and Defendants questioned
witnesses with respect to Exhibit A.
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B. Breach of the Contract
A

of contract is non-performance of any contractual duty of immediate

performance. Buku Properties v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 833 (2012). More specifically, a breach
of contract consists of a failure, without legal excuse, to perfonn any promise which forms the
whole or part of a contract." Id.
Counterclaimants have adduced sufficient evidence to establish that Real Properties, LLC
breached the Agreement by failing to make payment as promised and that such breach caused
damages.

I. Affirmative Defenses
Real Properties, LLC has asserted a number of affirmative defenses to Count I, including
that Real Properties' performance was excused due to Counterclaimant's breach of the
Agreement (Eighth and Eighteenth Affirmative Defenses) and Counterclaimant's failure to
comply with Real Homes, LLC's operating agreement. The burden of proving the existence of a
contract and fact of its breach is upon the plaintiff, and once those facts are established, the
defendant has burden of pleading and proving affirmative defenses, which legally excuse
performance. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 747, 9 P.3d 1204, 1213
(2000) (citing O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796,813,810 P.2d 1082, 1099 (1991)).
"If a breach of contract is material, the other party's performance is excused." JP.

Stravens Planning Associates, Inc. v. City of Wallace, 129 Idaho 542, 545, 928 P.2d 46, 49
(Ct.App.1996). A material breach of contract occurs as the result of "'a non-performance of [a]
duty that is so material and important as to justify the [non-breaching party] in regarding the
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whole transaction as at an end." Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 740, 536 P.2d
4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 946 at 809 (1951

735 (1

is one that touches the fundamental purpose of the contract and defeats the object of the parties
in entering into the contract. JP. Stravens, 129 Idaho at 545.
As evidenced by the language of the Agreement quoted above, the fundamental purpose
of the contract between Trefren and Sallaz, as "co-owners" of Real Homes, LLC, and Real
Properties LLC was the transfer of all of the ownership interest in Real Homes, LLC. As
Defendants/Counterclaima nts' counsel stated at trial, "[t]here is no document in existence, dated
January 6, 2006, in which any sellers therein conveyed Real Homes property as we have a

two

sellers, Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Trefren, who are selling or assigning their ownership interest to Real
Properties, LLC." In furtherance of that purpose, Trefren and Sallaz covenanted to Real
Properties that they had the "absolute right to sell, assign and transfer same to Buyer . . . without
any breach of any agreement to which" they were a party.
As noted previously, Defendants' Exhibit A, which was generally identified as
Defendants/Counterclaima nts' version of the operating agreement for Real Homes, LLC was
never admitted into evidence. However, both Sallaz and Trefren testified that they had a written
operating agreement for Real Homes, LLC and that Exhibit A was a true and correct copy of that
Agreement. In addition, Mr. Sallaz testified that he authored Exhibit A and that it is identical to
Plaintiff's Exhibit 24 in all but three specific respects:
Q.
excuse me

Is this particular operating agreement [Exhibit 24] an identical copy
identical 21-page with essentially three changes?
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A.

Well, yeah. It's a model to the original.

Sallaz then identified the three provisions of the two agreements that were not identical:
(1) Paragraph 2.1 ("Names, Addresses and Initial Contributions"); (2) Paragraph 5.1 ("Books of

Account"); and the signature page.
Based on the evidence before it, the court finds that Exhibit 24 is a true and accurate
representation of Defendants/Counterclaimants' operating agreement, with the exception of the
above-noted variances.
Pursuant to Section 9.2 of Exhibit 24:
Events of Dissolution. Except as otherwise provided in this Operating
Agreement, the LLC shall dissolve upon the earlier of ... (b) sale of all or substantially
all of the LLC's assets ....
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 53-642, a "limited liability company is dissolved and its
affairs shall be wound up upon the happening of the first to occur of the following: (1) At the
time or upon the occurrence of events specified in writing in the articles of organization or an
operating agreement" (emphasis added). Idaho Code section 53-644 authorized persons winding
up the business or affairs of a limited liability company to perform a number of actions, none of
which includes the transfer of membership interests to third parties.
Based upon the evidence before it, the court finds that the property transferred by Real
Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC pursuant to the Agreement constituted all or substantially
all of Real Homes, LLC's assets. By operation of the terms of the operating agreement and
applicabie Idaho statutes, Real Homes dissolved upon execution of the Agreement. Upon such
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dissolution, Real Homes, LLC's business and affairs were required to be wound up. The
statute did not authorize the transfer of a member interest

the winding up process.

In light of the above, the court concludes that Treferen and Sallaz breached the covenant
that they had the "absolute right to sell, assign and transfer same to Buyer ... without any
breach of any agreement to which" they were a party and, in fact, were not authorized to transfer
the member interests in Real Homes to Real Properties. In addition, the court concludes that
such breach defeated the fundamental purpose of the Agreement, as between Trefren and Sallaz
as "co-owners" and Real Properties, LLC, to transfer all of the ownership interest in Real
Homes, LLC to Real Properties. Accordingly, Count I of the Counterclaim is dismissed.

COUNTERCLAIM COUNT II
In Count II of their Counterclaim, Trefren and Tradesman allege:
105.

106.

107.

Plaintiffs contracted with Glenn Trefren and Tradesman ... for goods and
services to be used for the maintenance of the properties at issue in this
litigation.
That Glenn Trefren and Tradesman Contractors & Construction, LLC did
provide materials and services used in the maintenance and improvements
of the subject matter properties as agreed, until they were prevented from
performance by the actions and/or requests of Plaintiffs.
That Plaintiff's failed and or refused to pay Glenn Trefren or Tradesman
Contractors & Construction, LLC for the goods and services they did
perform and are in breach of the agreement as a result thereof in an
amount to be proven at trial.

I. Count II: Prior to and Through Trial
Prior to the trial of this action, Plaintiff filed a Motion in Limine seeking an order
precluding Counterclairnants from introducing evidence of damages on Count II, because
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Defendants served discovery responses stating that they are not seeking damages for goods or
or
At the hearing on Plaintiffs Motion, Counterclaimants' confirmed that Counterclaimants
were not seeking damages for labor or materials but for Mr. Trefren's "services as the general
contractor." Counterclaimants apparently contend that Mr. Trefren's labor is somehow exempt
from Plaintiffs' interrogatory seeking information regarding "the cost(s) for any and all labor for
which you are seeking reimbursement in Count II of your Counterclaim" (even though
Counterclaimants' counsel also stated, at the hearing, that the claim is for "his unpaid labor"),
because such labor constitutes services Mr. Trefren provided as general contractor. It is this
statement of the substance of Plaintiffs claim upon which Plaintiff, and the court, went into the
trial of this action.
The court concludes that Counterclaimants are precluded from recovering damages
pursuant to Count II for services rendered by Trefren and/or Tradesman as a general contractor,
pursuant the Idaho Contractor Registration Act (the Act), Idaho Code section 54-5201 et seq.,
because Counterclaimants have not alleged or proved that either Trefren or Tradesman was a
duly registered contractor or was exempt from registration.

A. The Act
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 54-5217(2):
No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, unless
otherwise exempt, may bring or maintain any action in any court of this state for the
collection of compensation for the performance of any act or contract for which
registration is required by this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a duly
registered contractor, or that he was otherwise exempt as provided for in this chapter, at
all times during the performance of such act or contract.
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defines "contractor" broadly,

section 54-5203:

(4) "Contractor" means:
(a) Any person who in any capacity undertakes, offers to undertake, purports to have the
capacity to undertake, or submits a bid to, or does himself or by or through others,
perform construction; or
(b) A construction manager who performs construction management services.

3) "Construction" means the performance of building, altering, repairing, adding to,
subtracting from, improving, reconstructing, moving, excavating, wrecking or
demolishing any building, highway, road, bridge, or other structure, project, development
or improvement to real property, or to do any part thereof, including the erection of
scaffolding or other structures or works in connection therewith.
Counterclaimants allege that they "contracted" with Plaintiff for the maintenance and
improvement of the real property at issue in this action. The evidence adduced at trial is clear
that Trefren and/or Tradesman engaged in "construction" in performance of the alleged contract.
Counterclaimants are precluded from maintaining an action for the collection of compensation
for the performance of the alleged contract without alleging and proving that they were
registered and/or exempt from registration.
II. Count II: Post-Trial

In a four-page narrative at pages 16-19 of their Closing Argument and Response to
Alternative Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants' Post-Trial Brief and Opening Argument,
Counterclaimants make several new, and vague, assertions regarding claims, and regarding their
entitlement to judgment on Count II, despite the failure to plead the fact of compliance with the
Act or exemption therefrom.
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Venture
contends that he is,

fact, seeking to enforce a partnership or joint venture

agreement between himself, Sallaz, and Roy Rice, in which Trefren was entitled to receive onethird of the profits "pursuant to his perception and understanding he was involved in a three-way
profit splitting arrangement that was represented to include these four parcels of property, along
with the Melba property, and any other properties, which were then in the process of being
acquired through loans advanced by D.L. Evans Bank, upon the use of the four parcels as
collateral to get the funds to make these purchases." Closing Argument and Response, p. 17.
This argument fails for a number of reasons.
First, this is a distinctly different claim from that asserted in Count II and from that
asserted by Trefren in response to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine and there is no basis for the court
to conclude that the parties tried this claim by consent.
Second, Trefren has not identified any competent evidence in the record that supports the
conclusion that a partnership was created between himself, Sallaz and Rice. "(A] mere
agreement to share in profits, of itself constitutes neither a partnership nor a joint adventure.
There must be other facts, showing that relationship to have been the intention of the parties, or
such as to estop a denial of it as against third parties." J\lfoon v. Ervin, 64 Idaho 464,472, 133
P.2d 933, 937 (1943). Trefren testified:
A.

No. I'm just claiming payment for what I have done. Didn't do it as a

general contractor. I did it as an owner. Now, I realize Roy's name was on the property.
But we had made an agreement between ourselves to finish these properties, boy, and
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we'll take all the moneys, and ...
a

just work our way right through these. We'll

little chunk of profit, because there is a lot of profit here, and we will go to

Melba, where we're going to do this great big storage unit where we're even going to
have a third ....
Q.

When was that agreement made?

A.

Before he even signed that contract.

Q.

The January -

A.

When we went over and looked at all the properties at the lake and drove

around to the

we drove around to all the properties. We talked about those. I told him

about the property out at Melba. We had even went out and had a look at it. It came a
little while later, but we were talking about let's finish these properties. We'll just finish
them one at a time. We'll split the money when we get done.
Q.

That agreement, that took place

A.

At 30 percent. Or one-third. Not 30. One-third owner. We were going to

sell everything at the end when it was all done, we were going to divvy it up one-third.
Q.

That agreement took place before January 6, 2006; correct?

A.

We talked about it, yes we did.

Q.

You said that there was an agreement. When did the agreement take

place?
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A.

Are

talking about the oral agreement? Or are you talking about the
The oral agreement we had many

We must have talked about

it eight to ten different times.
So, Trefren's testimony was that, prior to Real Properties, LLC even acquiring the
properties at issue from Sallaz and Trefren, Roy Rice agreed to split the profits from the
development of such properties evenly with Sallaz and Trefren and then committed to pay Sallaz
and Trefren $250,000.00 to acquire the properties from them so that the parties could then split
the profits from their sale three ways. The court does not find this testimony credible.
Third, and related, is the absence of sufficient competent and credible evidence in the
record to find the existence of an enforceable agreement. In order for a contract to be formed
there must be a meeting of the minds. Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 703, 779
P.2d 15, 17 (1989). A meeting of the minds is evidenced by a manifestation of intent to contract
which takes the fom1 of an offer and acceptance. Id The "meeting of the minds" must occur on
all material terms to the contract. Dursteler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230, 233-34, 697 P.2d 1244,
1247-48 (Ct.App.1985). Trefren's testimony is simply too vague to support the existence of the
alleged partnership/jo int venture contract.
· B. Exemption from Registration

Trefren also posits that he "should or could be considered to be exempt from any
regulation under the Contractor Registration Act under the provision of LC. § 54-5205(2)(m)
(owners of commercial property who themselves perform maintenance, repair, alteration, or
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work on their own properties)." There are at least two problems with this

First, there is no evidence in the record that the properties at issue were "commercial
properties," within the meaning of the Act. All the evidence adduced at trial identifies the
subject properties as residential properties, not subject to the exemption cited. In fact, based on
Counterclairn ants' own contentions ("Mr. Trefren's services could be seen as having been
undertaken as a part of, or as an extension of, the Purchase Agreement itself, given the
inducement he was led to believe he would be paid from profits that would be coming also from
those parcels, as part of the greater development venture he was promoted by Mr. Rice to
believe, as Mr. Rice obviously wanted Mr. Trefren to continue to be engaged in the development
that had already been started, and to continue his services in the direction of finishing the

houses, as there were three more out on Riverside still up on cribbing that needed to be
finished." Closing Argument and Response, p. 18 (emphasis added)). This statement would
most properly invoke the exclusion from exemption set forth in Idaho Code section 545205(2)(1):
An owner performing construction on the owner's personal residential real property,
whether or not occupied by the owner, provided however, this exemption shall not
apply to an owner who is othenvise regulated by this chapter who constructs a
building, residence or other improvemen t on the owner's property with the
intention and for the purpose of promptly selling the improved property, unless the
owner has continuously occupied the property as the owner's primary residence for
not less than twelve (12) months prior to the sale of such property.
( emphasis added).
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~~·v~,,~. there is no evidence in the record that Trefren and/or Tradesman was either the

owner or lessee of

at issue, as required for application of the exemption set forth in

section 54-5205(2)(m).
C. Construction Manager

Trefren also asserts that he was not required to plead or prove compliance with the Act,
because "[a]s the evidence demonstrates, Mr. Trefren engaged his services in the nature of a
superintendent and construction manager . ... " Closing Argument and Response, p. 17

(emphasis added). It is not clear to the court how Counterclaimants contend that this asserted
fact eliminates the requirement to plead and prove registration or exemption therefrom.
As noted previously, the Act defines "contractor" broadly, in section 54-5203:
(4) "Contractor" means:
(a) Any person who in any capacity undertakes, offers to undertake, purports to have the
capacity to undertake, or submits a bid to, or does himself or by or through others,
perform construction; or
(b) A construction manager who performs construction management services.
(emphasis added). Again, the evidence, and Counterclaim ants' own contentions, place Mr.
Trefren squarely under the requirements of the Act.

D. Quantum Meruit/Unjust Enrichment
Finally, Counterclaim ants assert that, despite the evidence that Trefren is seeking
recovery for services that require registration under the Act and the fact that Trefren failed to
plead or prove the fact of registration or exemption therefrom, Trefren is entitled to recover on
Count II "under one sort or another of a contract that shouid be implied in fact, or a contract that
should be implied in law, and his right to recover the "value" of his "services" is best formulated
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the

of an implied contract

fact, as he is entitled to recover the reasonable value

pursuant to the theory of recovery under quantum meruit, as described in more
detail in our initial memorandum." Closing Argument and Response, p. 18. 6 This assertion
ignores the fact that the language of section 54-5217(2), quoted above, refers to "compensation
for the performance of any act" for which registration is required, and is not limited simply to

a claim based on an express contract.
In addition, Trefren has not identified any competent evidence in the record establishing
the amount of the reasonable value of his services, as opposed to his testimony regarding his
expected "share" of each parcel of property at issue.
Based on the foregoing, Counterclaim Count II is dismissed.
COUNTERCLAIM COUNT III
In Counterclaim Count III, Counterclaimants seek recovery for unjust enrichment under
the Agreement and "as a result thereof ... the contract and all property transfers should be set
aside with parties being returned to their respective pre Purchase Sale Agreement Positions."
The court first notes that Counterclaimants have not adduced any authority for the
proposition that a rescission remedy is appropriate on an unjust enrichment claim.
More importantly, "[r]ecovery cannot be had for unjust enrichment where there is an
express contract covering the same subject matter. Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 642, 249
6

Apparently, the latter part of this sentence refers to Counterclaimants' Motion to Amend the Counterclaim at the
close of trial. Once again, the court notes that Counterclaimants have adduced no basis for the court to conclude that
the parties tried the issue of an implied contract, based upon the allegations in Count II, by consent. In fact, while
Counterclaimants apparently request that the court view Count II broadly in order to support a recovery in their
favor, they ignore the fact that they first raised the issue that Trefren was acting as a contractor in order to justify not
responding to Plaintiff's discovery requests regarding the damages claimed on Count If, based on their very narrow
of Plaintiff's
requests. The court declines the invitation to reward this strategy.
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P.3d 829, 836 (2011). "The reason for this rule presently is that the remedies for breach of an
contract, whether

law or by express

afford adequate relief." Id. (quoting

Triangle Min. Co., Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 753 F.2d 734, 742 (9th Cir.1985)). "[O]nly when

the express agreement is found to be enforceable is a court precluded from applying the equitable
doctrine of unjust enrichment in contravention of the express contract." Id (quoting Wolford v.
Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 1064, 695 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1984)).

Since the court found that the Agreement was enforceable against Plaintiff: Counterclaim
Count III is also dismissed.
ORDER

This Memorandum Decision constitutes the court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law pursuant to Rule 52(a), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS SO ORDERED .

. -/,£~-

Dated this

'7..3 day of February, 2014.

District Judge
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)

)
)

compm1y,

)

Plain tiffs,
vs.

DENNIS SALLI\.Z, GLE NN

TREFREN, and TRADESMAN
CONTRACTORS and CONSTRUCTION,
L.LC ., an Idaho limit ed liabi lity company, and

REA L HOM ES, LLC , an Idah o limi ted liability

company,

Defe ndan ts,
And Related Cou nterc laim s

)
)
)
)
)
)

JUD GM ENT

CV-2009-11

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJ UDG ED, AND DEC
REE D that

the Complaint filed in

this actio n is dism issed , with preju dice; and it
is fruther ORD ERE D, ADJ UDG ED, AND
DEC REE D that the Cou nterc laim filed in this
actio n is also dism issed , wiih prejudice.

JUDGMENT
1.

. -, ,. ,., ,r,.,f ,.~~L

vJ

~".J:=1::3
Qd'i:!ml'vlS

>JCI
Tr

rr :mi :[1D
B8f30TE[E

':Jli : LT

TTLEL t, f't, 100[1

# "d3'::;

9Z.9LVSiPB0Z.

><iJ .::J

ST:t T rTOC:/8C:/c.[1

3~'Hl

'.::;ldr!Cl:::.i /,lrW11J::J HD/sH'v':)

131

3\•J\1H

BC: /c.li

. .·' 1 .

Ii~. .

N0. Jjj

3,]l]H
1Tl'3 3d
('.::;)3'.:)Vd
t .J[I I 1 tidriO
3H\1tl./ . Cit~ >:\1.::J
3HI1 '31\:1 0

i

·. '.:J11I •;'.::; I DH '•./EF.'. IF I CAT I rn l PEF'CIPT

02/28/2 014 17:25

TIME
t·lAME

CAHV1JH CC!UHT\1 CIJIJF'T'.3

FAX
TEL
SEP.#

2084547525

000L9J473711

9]45'3'3132
OD: 0:::: 50

DUF:ATIDtl

F'A(3E ('.::;)

F'ESULT
MODE

E ;

V

---A .M.
fijij

.~.

Q

':f'D3 PM.

2 8 iPV!

CANYON COUNTY CLSAK
K CANNON, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRI CT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICI AL DISTRI CT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

EUGEN E RICE and JANET RICE, husband and
wife, and REAL
PROPERTIES, LL.C., an Idaho limited liability

cornpany,

)
)
)

)
)

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.

)

DENNI S SALLA Z, GLENN
TREFREN, and TRADE SMAN

)
)
)

CONTRACTORS and CONSTRUCTION,
L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability company, and
,-.._.~"'J HOMES,
an
Limited
company,

JUDGMENT

)

)
)
)
)

CV-2009- l 1855-C

)

PROPERTIES,

)

an

)

compan y,

)
)

Plaintiff s,

)

vs.
DENN1S SALLA Z, GLENN

TREFREN, and TRADESMAN
CONTRACTORS and CONSTRUCTION,
L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability compan y, and
REAL HOMES, LLC, an Idaho limited liability

company,

Defenda nts.
And Related Counterclaims

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1855-C

)

lT IS HEREB Y ORDERED, ADJUD GED, AND DECRE ED that the Complaint filed in
this action is dismissed, with prejudice~ and it is further ORDER ED, ADJUD GED,
AND
DECRE ED that the Counter claim filed in this action is also dismisse d, with prejudic
e.
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Iver J. Longeteig (ISB 1051)
5304 Turrett
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 342-5995
(208)
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14

~~uuu;;~

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
S BROWN, DEPUTY

Vernon K. Smith (ISB 1365)
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone (208) 345-1125
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE,
husband and wife, REAL HOMES, L.L.C.
and REAL PROPERTIES, L.L.C., an
Idaho Limited Liability Company,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants,

)
)

)

vs.

)

DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN,
and TRADESM AN CONTRACTORS
and TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS
AND CONSTRUCTION L.L.C., an Idaho
Limited Liability Company,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 09-11855

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION;
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW; MOTION TO CLARIFY
ASPECTS OF DECISIO N AS IT
RELATES TO THE APPLICATION
OF CLAIM AND ISSUE PRECLUSION

)
)

___ ___ ___ _ )
IN THE ALTERNATIVE

)
)

EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE,
husband and wife, and REAL
PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,

)
)
)

)

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; FINDING OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; MOTION 1'0 CLARIFY ASPECTS
AS TO THE
APPLlC\TlON OF CLA!M
iSSUE PRECLUSION
P. l

)

Plaintiff s/Count er Defendants,

)

)

vs.

)
)

DENNIS SALLA Z, GLENN TREFR EN,
and TRADE SMAN CONTR ACTOR S
AND CONST RUCTIO N L.L.C., an Idaho
Limited Liability Company,

)
)
)
)

Defenda nts/Cou nterclaim ants.

)

)

COMES NOW the Defendants/Counterclaimants herein, by and through their respecti
ve
attorneys of record, V emon K. Smith and Iver J. Longeteig, and do herewith request this
Court to
1.) Reconsi der certain aspects of its Memora ndum Decisio n and content of its Judgme
nt entered

Februar y 28, 2014, pursuant to Rule ll(a) (2)(B) I.R.C.P.,
2.) To alter or amend its findings of fact and conclus ion of law containe d
within the
Memora ndum Decisio n pursuant to Rule 52(b) l.R. C.P., and
3 .) To otherwi se provide appropriate and needed clarification, as deemed consiste
nt with the
facts presented, as it relates to the application of claim and issue preclusi on, stemmin
g from
those findings and conclusions made and entered by the Court, thereby providin g future
direction
for the parties to address the relief to which these moving parties are entitled to pursue,
given the
Court's Decisio n the fundamental purpose of the contract came to an end and is void,
as rendered
by the Court in this action.

INTRODUCTION
This Court has found there was, in fact, a contract entered into between certain
contracting parties, that being Dennis Sallaz, Glen Trefren, and Real Properties, LLC,
and that
the Buyer therein, Real Properties LLC, did, in
balance

upon the purchase price

breach that contract, by failing to pay the

:Niemorandum

and as a result

that
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factually established breach, the Court did find, as a factual matter, that the breach
of Real
had

caused damages. (See Memora ndum page 23).
contained in the Courts Decisio n,

did confirm the

evidence established that the "intent" of the parties when entering into the contract
, was to
"transfer" the "membership interest" of Dcn11is Sallaz and Glen Trefren, who together
held 100%
of the membership interest in Real Homes, LLC, and that "transfer" of interest was to
go to Real
Properties, LLC, a limited liability compan y owned, operated, and manage d by Roy Rice
and his
wife Janet Rice. The Court found the "intent" of the parties is demons trated by the very
title of
the contract itself, as the contract is referred to as the "Purcha se Agreem ent for Sale of
Interest in
Real Homes, LLC", and furthermore the "intent" is embellished by the reference containe
d in the
"Where as" clause itself, where it states: "It is the mutual desire of the parties hereto
that sellers
shall sell to the buyer all of said "ownership interest" and all right, title and interest in
and to all
real properties owned by Real Homes, LLC, as set forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto".
This
Court did find that the fundamental purpose and intent was the sale of the ownership
interests,
which included along with it, the "attenda nt transfer" of the real property referred to
and being
described therein.
The Court, thereafter, undertook to conduct a very detailed analysis of the "operati
ng
agreement" of Real Homes, LLC, as it relates to the consequential effects of "transferring"
all or
substantially all of its assets, and the Court concluded those "real property interests" describe
d in
Exhibit "A'' to the contract constituted "all or substantially all" of the entities' assets,
and as a
consequence of the expression of such a "mutual desire" to sell "all right, title, and
interest" in
and to all real property owned by Real Homes, LLC,

expressed desire "triggered" a
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provision that required commencement of dissolution proceedings of Real Homes, LLC, and a
process was therefore mandated by the "operating agreement" of that entity.
thereupon found that if

was

Messers. Sallaz and

Trefren to transfer real property interests, also, that they would then no longer have any
"authority" (under the Operating Agreement) to "transfer" the "ownership interests" of the
members to the Buyer, and any attempt to do so would constitute a "breach" of the "operating
agreement" to which Messers. Sallaz and Trefren are the members therein, and therefore bound
thereby.
We certainly understand and appreciate the analysis of the Court, and it's "logical"
analysis of the "authority" issues and "consequences" of the transactions, but with all due
respect, the "intent" of the parties was to accomplish the transfer of the right to the ownership
and control of the parcels of real property, and it was never anyone's intent to create a
meaningless or void transaction. This "contract" was actually the first step in a larger venture
process, that being the fact the parties intended to continue their mutual involvement and
participation in a development venture, where each had a one third interest in the "profits" to be
generated in the development venture, and that "profit" would be generated from these and other
properties, all of which was being promoted under the inducements of Roy Rice, and his
insistence the parties to take the initial action now, as three of the parcels, referred to as the
Riverside parcels, (not including 15584 Riverside, as it had been "released" from the original
sale) were scheduled for a trustee sale, set to take place on January 16, 2006.
The Court will recall from the testimony presented at trial by both Messers. Sallaz and
Trefren that because of

concerns that had been discovered over the conduct of Renee Baird,

resulting from the deterioration of her relationship with Mr. Sallaz, that some reaction was in
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order, and a determi nation was made by Messers. Sallaz and Trefren, as Mr. Trefren
had to
protect his interest in

limited liability compan y, because of what they were experiencing with
funds, coupled

with

to move from the

residential property at 15584 Riverside, along with her contrary attitude and breach
of the
agreement that the 15584 parcel of property was being held in trust for the benefit
of Real
Homes, LLC, an agreeme nt that was made between Messers. Sallaz and Trefren when
that parcel
had been transfen ed out of Real Homes, LLC, to Dennis Sallaz (and later discover
ed to Renee
Baird), so Mr. Sallaz could obtain a loan to finance the ongoing develop ment venture
of those
various properties. Messers Sallaz and Trefren agreed that title to the three remainin
g parcels at
Riverside, along with the Smith property, would need to be "transferred" temporarily,
and for
security and safekeep ing purposes, to Tradesm an Contractors and Construction, LLC,
as that
company was owned exclusiv ely by Mr. Trefren and he would hold the property "in
trust" for
Real Homes, LLC. The Court has those "transfer" exhibits in the record, and
they were
undertaken, as the testimon y confirmed, to protect the property from any more of the
fraudulent
claims being asserted by Ms. Baird. In a similar fashion, the Court will recall the balance
of the
loan proceeds generate d from the loan of $105,00 0.00 taken out against 15584 Riversid
e, that
was given as collatera l for that loan in Februar y 2004, was also removed from the bank
account
of Real Homes, LLC, being that bank account maintain ed by Mr. Sallaz at DL Evans
bank in
Boise, Idaho. The balance of the account funds (but for the sum of $1,000.0 0) was withdraw
n by
Mr. Sallaz on or about May 7, 2004, just four days before Renee Baird was then
"fired" and
removed from the Sallaz law office. The real property that was transfer red out of Real
Homes,
LLC, and the withdra wal of the balance of the loan funds, was each being undertak
en upon the
rationale that Mr. Trefren had come to no longer harbor any reservation as to the
extent and
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degree of manipulation and fraud Ms. Baird was capable of doing, as she clearly would
seek to
undertake any course
was

needed to get her hands on Mr. Sallaz' assets, and Mr. Trefren

that,

those

from DL Evans Bank, and

also, at least temporarily, remove the parcels of property out of the LLC, either or both
assets
would someho w be wrongfully appropriated by Ms. Baird, as she had, prior to Septemb
er 2003,
held the "authority" in this Sallaz-Trefren LLC partnership venture, in her limited capacity
as the
"manager" of Real Homes, LLC. It was trne that Mr. Sallaz had removed her from that
position
as his "manag er" in September, 2003, but she seemed to show little concern about her
loss of
authority and "removal" from that managerial capacity where she was acting for him, as
she was
simply on the hunt, and interested only in taking whatever she could get her hands to
take and
keep for herself, as she was now best described as "persona non grotta". The docume
nts
supporting those events are contained in the Record of this case, and listed as among the
exhibits
presented at trial.
Consequently, it could be regarded to be a "true" statement to say that "all or substantially
all" of the assets (parcels of real property and bank accounts) of Real homes. LLC, were
taken
out of the existing corpus of Real Homes, LLC, at least temporarily, as they were being
relocated
or "transferred", for safekeeping, but none-the-less, was being done for the benefit and
in trust,
for Real Homes, LLC members, who consisted truly and lawfully as being Dennis Sallaz
and
Glen Trefren only, and NEVER Renee Baird. The basis for them taking that action was
more
than justified, as Ms. Baird had already shown her true colors when she had chosen to parlay
the
"quit claim" deed, that being the deed she had created, when she "transferred" 15584
Riverside
from Real Homes, LLC, on February 10, 2004, so Mr. Sallaz could get the operatin
g loan he
needed to fund the ongoing development.

She listed herself along with Mr. Sallaz, as the
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APPLiCATTON OP CLAIM AND

grantees which was to have been done solely so Mr. Sallaz could get the loan, and his having not
seen the documen t at the time, had no reason to believe or think somethin g detrimental would
result

that.

later,

course,

trne to her nature, she refused to honor the clear

understan ding why that title was changed temporar ily from real Homes, LLC, and fae only
reason for that transfer in the first place, as Messers. Sallaz and Trefren had agreed it was to be
held in trust by Mr. Sallaz, for the benefit of Real Homes, solely for the purpose to obtain the
loan they otherwise could not obtain in the name of the LLC itself,as it had no established credit,
and so they had to use Mr. Sallaz' s borrowin g capacity to get the loan, so they could further the
developm ent objectives envisione d by Dennis and Glen. Now that Ms. Baird had acquired this
"new found interest" in a parcel of real property, in which she had no interest whatsoever, she
refused to return that "quit claim" interest obtained in that process, and then refused to move
from the residential facility at 15584 Riverside, and by refusing to do either, Mr. Sallaz could not
accompli sh selling that parcel and residential facility, as now she had successfu lly clouded the
title, and now occupied the house, so it could not be sold, as was always the mutual "intent" of
Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren when the loan was obtained. The sales' proceeds to be generated
from the sale of 15584 Riverside were intended to be used to retire that loan, and what balance
remainin g would continue to be spent to advance the development. Instead, Ms. Baird artfully
claimed her infamous "commun ity interest" in that parcel of property, and continued to do so as
she then filed her Complain t for "divorce" from Mr. Sallaz in May 2004.
It is of some significant importance for this Court to fully appreciate the "landscape" in
which Messers. Sallaz and Trefren found themselves in dealing with Ms. Baird, and then the
traditional "restraini ng order" that later comprom ised his personal ability to go out and transact
another property loan in his name to get operating funds for their LLC. It was in that financial
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environment in which these three individuals (Sallaz, Trefren and Rice) were structur
ing their
develop ment

and it was their "mutual desire" and "mutual intent" to
m

transaction,

having to operate m that

environment. Messers Sallaz and Trefren were attempting to protect the real property
, the
remainder of the loan proceeds from the loan obtained on the 15584 Riverside parcel,
and their
"membership rights" from the greed and corruption of Ms. Baird, who was then on a rampage
to
11

upgrade her financial position, about which she thought she could avail herself from
what
11

Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren were doing in their land development venture, and she believed
she
needed to "get what she could", by virtue of her marriage" to Mr. Sallaz, as she was
soon to be
11

among the "unemp loyed and unwelcomed".
, Thusly, once Mr. Rice had come to conclude that he now wanted to embark upon
this
"develo pment venture" with Messers. Sallaz and Trefren, starting out with these parcels
of real
property they had ownersh ip already, he made it clear to them that it only made sense
to start
with the develop ment of those properties that Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren already owned
(or at
least controlled the "owners hip" to them), and what was then necessa ry for them to
do was to
decide what "vehicle " would be used to undertake the development of these parcels of
property,
bearing in mind the "manag ement and control" would be under Mr. Rice, as he v;ould
now be
the sole source of the financial requirements. It was decided that Mr. Rice wanted a
new LLC,
and into that he wanted the placeme nt of the parcels of real property, all of which was
logical,
and within keeping of the specific intent and the furtherance of the practical method
for the
"development venture project" to proceed, which meant the parcels of real property
were to be
transferred, NOT FROM REAL HOMES, LLC, but from Tradesm an Contrac
tors and
Construction, LLC, as Tradesm an then had the title to those properties. The agreeme
nt was that

MOTtON FOR RECONSil lFRATfON ; FINDING OF FACT, CONCLUS [ONS OP
LAW; MOTION TO CLARIFY ASPECTS AS TO THE
APPUCA TION OF CLA iM
no
ISSU!~ PRECLUSI ON
[' 6

the title would be conveyed to the "developing " entity, and to do that, the parcels needed to be
titled over to Real Properties,
before, as that was to be the

which Mr. Rice, at his instruction, had formed just two days
in which the development was to be undertaken, as these

parties were then intending to so embark upon, and it was the choice of the "Buyer", whether
that be considered to be Real Properties, LLC, or whether it be regarded to be Mr. Rice himself,
the fact remained it was Messrs. Rice, Sallaz and Trefren that wanted to conduct the
development of those properties in that particular vehicle or venue, and no one has any basis, let
alone have ever attempted to contest that fact or present it differently in this case.
Rather than place the "title" of these properties, once again back into the name of Real
Homes, LLC, as could have been done, the election was made instead by Mr. Rice to have Mr.
Trefren execute quitclaim deeds, that would effectively "transfer" title to the properties directly
to Real Properties, LLC, as that was where the "loans" would be processed, and that was where
the disbursements would come from, and where the development of the properties itself would
be conducted. By doing it that way, it was thought there would be no "title" complications to
arise with the "lending" bank, as the plan was to use these properties to "finance" the
development of the properties, and should Renee Baird ever later decide to "attempt" to expand
upon her greed by filing some bogus claim against Real Homes, LLC, it would never reach the
actual "title" to these properties. The Record in this case demonstrates that, in fact, she later did
attempt to cloud the title, by filing her Lis pendens, as the Record in this case does confirm. She
ultimately did embark on that avenue in her attempt at "civil" theft, when, on July 25, 2006, she
caused to be filed with the Canyon County Recorder's Office, in conjunction with the "divorce"
proceedings, through the instrumentality of her attorney, Debra Eismann, such a claim against
the "ownership" of those properties. It is to be noted by this Court that Ms. Baird did not
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undertake to file any claim in the name of, or on behalf of, Real Homes, LLC, but rather
her
focus of greed was

that she instead undertook to file a claim in her "own" name, as part of
any

explanation or

historical

that could

support any right of ownership by such a claim of "Renee Baird", individually, as she never
had
any historic involvement as an "individual", in such a capacity whatsoever, and she at
no time
ever appeared in the "chain of title" to any of these properties, save only and except for
the fact
she had "fictitiously" been successful in generating the appearance of an interest
in 15584
Riverside, as she created the "quitclaim" interest she created for herself, when she underto
ok the
transfer 15584 to Mr. Sallaz, and she included herself in the transfer of that ownersh
ip on
February 10, 2004. There was never any agreement for her to do that, and it was absolute
ly
contrary to what Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren had agreed to do.
Consequently, the objective of having the parcels of property placed in the name of,
and
titled to, Real Properties, LLC, was logical, consistent, and within the fundamental purpose
and
objective of the contracting parties, and it was part of the "mutual desire" and the "mutual
intent"
of these parties, and it proved to be the best alternative available to them at the time, and
it was
the most satisfactory arrangement from the standpoint of Roy Rice, as he owned Real Properti
es,
LLC. The intent of the "transfers" of the parcels of property, along with the "transfer"
of their
members' interest were intended to "come together", where it all would be held with
Real
Properties, LLC, as the loans, disbursements, construction transactions, and processi
ng of the
various stages of the development venture would only come through, and go through,
Real
Properties, LLC, in the final analysis. No one saw such a process as being a violatio
n of their
objectives or intended results, and there obviously has been no such claim of a resulting
breach
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or damage claimed or demonstrated to have resulted from the effects of that "combined"
transfer
of real property and membership interests in this "contract" between these parties.

i\s a consequence, there is no legal or factual basis for any of these Plaintiffs to assert a
"material" or "fundamental" "breach" in the "purpose" or "objective to be accomplished"
by
their contract, or any of the actions or process in the way it has now resulted, merely from
this
"bundling" or "combining" of Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren 's membership interests in Real
Homes,
LLC, with the conveyance of that real property. As the Record reflects, the "transfer" of
the real
property came from Tradesman, as that was being held by the "third party" source (Tradesm
an)
where title to the real property was being temporarily held for "safekeeping", as
it was
understood by all parties that Tradesman was the "repository" and the current resting place
of the
title to those parcels, and Tradesman was recognized to be a completely separate entity
whose
ownership was held exclusively by Mr. Trefren, alone. As this Court will recall, Mr.
Trefren
insisted upon and demanded his protection from Ms. Baird, and his holding title to
the real
property parcels was his way of securing his interest in it, and Tradesman was the best
way for
him to preserve not only his interest, but also to protect that of Mr. Sallaz, so it was agreed
title
would be held by it. But now, with this first stage of their development "contract" in
place on
January 6, 2006, they had to then take action to "convey" the parcels of real property
, as
otherwise there was no "real property" titled in the name of Real Homes, LLC, from
which to
develop. Ultimately, at some point in time, the real property had to be transferred to
the Rice
entity, and everyone knew that was required under the agreement they had entered
into.
Consequently, they represented the real property interests were to be conveyed. So the
member
interests, as well as the real property interests, were each necessarily being transfenecl,
which were to go into Real Properties, LLC, as that is the way Roy Rice wanted it to
be done,
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and this Court will find it rather difficult to point to an allegation or testimony where these
Plaintiffs have elected to say the earlier protection of
or

breach

real property assets constituted a

any warranty or representation regarding any unintended

application or effects of an operating agreement that could be "verbally" modified by the
"member s", which, arguably was verbally modified by the actions taken by the only members in
the LLC. If Messers. Sallaz and Trefren decided to "bundle" and "combine" the "assets" and
"interests" IN THE FASHION THEY DID, we would respectfully argue they had the right to do
so, as they were the 100% members of the LLC, just as this Court has so found the evidence to
have been in the trial of this case, and that result could be, and apparently was, what had resulted
from their action of combining those matters as they did. Consequently there could be no
actionable claim raised by these Plaintiffs, as Mr. Rice got what he wanted; got what he
bargained for; took the membership interests, as well as the title to the parcels of property; held
both in Real Properties, LLC, wanted to receive and hold both in that entity, and has never
complained, let alone claimed any such technical "violation" of the operating agreement, or for
that matter, attempted to show any basis from which to assert a damage from this "academic"
exercise and "theoretical" assessment of the Operating Agreement, which the facts would
suggest and arguably demonstrate was functionally "modified" by the mutual actions of its total
membership (Sallaz and Trefren) on January 6, 2006. With all due respect, the Plaintiffs have not
advanced any theory or claim that Real Properties, LLC has a problem over the way in which the
"membership interests" were handled; their concern and "claim", at best, was to remove Ms.
Baird from her bogus claim to the properties or to an interest in Real homes, LLC, and they got
their wish come true with their settlement with her took place in August, 2010, as a result of
suit against her, as it was intended to accomplish by all parties to this litigation. If these "Sellers"
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did not transfer real property on or shortly after January 6, 2006, then since Real Homes, LLC,
was only a "shell" entity, a fact known to Mr. Rice, without the follow through transfers, of the
property parcels, that could be a breach of their fundamental

That was "why" the

real property parcels had to be transferred as well. He needed to receive both, just as envisioned
and as contemplated by the paiiies, and he therefor did receive both. Had he not gotten both, he
certainly could claim a breach of the intended purpose of the contract. He cannot claim such, or
take advantage of some theoretical concept that was never an issue, never made an issue, never
argued to be an issue, and no "damage" or loss claim ever been shown to exist, let alone be based
upon a technical term in an operating document that could be (and apparently was) altered by the
very actions of its 100% members' interest when the contract was entered into by the contracting
parties. If the Sellers held back on the transfer of the real property parcels (being those three
parcels in Riverside and the Smith lots that Mr. Rice wanted), that would certainly be regarded as
a "fundamental" and "material" breach of what the parties had agreed to accomplish. The Court
must well appreciate that Mr. Rice didn't decide he would not pay the balance of the purchase
price mere Iy because he had become aware of some "operating Agreement" technicality that
required a "dissolution" and "winding up of a "shell" entity; he withheld his payment of the
balance of the purchase price because the economy had become of such a state of despair, that to
call it anything less than a "depression" in the eyes of the real estate market would be to
undermine the effects it had in that industry. As this Court will recall, Mr. Rice had two years to
pay the balance (due January 6, 2008), and the economy in January, 2006, when the contract was
created, was then just starting to tum blue-white hot, from the red flame it had already become
since starting in 2004, but by January, 2008, the housing industry and land development, along
with any kind of financing, was non-existent, with a national foreclosure rate, the likes of which
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had not been seen since the Great Depression. The very economy itself had turned to ice, and Mr.
was simply unwilling to shell out cash on a deal that the economic rug had been pulled out
under him, and what had before been a "red

had turned into a bowl of "sour

grapes", and he was not about to pay out funds on a project that was no longer able to fund itself.
The way in which the situation now stands, the Court has found the existence of a
"breach" by Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren over the transfer of their membership interests, yet it was
the parcels of real property that Real Properties, LLC, received that actually provided the "value"
in the transaction. The Court will recall Mr. Rice, through Real Properties, LLC obtained huge
loans from D. L. Evans Bank to purchase the Melba property and other holdings, all of which
was able to take place because Mr. Rice used these parcels of real properties it had received from
Tradesman as collateral for those loans. Consequently, the "value" that allowed those loans to
occur were NOT the member interests in Real Homes, LLC; as that was only represented to be
an interest in a "shell" company. The only "value" lies in the parcels of real property; and it was
the real property that Roy Rice wanted to receive, as the "real" basis of the "purchase price", not
what he perceived to be the worthless member interests to the entity he had no intention of
conducting business within.

That being said, and notwithstanding, he received the right of

ownership to, and benefit of both, that is the real property parcels themselves, and the
"membership interest" in Real Homes, LLC. The Plaintiffs' "Complaint" was over Ms. Baird's
lis pendens claim, which was to the real property parcels themselves, not her assertion to a claim

to the ownership, as sole member of Real Homes, LLC. Her lis pendens demonstrated that, and
her "release" arrangements in her settlement documents with Plaintiffs demonstrate that fact.
Plaintiffs claim(s) against Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren was only to the effect of Ms. Baird actually
succeeding in having a "valid" claim to the real property parcels; she never did have, she never
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was willing to defend or advance her bogus claim, and in fact, she surrendered the claim by
releasing her lis pendens, once she realized Mr. Rice had no desire to pursue 15584 Riverside,
truth, that was

she ever had any form of a "docume ntary" interest in, as that stolen

"interest" was reflected in the quitclaim deed she created when she claimed to be the "presiden t"
Real Homes, LLC, when the "transfer!! to Renee and Dennis took place back on February 11,
2004, in order for Mr. Sallaz to process the operating loan.
Mr. Rice had no interest or desire to pursue any "title", interest or claims to 15584
Riverside, and that fact he had made clear, as he repeatedl y told Mr. Sallaz, not less than "forty
times", that he believed there was no remaining value in the residential house and lot of 15584,
over and above what was owed against it, and he had no desire to own or develop it further. That
was his "hard and fast" attitude towards that parcel, despite the fact Mr. Rice was told repeatedly
by Mr. Sallaz that whatever the outstanding encumbra nce was still owed against that parcel, once
they got title to it, and the debt was assumed and paid, that sum would be deducted from the
balance of the purchase price. Mr. Rice had this "deal" sowed up from one end to the other, as he
orchestrated it from the start to finish, but he just clearly felt there were other investments out
there to be had in other properties, as there were many properties out there to be developed, and
the market was a sizzling hot environment. Once Ms. Baird stepped forward and simply released
her lis pendens, the Plaintiffs acknowledged they had no warranty breach or any further "quiet
title action" to pursue, and that was not only evident from the case Plaintiff presented at trial, but
was admitted to be such, in their opening final argument to this Court, where they confirmed
they had been trying to dismiss Count V in their complain t ever since the settlemen t with Ms.
Baird. Understa ndably so, as they had no claim upon which to base any "breach" over anything,
and clearly, had no basis or evidence to establish they had suffered any damage over a restriction

MOTION FOR RECONSfDERATlON; FIND!J'.JG OF FACT, CONCLCSIONS OP LAW; MOTION
TO CLARIFY ASPECTS AS TO THE
APPLICATION OF CLAL\1 AND ISSUE PRECLUSION
P. l 5

or provision in an operating agreement of a "shell" entity. Clearly, Plaintiffs had no damage of
kind; that was

reason Count V had to be dismissed.
Court's finding of a material breach by Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren is

only of a theoretical concern, not a realistic function that has served to create an actionable claim
to a damage or loss. Factually speaking, the "member interests" in Real Homes, LLC have
served to be of no concern to Real Properties, LLC or to Mr. Rice, as all he wanted was to
develop the properties Tradesman had title to, as that was to be the beginning of their
development venture, and it was NEVER to be conducted or pursued in the name of Real
Homes, LLC.
From the standpoint that this Court found there was a "valid" contract entered into
between the parties, and that Plaintiffs were unable to prove a breach, let alone a damage, they
are estopped to claim or to assert any affirmative defense of a breach of any kind, by virtue of
claim and issue preclusion from the failures of their own case in chief when presented at trial.
The non-suit decided that legal application. They could never dispute that Real Properties, LLC
received the membership interests (they contracted to have placed with it), and received the real
property assets that were caused to be transferred to Real Properties, LLC, from Tradesman, as
that also they wanted to receive. There is no basis to assert a breach by Messrs. Sallaz and
Trefren, as none were proved, and none ever caused a resulting damage in any "material or
fundamental" way in this transaction that could be acted upon, as Real Homes, LLC has been left
dormant, and there has never been a contention or claim by anyone that it "illegally" or
"unlawfully" transacted any business, as it was left dormant, to the same effect if it had been
dissolved and wound up. It has done nothing, and was not intended to do anything, since January
6, 2006, and the transfer of the membership interest into Real Properties, LLC assured that it
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would remain a reality if it was dormant. A breach can never be "material and fundam
ental" if
you never suffer a damage or loss. Quite interestingly, there has NEVER been even a
resulting
...,~.,HUFY

claimed in the context of that concept of t.l-iis operating agreement. Since there was no

damage claimed as a result of this "provision", and at no time has there been any damage
even
to have occurred, despite the fact none has been proven, let alone demonstrated to have
come
into existence, it could be seen only as a "potential" claim of a damage or loss, had there
been
any attempt to conduct "business" under the name of Real Homes, LLC. In that regard,
it is also
of significant importance to note that the "business" of Real Homes, LLC ceased entirely
after
Tradesman received title to the parcels of real property. Consequently, if the restricti
on or
limitation created by the term of the operating agreement was not orally or verbally modifie
d, by
virtue of the actions of its members, in doing what they did on January 6, 2006, or that the
effects
of claim and issue preclusion have estopped Plaintiffs from any attempt to take advanta
ge of a
theory they never alleged, let alone ever known to exist, given the fact there has been no
business
conducted since the transfers of the real property interests were made by quitclaim
deed to
Tradesman, then the idea of any affirmative defense of a theoretical breach being discusse
d(in a
vacuum no less, and without any pleading notice whatsoever), the clear and undispu
ted fact
remains no damage OF ANY KIND has occurred, so it cannot be considered to be a
material,
substantial, fundamental, or destructive to the very purpose or intent of the transact
ion
contemplated by the parties, and "fundamentally" speaking, Real Properties, LLC orchestr
ated
the transaction, having gotten everything it wanted, used the properties, without restricti
on or
limitation, to get loans and make new acquisitions, and has not only NEVER SUFFERED
ANY
DAMAGE OF ANY KIND, but has gained phenomenally by the transaction,
and has
substantially improved the wealth of Mr. Rice and his Real Properties, LLC, having
now also
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"stolen" the parcels of real property, by conveying them to his Ada Properties, LLC, without
any
"consideration", I might add, and despite the huge gains
is owed, for the obvious reason

has accomplished, he simply has
market

apart thereafter, and he

would not fund the transaction with his own stashed funds.
This Court should now consider amending its Finding of Facts and Conclusions of
Law, and find that Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren did perform as Mr. Rice expected of them,
and did
substantially meet the expectations of Mr. Rice, and met full compliance as to the
intended
performance of their agreement, and Real Properties, LLC received everything Mr. Rice
ever
wanted to be transferred to and placed with Real Properties, LLC, and no affirmative defense
of
any actionable claim of a breach or damage prevents entry of a money judgment, whereby
Mr.
Rice himself, or Real Properties, LLC owes Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren the remaining
principal
balance as identified in Defendants' opening and closing arguments, together with interest
since
January 6, 2008. Otherwise, Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren have parted with their "membe
rship"
interest in Real Homes, LLC, as well as Tradesman having parted with the ownersh
ip of the
parcels of real property that Mr. Trefren conveyed to Real Properties, LLC, as a compan
ion
transfer, in accordance with the intended purpose of the development venture agreeme
nt, all of
which has occurred without receipt of any value or consideration. Thus far, Messrs. Sallaz
and
Trefren have parted with everything and have received NOTHING, but for (arguably) the
sum of
$5,000.00 that we genuinely acknowledge was paid to Mr. Sallaz under the transaction,
despite
the ongoing position of Mr. Rice, where he continues to say it was "probably" a loan
to Mr.
Sallaz. As they say: 0 what a tangled web we weave when at first we begin to deceive.
If this Court declines to amend its findings and conclusions, and fails to reconsid
er the

scope contained within the effects of this final judgment, then we are left to ponder the
fact, that
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we are left to believe this Court has chosen to conclude that the transfer of the "membership
interest" could not occur because of the transfer of the "parcels of real property" took place also,
despite the fact that \Vas to

occurred as it did, by the clear agreement

the parties,

notwithstanding the state of, or the content of, the operating agreement that was never made a
material concern of these parties to this agreement. The conveyance of each such "compon ent"
in the transaction of their agreement was never contemplated to constitute a breach of their
"intended transaction", as the issue of "authority", affecting either one or both of these
"components", was not material to the purpose of the intended expectations of the parties, and
since the transfer of the member interests came to be "transferred" through the Purchase and sale
agreement, and the real property came to be actually conveyed through separate quitclaim deeds,
in a separate transaction undertaken by Tradesman, that we are then left to believe the "transfers"
of the "parcels of real property" was done without consideration, and came through deeds of
conveyance (quitclaims) executed by Glen Trefren, in behalf and Tradesman Contractors and
Construction, LLC, who held those real property interests pursuant to the conveyances made to
Tradesman from Real Homes, LLC, as identified in the exhibits in this Record. Consequently,
the "conveyances" from the Grantor, Tradesman, to Real Properties, LLC, receiving the interests
as the grantee, has taken place without any consideration whatsoever having been paid as
required, as nothing has been paid as was the intended purpose and expectations of the parties.
That transaction, therefore, is void, for complete lack of consideration. Therefore, title to those
properties MUST come back to and be restored in the name of Tradesman Contractors and
Construction, LLC, and if this Court declines to do that in its reconsideration, or amendment of
its findings and conclusions, then it will result in a requirement for the expansion of some
additional litigation, between and among some of these parties, which would necessarily include
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a quiet title action, the very action that Plaintiffs had commenced to conduct, but
chose to
dismiss, without prejudice, several years ago. This quiet title action would be commen
ced upon
Court's determination

has been a contract proven by Defcndants/Counterclaimants, but

due to mutual and material breaches, the fundamental purpose and objective of the agreeme
nt
had come to an end, and the agreement is void. Though the Court has determined the
written
contract is now void and therefore has come to an end, it would appear the equitable
doctrines
should be available to the Court, and the Court "could have" elected to apply the damage
theory
of "unjust emichrnent" to the transaction, rather than send the parties off to do another
round of
expensive litigation in the future, as there can be no question that no consideration has
been paid
by Real Properties, LLC for the real property that has been conveyed to it by Tradesman,
and we
know that Mr. Rice has repeatedly declined to agree to a rescission of the transaction, as
he liked
the deal so well in 2006, that he wouldn 't even consider it when "offered" to him by Judge
Epis.
Currently, this Court's decision has confirmed that no consideration has been paid for
the real
property, as the Court has found the fundamental and principal purpose of the
purchase
agreement was for the "transfer" of the membership interests only, and the real property
, was an
"attendant" transfer only. The parties, however, saw the transaction to have been the other
way
around, but in any event, the consideration to have been paid was never paid, a.11d
the "real
property" conveyance, regardless how the transaction is viewed, construed or dissected,
has not
been paid as the consideration was contemplated to be paid by the parties.
It is therefore incumbent upon this Court to provide the appropriate clarification, thereby
confirming there has been no consideration for the conveyance of the parcels of real property
to
Real Properties, LLC from Tradesman Contractors and Constrnction, LLC and that transacti
on
therefore is void and of no effect. Messers Sallaz and Trefren are willing to endorse
that
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SAS TO THE

conclusion, and that finding of fact and conclusion of law, from which the necessary steps
may
now be taken to initiate the quiet title action against Eugene Roy Rice, Janet Rice,
Real
LLC, Ada Properties, LLC, and any other party, entity or corporation claiming any
right, title or interest in or to any of these parcels of real property identified in those
deeds of
conveyance created by Tradesman.
CONCLUSION
Whether the Court is inclined to amend its Findings o~ Fact, Conclusions of Law,
or
reconsider its decision and thereby and amend or alter its final judgment, it would serve
to be in
the best interests of these parties for the Court to "clarify" its decision, with regard to the
effects
of the final judgment, as it relates to the concerns of issue and claim preclusion to pursue
the
quiet title action between and among some of these parties. We would ask this Court to
take the
initiative to enter a further finding of fact and conclusion of law that the evidence demons
trates
from the documents presented at this trial that the consideration contemplated by the parties
to be
paid, has not been paid as expected have been forthcoming from Real Properties,
LLC, in
conjunction with the conveyance of the parcels of real property transferred to Real Properti
es,
LLC through the quitclaim deed conveyances made by Tradesman Contractors and Constru
ction,
LLC, executed by Glen Trefren on January 6, 2006. That as a result of that failure
of
consideration, the transaction, regarding said transfers of interests in real property, in all
respects,
are null and void, and entry of an order to that effect would then preclude need for these
parties
to engage in further litigation to conduct a quiet title action to return title of those parcels
of
property back to Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC, as otherwise required
by
application of law, and the void status of the parties' agreement.
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COME NOW Alternative Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Real Properties, LLC, and
Counterdefendants Eugene
file their

Rice by and through their counsel of record, J. Kahle
to

'/ Counterclaimants'

Reconsideration, Motion to Clarify, and !vlotion For Attorney Fees and Costs:
INTRODU CTION

Four years of litigation resulted in a five day trial conducted November 20-26, 2013. A
Judgment was issued on February 28, 2014, dismissing plaintiff's single remaining claim (plead

in the alternative) as well as Mr. Trefren/Tradesman's counterclaims. Now Mr. Sallaz and his
proxy, Glen Trefren, seek reconsideration of the 37-page Memorandum Decision and Order, an
advisory opinion on how to unlawfully collaterally attack the judgment, as well as attorney's fees
for a lawsuit they admittedly requested Plaintiffs file against them. For the reasons set forth
herein, this Court should deny Sallaz/Trefren/Tradesman's motions.
LEGAL ARGUME NT
1. The JVIotion for Reconside ration should be denied.

Defendants/Counterclaimants have timely filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant
to IRCP 52(b) and IRCP l l(a)(2)(B). No paiiy however has filed a motion for a new trial
pursuant to IRCP 59 and pursuant to IRCP 59(b) the time to do so has now expired. The
applicable standard of review to Defendants'/Counterclaimants' Motion for Reconsideration is
the "clearly erroneous" standard.
[The Supreme] Court exercises free review over conclusions of law, Smith v. J.B.
Parson Co., 127 Idaho 937, 941, 908 P.2d 1244, 1248 (1996), but will not set
aside a finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. Idaho R. Civ. P. 52( a). When
a case is tried to a court, determinations as to the credibility of witnesses, the
weight of their testimony, their probative effect, and inferences drawn from that
testimony are the province of the district court. Estate of
v. Security
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Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16, 19-20, 89 P.3d 856, 859-60 (2004); Idaho
Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 746, 9 P.3d 1204, 1212 (2000).
Insight LLC v. Gunter, 154 Idaho 779, 783, 302 P .3d 1052, 1056 (2013 ).

Defendants/Counterclaimants

not asserted any new factual grounds or

theories in their briefing. Not a single case was cited in either of Defendants/Counterclaimants'
jointly filed briefs.

Rather the arguments for reconsideration are simply an incoherent

regurgitation of the arguments found in the closing briefs filed by Defendants/Counterclaimants.
This Court has already made a thorough and well-reasoned 37 page ruling.

Therefore, in

addition to the Court's findings that Plaintiffs met their burden in proving their eighth and
eighteenth affirmative defenses, Plaintiffs simply incorporate their arguments previously made in
their own post-trial briefing to the extent necessary to refute any assertions made in Mr.
Sallaz/Trefren's 21-page rambling brief seeking reconsideration.
2. Defendants/Counterclaimants are seeking an impermissible advisory opinion on
how best to violate IRCP ll(a)(2)(A) and the doctrine of resjudicata .

Mr. Trefren, Tradesman, and Mr. Sallaz have telegraphed their disregard of this Court's
findings of fact, their contempt for the finality of judgments, and their impending unlawful
course of action:
That transaction, therefore, is void, for complete lack of consideration. Therefore,
title to those properties MUST come back to and be restored in the name of
Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC, and if this Court declines to do
that in its reconsideration, or amendment of its findings and conclusions, then it
will result in a requirement for the expansion of some additional litigation,
between and among some of these parties, which would necessarily include a
quiet title action, the very action that Plaintiffs had commenced to conduct, but
chose to dismiss, without prejudice, several years ago. This quiet title action
would be commenced upon the Court's detennination there has been a contract
proven by Defendants/Counterclaimants, but due to mutual and material breaches,
the fundamental purpose and objective of the agreement had come to an end, and
the agreement is void ....
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Messers Sallaz and Trefren are willing to endorse that conclusion, and that
finding of fact and conclusion of law, from which the necessary steps may now
be taken to initiate the quiet title action against Eugene Roy Rice, Janet Rice,
Properties, LLC, Ada Properties, LLC, and any other party,
or
corporation claiming any right, title or interest in or to any of these parcels
of real property identified in those deeds of conveyance created by
Tradesman.
1vlotion for Reconsideration: Finding of Fact Conclusions of Law: 1vfotion to
Clarify Aspects as to the Application of Claim and Issue Preclusion at 19-21.
(Emphasis added).
Mr. Trefren/Trade sman's proposed course of action would appear to divulge an
impending violation ofIRCP l l(a)(2)(A).
In any action, if an application by any party to the judge of a court for the
issuance of an order or writ is denied in whole or in part by such judge, neither the
party nor the party's attorney shall make any subsequent application to any other
judge except by appeal to a higher court; provided that a second application may
be made for a constitutional writ after a disclosure of the first application has been
made to the second judge. Any writ or order obtained in violation of this section
shall be immediately vacated by the judge issuing the same upon discovery of the
prior application to another judge, and the party and the attorney shall be subject
to such costs and sanctions as the court may detennine in its discretion ....
IRCP 1 l(a)(2)(A).
Furthennore, Mr. Sallaz (who has previously assigned his interest in the subject contract
to Jim Bevis as well as Glen Trefren, see Assigrnnents of Interest attached to Affidavit Of J
Kahle Becker in Support of Response and Objection to: Defendants'/ Counterclaimants' 1vfotion
for Reconsideration, 1vfotion to Clarify, and Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, herein after
"Becker Affidavit," as Exhibits A and B), Tradesman, and Mr. Trefren are now seeking an
advisory opinion from this Court on how to go about filing a lawsuit otherwise prohibited by the
doctrine of res judicata. See State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 9, 232 P.3d 327, 330 (2010) ("In
effect, the State is asking this Court to issue an advisory opinion in order to avoid the

m

future cases; an exercise this Court will not undertake."). Thus, as a threshold requirement, a
RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO: DEI<'ENDANTS'/ COUNTERCL AIMATS' MOTION FOR
RECONSlDER t\. TION, MOTION TO CLARIFY, and MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS4

declaratory relief action must involve an actual "case or controversy" so the court does not
render an impermissible advisory opinion. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.
(1

a

Cal. v.

83, 95-96, 88 S.Ct.
386 (9th

Cir.1996) (recognizing that "federal courts have never been empowered to render advisory
opinions"). Veoh Networks, Inc. v. UA;fG Recordings, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1268 (S.D.
Cal. 2007).
Should this Court accept Mr. Sallaz and Trefren's invitation to sanctify this hypothetical
impending lawsuit, the doctrine of res judicata indicates that Mr. Sallaz, Mr. Trefren, and
Tradesman's proposed course of action is prohibited.
The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim
previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the
same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been
made. Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 915-916, 684 P.2d 314, 317-318
(Ct.App.1984) ("[T]he rule against splitting a claim applies even though the
remedies or forms of relief demanded in one suit are different from those
demanded in another."); see also US. Bank Nat'! Ass'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho
222, 226, 999 P.2d 877, 881 (2000) (noting Idaho has adopted the "transactional
approach" to res judicata ).
Hindmarsh v. Nfock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002) (Emphasis
added).

Under this doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in
the previous action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the
original action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim
involves the same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises
out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the original action.
Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, 278 P.3d 943, 951
(2012).
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The record reflects Mr. Sallaz has already answered the question he now poses to this

do
A. I should

suing my clients m this case?
But you'll have to ask my attorney if I am.

P. 53 of November 21, 2013 Trial Testimony of Dennis Sallaz attached to Becker
Affidavit as Exhibit C.
Unfortunat ely for Mr. Sallaz, his attorney (as well as Trefren/Tr adesman's attorney) appears to
have realized their error long after the "120 days prior to trial" deadline imposed for amendmen ts
to pleadings as is dictated in the April 12, 2013 Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning. "For of
all sad words of tongue or pen, the saddest are these: 'It might have been!''' John Greenleaf
Whittier, Maud Muller, 1856.
The record reflects neither Dennis Sallaz, Glen Trefren, nor Tradesman brought a claim
for quiet title or alleged their claim to title to any of the subject properties was superior to that of
Real Properties, LLC or the present owner, Ada Properties, LLC. Defendants /Countercla imants
acknowled ge that the subject properties were transferred to Real Properties, LLC in 2006:
The conveyanc e of each such "componen t" in the transaction of their agreement
was never contemplat ed to constitute a breach of their '"intended transaction", as
the issue of "authority", affecting either one or both of these "componen ts", was
not material to the purpose of the intended expectation s of the parties, and since
the transfer of the member interests came to be "transferred" through the Purchase
and sale agreement, and the real property came to be actuallv conveyed
through separate quitclaim deeds, in a separate transaction undertaken by
Tradesman, that we are then left to believe the "transfers" of the "parcels of real
property" was done without considerati on, and came through deeds of conveyanc e
(quitclaims ) executed by Glen Trefren, in behalf and Tradesman Contractor s and
Constructio n, LLC, who held those real property interests pursuant to the
conveyances made to Tradesman from Real Homes, LLC, as identified in the
exhibits in this Record.

Afotion for Reconsideration: Finding of Fact Conclusions of
· 1Vfotion to
Clarify Aspects as to the Application of Claim and Issue Preclusion at 19.
(Emphasis added).
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Defendants/C ounterclaiman ts

simply

contend

the

transfer

consideration and yet they neglected to file a proper claim for
their individual

or on behalf of Tradesman

was
quiet

made

without
or mesne

Construction,

LLC. Likewise, Defendants neglected to bring a claim on behalf of Real Homes, LLC pursuant
to LC. 53-644(2).

See Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 106 P.3d 465 (2005) citing Idaho

Limited Liability Company Act, Idaho Code § 53-644(2) (Persons winding up the business or
affairs of the LLC, may prosecute and defend suits in the name of, and for and on behalf of, the
LLC).
The holder of title to property (Real Properties, LLC and, as of 2010, Ada Properties,
LLC for all the property at issue except Riverside lB/15584 Riverside, which as of August 2010
was owned by Renee Baird) is the presumed legal owner of that property, and if someone else
claims ownership of such property, he must establish his claim by clear, satisfactory, and
convincing evidence. Anderson v. Rex Hayes Family Trust, 185 P.3d 253, 145 Idaho 741 (2008).
An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or
interest in real or personal prope1iy adverse to him, for the purpose of determining
such adverse claim, provided that all actions to adjudicate water rights and obtain
a decree as to water source, quantity, point of diversion, place of use, nature of
use, period of use, and priority as against other water users shall be brought under
the provisions of chapter 14, title 42, Idaho Code.
Idaho Code § 6-401.
[A] party seeking to quiet title against another must succeed on the strength of his own
title, and may not rely merely upon the weakness of his adversary. Aldape v. Akins, l 05 Idaho
254, 260, 668 P.2d 130, 136 (Ct. App. 1983). Likewise, neither Mr. Trefren, Tradesman, nor
Mr. Sallaz brought a claim for mesne profits. "In an action for mesne profits, the plaintiff may
recover the mesne profits of the land and also all damages which have been sustained by reason
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of the disturbance of his possession by the defendant." Dumas v. Ropp, 98 Idaho 61, 62-63, 558
P.2d 632, 633-34 (1977).

for

title or mesne profits would have been

A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing paiiy, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if ( 1) at
the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending
action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon the claim by attachment or
other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal
judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this
Rule 13.
IRCP 13(a).
A nearly identical attempt to re-litigate a real estate transaction (which was made in
anticipation of an impending divorce) was rejected in Ramseyer v. Ramseyer, 98 Idaho 554, 569
P.2d 358(1977) based on the res judicata effects of the prior litigation.
In the course of our discussion of the law of voluntary partnership dissolution in
Ramseyer I, we stated that a dissolution agreement of this nature "is presumed to
include all disputed matters among the partners, and will be final and conclusive
upon them in the absence of fraud, mistake or duress." (Emphasis added.) 98
Idaho at 52, 558 P.2d at 81. In short, by demanding a judicial dissolution, an
accounting and a division of partnership assets, Homer put in issue all his interests
in the former partnership property during the course of the Ramseyer I litigation.
He lost. This Court affirmed the trial court's detennination that no judicial
dissolution was in order because a full dissolution and winding up of the
partnership had been reached by mutual agreement of the partners on June 12,
1969. The finality and completeness of the resulting decree in tying up all loose
ends, is emphasized by the fact that the trial court in Ramseyer I granted the sons'
cross-claim for refonnation of the 1969 settlement to include water rights and
AUM's (rights to animal unit months on federal grazing land) inadvertently
omitted from the settlement agreement.
The final judgment in Ramseyer I quieted title to Antelope Springs Ranch in the
sons. Homer now attempts to avoid that judgment by a cause of action to quiet
title to Antelope Springs Ranch in him to the extent of his alleged community
interest in that property an interest which, for reasons of their own, he and his
RESPONSE A1~D OBJECTIO N TO: DEFENDA NTS'/ COUNTER CLAIMAT S' MOTION FOR
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attorney preferred not to make explicit in the 1969 dissolution agreement or in the
partnership action. The attempt so to avoid the res judicata effect of the earlier
judgment is without merit.
V.

Idaho 554, 556,

360 (1

The trial court in Ramseyer I held that Homer had no interest m or title to
Antelope Springs Ranch and quieted title to the property in the sons. When
Homer brought the present action to quiet title, partition and recover mesne
profits in 1975, the state of facts giving rise to his claim had not changed. When
he changed the label applied to his theory of recovery, the essential relief sought
was no different from that sought in the partnership action. Accordingly, Homer's
quiet title action was barred by the judgment in the partnership action, and the
respondents' motions for summary judgment should have been granted for that
reason. As was stated in Treinies v. Sunshine klining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78, 60
S.Ct. 44, 51, 84 L.Ed. 85 (1939), "One trial of an issue is enough. 'The principles
ofres judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues,' as well
to jurisdiction of the subject matter as of the parties."
Ramseyer v. Ramseyer, 98 Idaho 554, 557, 569 P.2d 358,361 (1977).
Therefore, due to Defendants' /Counterclaimants' failure to bring a quiet title or mesne
profits claim in this action, the judgment entered herein is final and should not be subject to a
collateral attack. 1
3. Defendants'/Counterclaimants' Request for Attorney's fees should be denied.

Dennis Sallaz and Glen Trefren invited this lawsuit on themselves, "Both Trefren and
myself are willing and supporting Defendants and stand ready to participate to the max." See
Exhibit D to Becker Affidavit. In fact, Mr. Sallaz testified before this Court that what he actually

sold to his former clients, in the middle of his own divorce trial, was a lawsuit against him:
1

For examples of Mr. Sallaz's propensity to assert collateral attacks on judgments, see Complaint
for an
Independent Action to Obtain Relieffrom a Judgment, Ada County Case CV OC 1217666, as well as
November 9,
2013 Order Denying Suspension ofAppeal in Ada County Case No. CV DR 04-01075D attached to Becker
Affidavit
as Exhibits E and F. This "Independent Action to Overturn Judgment" sought to collaterally attack
Mr. Sallaz's
pending appeal of his divorce (5 years after the trial) based on the newly discovered "facts" that he was
not actually
manied to Renee Baird since the officiant (allegedly) did not have a valid license to solemnize their marriage
which
had taken place approximately 16 years earlier. See August 8, 2013 Notice of Appeal (which has
now become
Supreme Court No. 41301 appeal of Fourth Dist. Case No. CV DR 04-01075D) attached to Becker
Affidavit as
Exhibit G.
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Q. So what you really sold my clients was a lawsuit?
A. Absolutely. And he knew it. He knew he -- that was the reason for the
two years that he required, because it was going to take us that long to get it done.
It was · idea.

P. 190 of November 26, 2013 Trial Testimony of Dennis Sallaz attached
to Becker Affidavit as Exhibit H. (Emphasis added).
Plaintiffs tried to dismiss the entirety of this case after they settled with Mr. Sallaz's exwife, Renee Baird. Mr. Sallaz objected to the dismissal and filed three counterclaims (I. Breach
of Contract; II. Breach of Contract - Reimburseme nt for Materials and Labor; and III. Unjust
Enrichment) through his proxy, Glen Trefren. From approximately September 2010 until trial,
the Rices and Real Properties, LLC were largely in a defensive posture. At trial, it was revealed
for the first time that Defendants/Counterclaimants were seeking approximatel y $680,000 in
damages.

The Judgment entered by this Court awarded Defendants/Counterclaimants $0 in

damages.

"Avoiding liability is a significant benefit.. .. " Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord

Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005).
Plaintiffs contend there has been a concerted effort by Mr. Sallaz to delay this litigation,
delay litigation in Ada County Case No. CV OC 1107253, and to delay professional disciplinary
proceedings which have been initiated by the Rices against Mr. Sallaz. See January 16, 2014
Report of Speciai Master Jim Lynch at 2 as weil as transcript of January 21, 2014 hearing in Ada
County Case No. CV OC 1107253 at 18-19 attached to Becker Affidavit as Exhibits I and J.
Based on the Judgment that has been entered, there are no legal grounds for asserting that
Defondants/Counterclaimants prevailed in this action under 54( e)(1) such that they (as "willing
and supporting Defendants ... ready to participate to the max") would be entitled to fees under
any section of LC. 1 120.
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Defendan t/Counter claimants argument s for fees pursuant to I.C. 12-121 are likewise
without merit. Dennis Sallaz testified he assisted

preparing the Complaint and drafting initial

Rices/Re al

See pp.

21,

3

Trial Testimon y of Dennis Sallaz attached to Becker Affidavit as Exhibit C. The bulk of the
infonnati on Mr. Sallaz provided at the outset of this litigation turned out to be false. Thereafte r,
Mr. Sallaz refused to provide informati on and documen ts that were the subject of discovery
requests he helped draft, necessita ting a Motion to Compel and ultimatel y an award of sanctions
against him. Mr. Sallaz also hid behind Glen Trefren in: 1) assigning the subject contract to him
despite having already assigned that same interest to Jim Bevis four days earlier; 2) asserting a
countercl aim through judgmen t-proof Glen Trefren and even having his own attorney, Vernon K.
Smith, present Mr. Trefren's case at trial; 3) admitting to preparing Glen's pleadings ; 4) having
his attorneys take 72 hours of Mr. Rice's depositio n (though some portions of the depositio n
were admittedl y taken in connectio n with discovery in Ada County Case No. CV OC 1107253)
despite the extreme hardship this placed on Mr. Rice due to his COPD, only not to use any of the
depositio n transcript s at trial; and 5) filing a lis pendens on all of the subject properties , including
Riverside 1B/15584 Riverside , which is owned by non-party Renee Baird, despite not having
asserted a single claim that would entitle him to any interest in any of the subject properties . See

lis pendens filed May 8, 2013.
Additiona lly, Mr. Trefren and then Mr. Sallaz asked for a jury trial, only to waive it at the
last minute after Plaintiffs prepared jury instructio ns. Mr. Trefren provided testimony at trial
which the Court specifica lly found to not be credible. Memorandum Decision and Order at 31 .
. Sallaz, a licensed attorney, was evasive during cross examinat ion and provided inconsistent
testimony

througho ut

his

examinat ion.

The

Court

pointed

out

that

exhibits
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Defendants/Counterclaimants produced at trial were strategically withheld from Plaintiffs'
counsel until the last minute. See Pp. 114-118
to

November 26, 2013 Trial Testimony

Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Trefren' s litigation

were

frivolous throughout this case and they should not be rewarded with attorney's fees under LC.
12-12 l.

CONCLUSION
This Court should make a speedy ruling upholding its Afemorandum Decision and Order
as well as the current version of the Judgment in order to avoid farther delay in the myriad of
cases Mr. Sallaz's divorce from Renee Baird has spawned. An award of attorney's fees is not
warranted under the present Afemorandum Decision and Order nor the Judgment.
DATED this

di

day of March 2014.

J. KAHLE BECKER
Attorney for Alternative Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants
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CERTIF ICATE OF SERVIC E
that on this ~ I
day of March 201 a true
correct
of the foregoing RESPON SE AND OBJECT ION TO: DEFEND ANTS'/
COUNTE RCLAIM A TS' MOTION FOR RECONS IDERAT ION, :rv10TI0N TO CLARIFY ,
and MOTION FOR ATTORN EY FEES AND COSTS was served upon opposing counsel as
follows:
Iver J. Longetei g
5304 Turret
Boise, ID 83703
Attorney for Defendan t Glenn Trefren
& Tradesman Contractors & Construction,
LLC

y' US Mail
_ _ Personal Delivery
Facsimile

Vernon K. Smith
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, ID 83 702
Attorney for Defendan t Dennis Sallaz

; ( US Mail
_ _ Personal Delivery
Facsimile

James B. Lynch
Special Master
2047 Blaine Way
Boise, ID 83702

;( US Mail
_ _ Personal Delivery
Facsimile

~KAH LE BECKER
~ Attorney for Alternati ve Plaintiffs /Counterd efendants
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KAHLE BECKER (ISB # 7408)
Attorney at Law
l 020 W. Main Street,

400

Fax: (208) 343-3246
Email: =~'.::'..',~=°'~==:'..'cc.'::..!.".-'..O=
Attorney for Alternati ve Plaintiffs /Counterd efendants
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)
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)
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STATE OF IDAHO
Ada

)
:ss
)
J.

being over the

eighteen years and competent to

make this Affidavit, after first being duly sworn, and upon his own personal knowledge, states as
follows:
I. That I am an attorney in good standing with the Idaho State Bar and counsel for the
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants ("Plaintiffs") herein.
2. That I am an attorney for these Plaintiffs in the District Court of the Fou1ih Judicial
District, Ada County case Dennis Sallaz and lvlarcy Fox v. Eugene and Janet Rice et
all, Ada County Case No. CV OC 1107253.
3. That I make this Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Response and Objection to:
Defendants' / Counterclaimants' Motion for Reconsideration, Motion to Clarify, and
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs.
4. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of an "Assigmn ent of Purchase
Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC" from Dennis Sallaz to Jim
Bevis, dated March 6, 2006, Bates numbered RICE 00522, marked and admitted as
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 37 in trial for this case, held on November 20-26, 2013.
5. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of an "Assigmn ent of Purchase
Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC" from Dennis Sallaz to Glen
Trefren, dated March 10, 2006, Bates numbered RICE 00521, marked and admitted
as Plaintiffs ' Exhibit 38 in trial for this case, held on November 20-26, 2013.
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6. Attached as Exhibit C is a true and conect copy of "Court Trial - Testimony of
Dennis J. Sallaz November 21, 2013" taken in the Court tiial in this case, held on
13.
7. Attached as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of a letter from Dennis l Sallaz to
John L. Runft, dated January 8, 2009, Bates numbered RICE 00886 and marked as
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 in trial for this case, held on November 20-26, 2013.
8. Attached as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of the Complaint for an Independent

Action to Obtain Relief from a Judgment, filed by Dennis J. Sallaz and Vernon K.
Smith on September 28, 2012 in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada
County Case No. CO OC 1217666.
9. Attached as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of the Order Suspending Appeal,
denied by Judge Sticklin on November 13, 2012 in the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District, Ada County Case No. CO OC 1217666.
10. Attached as Exhibit G is a true and c01Tect copy of the Notice of Appeal, filed on
August 8, 2013, in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County Case
No. CV DR 04-01075 D.
11. Attached as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of "Court Trial - Testimony of
Dennis J. Sallaz November 26, 2013" taken in the Court trial in this case, held on
November 20-26, 2013.
12. Attached as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of a letter from James B. Lynch
(assigned as special master in this case) to myself, and counsel for Dennis Sallaz William Fuhrman, Vernon K. Smith, and Iver J. Longeteig, dated January 16, 2014.
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13. Attached as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of the Reporter 's Transcript of
Proceedings held on January 21, 2014 before Hon. Judge Wilper in the District Court
the

Judicial

Dennis Sallaz and

Fox v. Eugene and Janet

Rice et all, Ada County Case No. CV OC 1107253.
Further, your affiant sayeth naught

DATED thisJ!

day of March 2014.

Attorney for Plaintiff

STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss
County of Ada
)
SUBSCR IBED and SWORN to before me thi

fMarch 2014.

9-( si.. 1 M.~ 1

Notary Public fi r the State of Idaho
Residing at:
Bo 1se 1.1>
My Cornrnissi n Expires: /

e 1 · I 'I·

df) ,~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

--2!__

The undersigned hereby certifies that on this
day of March 2014, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing
J. KAHLE BECKER IN SUPPORT
RESPONSE AND
OBJECTIO N
TO:
'/
COlJNTER CLidM/•,N TS'
MOTION
FOR
RECONSI DERATIO N, MOTION TO CLARIFY, and MOTION FOR ATTORNE Y FEES
AND COSTS was served upon opposing counsel as follows:
Iver J. Longeteig
5304 TmTet
Boise, ID 83703
Attorney for Defendant Glenn Trefren
& Tradesman Contractors & Construction,
LLC

L u s Mail
_ _ Personal Delivery
Facsimile

Vernon K. Smith
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, ID 83702
Attorney for Defendant Dennis Sallaz

LusM ail
_ _ Personal Delivery
Facsimile

James B. Lynch
Special Master
2047 Blaine Way
Boise, ID 83 702

,)( US Mail
_ _ Personal Delivery
- - Facsimile

Attorney for Alternative Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants

[T
J.
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Exhibit C

STRIC T COURT OF THE THIRD JUDIC IAL DISTR ICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

IN AND FOR THE COUNT

EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE,
husba nd and wife, REAL HOME Sr)
L.L.C . and REAL PROP ERTIE Sr
)
L.L.C ., an Idaho limit ed
)
liab ility comp any,
)

OF CANYON

Case No. CV20 09-11 855

)

Plain tiffs, ,

)
)

VS.

)

)

DENNIS S~LLA Z, GLENN TREFR EN,)
and TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS
)
AND CONS TRUC TION, L.L.C .,
)
an Idaho limit ed liab ility
)
comp any,
}
}

Defe ndan ts.

)

IN THE ALTER NATIV E

)
}

EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE,
)
husba nd and wife, and REAL
)
PROP ERTIE S, L.L.C ., an Idah o)
limit ed liab ility comp any,
)
)

Plain tiffs ,

)
)

vs.

)
)

DENNIS SALLA Z, GLENN TREFR EN,)
and TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS
)
AND CONS TRUC TION, L.L.C .,
)
an Idaho limit ed liab ility
)
comp any, and REAL HOMES,
)
L.L.C ., an Idaho limit ed
)
liab ility comp any,
)
)

Defen dant:: :;,

)

Kathe rine J. Klem etson.
115
Stree t
ldwel l Idaho 83605
08)

Cour t Tri.al . Testi mony of
Denn is J. Sa11a z
Novem ber 21, 2013

REPO RTER 'S PARTI AL TRAN SCRIP T OF PROC EEDIN GS

Held on Novem ber 21 1

2013

befo re the
Hono rable June al C. Kerri ck
Dist rict Judge

APPEA RANC ES:

For the Plai ntiff s:

J. KAHLE BECKER

1020 W. Main St., Ste.
Boise , Idaho 83702
-andGABR IEL McCARTHY
401 W. Fron t St., 1302
Boise , Idaho 83702

For the Defen dant
Denn is Salla z:

VERNON K. SMITH
1900 W. Main Stree t
Boise , Idaho 83702

For the Defe ndan ts
Glenn Trefr en and
Trade sman :

IVER J. LONG ETEIG
5304 Turr ett
Boise , Idaho 83703
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CALDWELL1 IDAHO

2

1

Thursday, November 21, 2013, 8:33 a.m.

3

(Court Trial - Day 2)

4

derk to be sworn, please.

2

Kind of got you blocked.

3

THE WITNESS: Kind of locked up.

4

5

(Start of requested portion of proceeding. )

6

THE COURT: Court wi!! take up CV2009-118 55, Rice

5

7

versus SaHaz,, et at Counsel are presenL And

7

DENNIS J. SALLAZ,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the plainllifu,
having been first du!y sworn, was examined and testified

8

Mr. Sallaz, Mr. Trefren are here today.

8

asfo!lows:

9

Good morning, counsel. Everybody came back.

10

11

9

MR. SMITH: And good morning, Your Honor. We

10

wouldn't miss it for the world.

12

THE COURT: We worked

DIRECT EXAMINAT ION

BY MR. BECKER:

11

Q.

can you please state your name for the record.

12

A.

Denny Sallaz.

13

Q.

Is that your full name?

so hard yesterday. We

13
14

the first witness yesterday, and so the plaintiffs will

14

A.

Close.

15

call -- well, I'm sorry.

15

Q.

What is your full name?

really did. So okay. We finished with the witness --

16

Any preliminary matters from the plaintiffs?

16

A.

Dennis James Sallaz.

17

MR. McCARTI-fY: No, Your Honor.

17

Q.

Mr. Sallaz --

18
19

THE COURT: From the defendants?

18

A.

Does that sound better?

MR. SMITI-1: Judge, I believe not at this time.

19

Q.

Mr. Sallaz, I see you brought some documents

20

THE COURT: Okay.

20

up to the -- or the witness stand there. What did you

21
22

MR. LONGETEIG: No, ma'am.

21

bring with you?

THE COURT: Thank you.

22

A.

Pardon?

23

Q.

What did you bring with you?

MR. BECKER: We call Denny Sallaz.

24

A. Well, I brought my - the first thing I

THE COURT: And if the witness would approach the

25

23

Plaintiffs may call the next witness.

24
25

brought with me is my complaint to the bar about you and

1

1

2

Runft, of being my attorneys and backing out and

1

2

double-cro ssing me. That's the first document I

2

some of the complaint and documentat ion before the bar

3

brought. I hired both of you.

3

association. But until that becomes an issue, let's not

4
5

MR. BECKER: Okay. If the bailiffs -- will we

4

dutter this record at this point in time, Judge. Thank

5

you.

have the bailiff, the marshal?

6

THE COURT: All right. Let's -- maybe I should

time, then Mr. Becker may get the opportunity to review

6

7

leave, and everybody could say what they want to say to

7

8

each other. And then I'll come back, and we'll by the

8

9

case. So let's just start. Ask the question, and we'll

9

THE COURT: All right. Well, I agree. Let's
proceed.
MR. BECKER: Fair enough. May I remain at counsel
table here, Your Honor?

10

proceed.

10

11

11

12

MR. BECKER: I'd like to have the opportunity to
review the documents that the witness has brought to the

13

stand before I begin my questioning , Your Honor.

14

MR. SMITH: To which, Judge, I will object.

13
14

A.

I'm an attorney.

15

THE COURT: Well, why do we need to do that if he

15

Q.

And how long have you been an attorney?

12

THE COURT: Oh, certainly.
MR. BECKER: Thank you.

BY MR. BECKER:

Q.

Mr. Sallaz, what's your profession?

16

isn't referring to them? If he ends up referring to

16

A.

In all, probably close to 40 years.

17

some of those things, then we may need to get into that.
But let's just --

17

Q.

And you were my dient's attorney for

18

18

approximate ly 25 years; correct?

19

MR. SMITH: Yes. For the record, Judge, at this

19

A.

No. It was longer than that.

20

time the bar complaint that Mr. SaHaz intends to bring

20

Q.

21
22

How long do you believe you were my client's

against Mr. Becker and/or Mr. Runft is at this moment in

21

time not relevant to the examination I anticipate that

A.

Probably 35 years, 40.

23

Mr. Becker will inquire of Mr. Sallaz.

Q.

Can you scoot forward? I'm having

24

He may happen to have his file. And if -

should

to refer to

at that point

attorney?

hearing you. And I want to make sure the court n>rmr~c,r
gets rt down.

t:ugene r<:1ce, et ar., v. uenrn
1

A.

Well, I'll just speak up.

1

2

Q.

Okay.

2

3

A.

I'd be gfad to.

4
6

A.

7

had half a dozen or a dozen ~ttomeys through this

9
10

5

I want my objection noted throughou t this
entire record. And so any reference by anybody to those
words is merely for convenien ce, not for the legal

6

consequen ce it creates.

Thank you. And you were my client's personal
attorney; correct?
Q.

5

8

3

Wen,

4

don't know what you mean by personal.

7

whole period of time. Attorney s that I've got for him
and some that he's found himself. We were always good
buddies for that 30 years.

11

Q.

THE COURT: All right. And so -- well, you've

8

objected. But what you're basically saying is

9

darifying the context in which your dient is going to
respond to that question.

10

So you're contendin g you were simply his

az,, et a1., t;ase No. t;vzuu~ -11~

not connote any legal connotatio n by virtue of that.
Because it's on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court.

11

MR. SMITH: That would be correct, Judge.

12

business attorney?

12

13

14

case is on appeal, and one of the issues is whether or

15

A. Well, I'm not concernin g anything . He's a
good buddy, and I helped him out. He helped me out. We
had a lot of - a whole lot of things together that we

15

not there was a marriage.

16

operated and did.

16

14

13

IBE COURT: Because I think there has been
reference in this case to the fact that that divorce

18

Renee Baird on July 4, 1996?

18

19

MR. SMITH: That is correct, Judge. Just so I can
complete the record in that regard, there has never been
in this purported divorce between Ms. Baird and

19

20

MR. SMITH: To which, for the record, Judge, I'll
preserve my objection to the term of -- the use of the

Mr. Sallaz never any certificate of marriage or marriage

20

21

license or matrimoni al document ation from any state

word •marriage . r It turns out, in fact, that they were,

21

22

according to Oregon law and Idaho law, never married.
Therefore any reference made in this case by any counsel

22

23

anywhere at any time, from any county of any state at
any time. And that's the criteria under Idaho Code for

23

24

the creation of a valid marriage, absent of which any

to either, quote, marriage, end quote, or divorce,

24

purported attempt at a maniage is void.

25

quote, end quote, is merely for convenien ce. It does

25

17

Q.

Okay. Now, I understan d you were married to

17

So that's where we are at. There's never been

5

1

6

2

such a certificate issued. Never produced in any court,
not in the court In which they had this purported

2

3

divorce.

3

4

1

So that's now on appeal to the Supreme Court.

5

The magistrate had no jurisdictio n, subject matter

BY MR. BECKER:

4
5

Q.

Were you married to Renee Baird on July 4,

A.

No. I thought I was. After the divorce was

1996?

entered, her girlfriend s were talking about how she got

6

jurisdictio n from which to undertake the so-called

6

7

half of my property, she never married me. I sent

divorce of a so-called ceremonia l marriage July 4, 1996.

7

8

letters over to Oregon to find out if it was true, and I

I want the record quite clear throughou t these
proceedin gs if that anybody makes any reference to it,
it's solely for convenien ce, not fur any legal

8

got the reports back that it was absolutel y true. So I
-- I wasn't married to her, unfortun ately. Or
fortunate ly, one or the other.

9

10

9
10

11

conseque nce. It's on appeal to be decided by the Idaho

11

12

Supreme Court.

12

13

14

IBE COURT: All right. Mr. Becker, are you

15

willing to go forward with that, just make that -- that
that is part of the record? That the defendant s are

16

contesting that issue?

17
18

MR. BECKER: I understan d that there is an appeal

filed.

Q.

You attended a wedding with Renee Baird on

July 4, 1996; correct?

13

A.

I thought I did. It turned out to be a party.

14

Q.

And you contend the officiant who was at that

15

wedding wasn't licensed in the state of Oregon; correct?

16

A.

17

MR. BECKER: Can we hand the witness Exhibit 134.

18

That's exactly what Oregon told me.
(Exhibit handed to the witness.)

19

THE COURT: Okay. Alf right. let's proceed.

20

MR. BECKER: It's --

21

THE COURT; So there's a question.

supplemen tal response to plaintiffs' first set of

22

MR. BECKER: Could you read the question back

interrogat ories and requests for production . Do you see

23
24

before the objection?

19

BY MR. BECKER:

Q.

Mr. Sallaz, this is defendant Dennis Sallaz's

that?

TI!E COURT: Why don't you just reask it?

25

A.

Yeah. I have it.
Now, can you tum to page 17 of that document ?

7

8

1

Can you see where your name is written below a line with

1

2

a signature on it?

2

3

A.

I do.

3

4

Q.

Is that your signature?

4

5

A. I'm sure it is.

6
7

Q.

5

And there's a paragraph above that that's

6

entitled "Verification." Do you see that?

7

Q. She used to work for you; correct?
A. Oh, yeah. She worked for me for a couple

years.
Q.

And she was a notary in your office; correct?

A. Well, she was a notary. She brought her own
notary with her-. Does that make any difference to
0. Do you recall signing this dou.;r,ent?

8

A.

Yeah.

8

A.

No, I don't.

9

Q.

And do you agree that when you signed that

9

Q.

Would you like to take a minute to review the

10

11

document, that paragraph places you under oath; correct?
A. Well, I didn't read it, but that's what my

11

12

opinion was.

12

10

13

Q.

/ls a lawyer of 40 years?

13

14

A.

Well, as a man that can read.

14

Q.

And there's a stamp of a notar/ below that.

15

15

16

Do you see that?

16

17

A. I do.

18

Q. Okay. And it's

19

Do you see that?

the name says Tracy Brown.

document?

A. No. rm - this is my signature.
Q. Okay. And you understand !:hat this -was
discovery responses given in response to requests made
in this case; correct?

A. That's what it says..
MR. BECKER: Okay. rd move fOf'" the admission of

17

Exhibit 134.

18

MR. SMITH: I would object to the admission of
Exhibit 134. It's a hearsay document. In fact, if they
wanted to inquire from it oc through it as to whether or

19

20

A. Okay.

20

21

Q.

Do you see where it says Tracy Brown?

21

not he's of the same opinion as to any question there

22

A.

Yeah.

22

asked or the ans,ner there given, that's one thing fur

23

Q. Who's Tracy Brown?

23

purposes of cross-examin ation, butt: not fur initial

24

A.

24

evidence.

25

Well, she's at a real estate company right

now.

25

THE COURT: All right.

9

1
2
3

4
5

6

objection.

1

MR. BECKER: Okay.

2

THE COURT: You can inquire of the subject matter

3

and then, if necessary, refer to the document for
further questions.

MR. BECKER: All right.

A.

5

Q. The paragraph begins with Dennis Sallaz?

6

A. That's the first one; right?
Q. It would be the first full paragraph.
A. Yeah.

BY MR. BECKER:

7

8

Q. Can you tum to page -- tum to page 6 first.
Do you see where interrogatory number 9 is?

9

10
11

A.

I do.

8
10

Q. It says, have you or anyone acting on your
behalf obtained any kind of written, recorded,

12

13

stenographic ally transcribed, oral, or other type of

13

14

statement from plaintiffs and/or their employees,
agents, or officers? If so for each statement: State

15

12

15
16

17
18
19

21

11

14

the date on which the statement was taken, identity of
the person taking the statement, and identify and

17

produce each statement, whether wril1:en, recorded, or
transcribed.

19

20

And you provided an original answer to that

below there. Do you see that?

22

A.

23
24

Q.

16
18

20
21

I do.

22

TI1en if we can tum

see in bold where it says

it says

11

7, do

23
24

Q. At the - it's the second paragraph there.
Supplemente d, colon, answer, colon. It begins with
Dennis Sallaz?

4

7
9

rm going to sustain the

10

Q.

Pardon?

can you read what that says?

A. Yeah, I read it.
Q. Okay. Do you see v,here it says, Dennis Sallaz
as both the personal and bffiiness attorney for
plaintiffs?

A. I do.
Q. Okay. And, again, you made that statement
underoam?

A. Didn't I tell you that?
Q. So you're my dienfs personal and businESS
attorney for

25 years; correct?

A. Among a fot of other things, yeah.
Absolutely.
MR. BECKER: Okay. f'low, let's hand the witness

Exhibit 11.

handed to the witness.}

-. "Ju:11.t:.u-1.l
1

Q.

2

A

3

Q.

4

1:::ugene KJce, ec ar., v. uenn.
Do you have it in front of you, Mr. Sallaz?
I do.

1

2

az, ec ai., l;ase NO.

t;V.!W~-1 -1lS:>:J

A.

Where I see Sellers on is on item D. Is that
the - what you're talking about?

3

Q.

A

Okay. Can you tell me what Exhibit 41 is?
A purchas e agreeme nt.

Near the signature lines there.

4

A.

Pardon?

5

Q.

Forwhat?

5

6

A.

Property and lLCs.

6

Q. The signature lines, Mr. Sallaz?
A. Ohr the signatur e line. Yeah,

7

Q.

Did you draft this document ?

7

8

A.

Yeah. T'WO or three times. Rice kept having

8

Q.

And is that your signature ?

9

me change it.

9

A.

I'm sure it is.

10

Q.

And is that Glenn Trefren's signature ?

Q. And I see it's dated January -- let's see

see

10
11

here. The fax heading on it that says 4--6-2006. Do you

11

A.

I - I would think so.

12

see that?

12

Q.

Is that Mr. Rice's signature ?

13

MR. SMITH: Well, wait just a moment. He's asking
him to identify it, or is he asking him to read from it?
If he's inquiring as to its contents, we'd better have

13
14

A. Well, yeah. I watched him sign it.
Q. Did you watch Glenn Trefren sign it?

15

A.

14

15

17

18

it admitted into evidmce first. Otherwise I'm not
quite sure how we're trying to address this exhibit. He
can identify it, lay a foundatio n for ts admission .

Well, I can't rememb er. But I probably did.
I was standing there.
Q. And you were watching him sign it as co-owner ;

18

correct?

19

But if he's going

19

20

A. Absolute ly co-owne r.

admitted.

20

Q.

21

THE COURT: Okay. Sustain the objection.
BY MR. BECKER:

21

Homes, LLC?

22

A.

16
17

22

23
24
25

16

to testify from it, it better first be

Do you see -- let's tum to the third page of
that documen t, Mr. Sallaz. Do you see where it says
Seller? Sellers?
Q.

23
24

25

13

1
2
3

4

Q. Now, there's some other pages behind here that
attach some legal descriptio ns. Do you see that?
A. Yeah.

6

Q. Okay. And so I wanted you to take a moment to
review this. But do you believe that this is the true
and accurate copy of the purchase agreemen t for sale of

7

interest in the Real Homes, LLC, working --

5

1

I've admitted it.

5
7

Q. Paragraph A. The ownership interest which is
being sold herein constitute 1 -- 100 percent of the
ownership of Real Homes, LLC. Do you agree that's what

8

it says?

10

MR. BECKER: I move for the admission of

11

13

14
15

9

12

THE COURT: Mr. Smith?
MR. SMITH: We have no objection to admission of
Exhibit 41.

And you were a seller; correct?

4

Q. That we're here about in this case?
A. As far as I know, it certainly is.
Plaintiffs' Exhiat 41.

A. Um-hmm . Yeah, that's what it says.
Q.

9

11

Q. Was this in your office?
A. That's my recollect ion that's \'\here we did it.
14

A. Well, I think we've talked about that, and

A.

12

Well, I'm not sure I watched him, but I was
there when it happene d.

2

6

As far as I - excuse me.

And you watched him sign it on behalf of Real

3

8
10

13

14
15

A. Well, of course.
Q. Okay. Paragraph 8. You're warrantin g that
you have good and marketab le title to the ownership
being sold and transferre d hereunde r. Do you see that?

A. I don't see anything in there that says
warrant.

Q. Well, paragraph 3. Sellers represent ,

16

. T'nE COURT: Mr. Longeteig ?

16

17

warrant, and agree with buyers as foilows, colon;

MR. LONGETEIG: No objection .
THE COURT: Exhibit 41 admitted.

17

correct?

18

19

20
21
22

(Exhibit 41 admitte-1- )

BY MR. BECKER:

Q.

Now, let's tum to page 2. Do you see number
3, about the bottom third of the page?

23
24

rnv name's

in p.int.

I do.

Q.
uuco,.-rc,nl-

Okay.
and agree

18

A. That's what it says up there.

19

Q.

20

A. Not

21
22

Okay.

not in B.

Q. Sellers have good and marketab le title to said
ownership interest being sold?

A..
sc-e it says, Sellers represent ,

as follows; correct?

Q.

Okay. And you agrre that that's what you

I

t::ugene K1ce,

e1 a1.,

v. uenrns .)c..

1

A

Agree this is what I said.

1

2

Q.

And you agree that you said you had absolute

2

3

right to sell, assign, and transfer the same to buyer?

3

page?

A

You're talking about the date and the time and

- or fax and whatever?

4

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Yes.

5

Q.

free and cfear of all liens, pledges, security

5

A.

That's what It says.

encumbran ces, without any breach of any

6

6

interests,

7

agreement to which he is a party?

Do

7

A.

8

A

That's exactly what it says.

8

9

Q.

Paragraph C

9

Q.

Again, you agree you're

a

10

warranting the statements in paragraph

11

A. I don't understan d "warrantin g," !:mt that's
exactly what I put in there, exactly what I intended to

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19

22

Yeah. Tnat wouid be a fax number to my

10

A.

From my office.

11

Q.

Next -- sorry.

12

A. To or from my office.

13

Q.

14

A. It is.

A.

Yeah. I changed it two or three times for

things that he wants and didn't want in there.
Q. Okay.

Q.

16

A. Yeah.

17
18

A.

And this is the final -- the finale.

Q.

Now, earlier we had talked about the fax

19

heading date. It says April 6, 2006. Do you see that?
A
Where are you looking?

That's y001r office fax number?

15

And it says Sallaz & Gatewood law next to it?

Q. Okay. And your contention is that my dien:t
was shown all three of these pages at the time he signed
this on Jarmairy 6, 2006, aliegedly?

20

A. Several times.

21

MR. BECKER: Can we hand the witness Exhibit 42.
(Exhibit handed to the witness.)

22

23
24

Q.

At the top of each page.

A.

Oh. Now, what's your question?

24

25

Q.

Do you see the fax heading at the top of the

25

23

BY MR. BECKER:

Q. Mr. Sallaz, I've handed you a January 17,
2000, letter on Sallaz & Gatewood Olartered letterhead.

17

1

18

Do you see that?

1

A

Yeah.

Q.

Who is Millis Anderson?

3

A.

4

A.

Millis Anderson was a legal assistant for the

4

Q.

5

7

2

firm for many years.
Q.

5

It says a legal assistant to Dennis J. Sallaz,

A.

Q.

And the date is Janu:ary 16, 2007?

8

A

Yeah.

9

Q.

On the fax header?

Q.

Okay. Was she your legal assistant?

A.

No. The whole firm, she took care of very

13

well.
Q.

And on the lower left, a little bit below the

signature, do you see where it says DJS/MA?

14

A.

Yes, I do.

15

Q.

16

A

Okay. DJS, that's your initials; correct?
It certainly is.

Q.

Okay. And slash MA, that's Millis Anderson;

17
18

correct? MA?

19

A.

22

Well, I would sure think that's what
but I -- I didn't do it.
Q.

24

Q_

10

A. Yes.

11

Q.

A

No, it's not the date of the fetter.

13
14
15

Q.

January 17, 2007's the actual date of the

17

1S
is,

As well as the date of the letter?

12

16

Okay. We've got that fax header up at the top

of the page again. Do you see that?

23

Yeah.

Sure.

10
12

A

7

9

11

rax

Pardon?

Salnaz & Gatewood law is written nexl: to the
header?

6

attorney at law. Do you see that on the signature line?

8

21

Sallaz & Gatewood law is written next to the
fax header?

2

6

20

Q.

3

letter?

A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Now, the letter appears to be written
to Roy Rice. Do you see that?

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Okay. The same Roy ruce that we've been

20

talking about?

21

A.

22

Yeah.

23

Is that your fax line for the firm?

24

You asked that question. Of course it is.
Jeez. let's get on with this.

Q. Okay. Now,

j

l

Okay. And next --

Q.

Now, do you contend my clients agreed to all
the essential tenns of this transaction ?

recognize that fax

office.

put in there.

20
21

'fOU!

says, dear Roy and Janet

Who's Janet?
Rice's wife.
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1

Have you met her?

1

2

Q. It says here in closing, Real Propertie s, LLC,
managin g member Janet Rice. Do you see that?
A. Yeah, I see it. I don·t know w-haf: it means.
let's tum to the next page.

2

Do you see that check?

3

MR. SMITH: Judge, let me inquire. Are we laying
a foundati on for its admissio n, or are we trying to
examine the docume nt which
for itself?

3

4
5
6

7
8

9

12

13

14

6

Q. Okay. At the bottom of the page there, we've
got Millis M. Anderso n; correct?

17

A.

Q. Okay. And, again, that's your office

25

assistan t, former office assistan t; correct?
A. For the thin:I time, she's been with me for
years, and she's -- was a wonder ful person .

Q. The third page of that docume nt appears to be
an annual report form; correct? Do you see that?

A. Well, I'm not sure what it is. I'm looking at
it..

1

THE COURT: All right. Exhibit

2

(Exhibit 42 admitte d.)

3

A. Yeah.
Q. It says Dennis J. Sallaz typed below that
signatu re?

BY MR. BECKER:

Q. Okay. So let's tum to page 2 of Exhibit 42,

5
6

Mr. Sallaz. Do you see the number 4? And it says,
manage ment of the limited liability compan y is vested

in?

7

A. Yes.

7

Q.

8

9

A

Do you agree that's your signatur e?
Sure.

42 is admitted .

4

8

10

Yes.

22

Q. And there's a signatur e on that docume nt. Do
you see it?

5

BY MR. BECKER:

18

21
Yeah, that's exactly what it is.

4

14

15

23
24

A. Yes.

1

best to proceed .

21
22

liability compan y that these articles are refening to
is Real Properti es, llC. Do you see that?

25

12

20

A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And the compan y -- the limited

22

have the witness go through and testify about the
docume nt, you need to have the docume nt introduc ed in
evidence .

13

19

Sallaz; correct?

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to sustain the
objectio n in that if -- Mr. Becker, if you're going to

MR. SMITH: I'm trying to be patient about all
this, but I'll let the court make a determi nation how

16

A. Yeah. The same office.
Q. And the initial registere d agent is Dennis J.

19

3

10
11

Q. Also your home; correct?
A. No. Technic ally it's not the same number .
Q. But it's the same building ?

17

2

9

And it says the initial registere d office is

18

24

7
8

at 1000 South Rooseve lt?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that your home address?
A. My office address .

16

23

6

Okay. It says it's the articles of
organiza tion for a limited lfability company ?
A. Yes.

15

20
21

5

Um-hm m.

10

11

4

Q. Now, it says manage ment is vested in membe rs.

9

A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. And you see where it says member s?

MR. SMITH: let me renew my objectio n, Judge.
Either we're going to introduc e the exhibit if we're

10

A.

11

12

mark?

13

going to later testify from it, or we're just going to
fay a foundati on and stop going through it. One of the

Q. And would you agree that that is a typed check

13

14

two.

14

15

A. I don't have any idea how it was put there,
but that's what's -- that's what's there.

i5

Q. You agree that it's typed and not handwri tten?

16

f7

So I wouid object to the line of question ing,
the format it's been, and encoura ge counsel to either
move for its admissio n or just lay further foundati on

A. Well, this copy is certain ly not handwr itten.

17

18

without trying to get testimon y as to the content of the

18

19

exhibit if he's not intendin g to use it as an exhibit.
THE COURT: Okay. Sustaine d.

Q. Okay. Do you believe -- strike that.
Now, the next pc1ragraph says, if manage ment is
to be vested in one or more manage rs, list the names and
addresse s of at least one initial manage r. If

11

12

16

!O
!1
~2
'.3

MR. BECKER: Well, I move for the admissio n of
Exhibit 1L

:4

MR. SMITH: We stipulate to its admissio n.
THE COURT: Mr. longetei g?

5

MR. LONGET EIG:

19
20

Yes.

21

manage ment is vested in the member s, list the names and

22

addresse s of at least one initial member . And you see
the name Janet Rice; correct?

23

24
this docume nt?

1:::ugene KJce, et
1

2
3

4
5

6
7

a,., v. uenrns ~-

aL, t,;ase NO. t,;vzuu~ -11tl!)!)

A.

Well, Roy and I prepare d it. This is what he
wanted . I put it togethe r.

1

Q.

Exhibit 42, I believe.

3

A.

Yeah.

4

Q.

5

2

Q.

And you agree that it was filed with the Idaho
secretar y of state on January 4, 2006; correct?

A.

Okay. And on page 3 where it says Buyer?
Page 3?

6

Q.

Page 3 of Exhibit 41.

7

A.

Yeah.

Q.

A.

Well, I didn't do it, but it's stapled that
way, and I have no reason to - to deny it. But I -- I
nothing to do with filing it.

8

Q.

Who do you contend filed it?

a

9

A.

Weir, either Roy or somebo dy out of my office.

9

10

Q.

Millis?

11

A.

12
13

14

Prnbabl y. Or possibly . She usuaUy didn't go
to town, but who knows. Somebo dy sure got it to town.

15

A.

16

Q.

17

I agree everyth ing that's on this docume nt.
And the Exhibit 41 we were talking about

earlier was dated January 6, 2006; correct?

18

A.

19

MR. BECKER: Can we hand the witness Exhibit 41.

Well, if you say so. I don't have i t

10

correct?

11

A.

Ido.

Q.

Okay. And it says By manager ?

13

A. Yeah.

14

Q.

15

A.

16

say.

Q. Of Real Propertie s, LlC?
Right. One says buyer, and then the signatu re
says manage r. I don't - that's what it says.
Q. Underne ath Real Propertie s, LLC?

18
19

(Exhibit handed to the witness.)

20

21

THE WITNES S: Yeah. 6th day of January 2006.
BY MR. BECKER:

21

22

22

Okay. And you see on the signature page on

23

A.

Which docume nt?

24
25

1

A.

Ido.

1

2

Q.

Okay. Now, this documen t, one of the

2

24
25

Q.
page 3?

And that's manage r of Real Propertie s, LlC?
Well, buyer and manage r, I guess you co1.dd

17

20

23

Do you see the signature line where it says
Buyer? And you see where Eugene L Rice has signed;

12

Q.

Okay. And so Real Propertie s, LLC, it appears
that it was filed effective January 4, 2006; agreed?

rm sorry. 41. You have that?

A.

A.

Is where he signed as manage r.

Q. Okay. And on the first page of that documen t,
the first paragrap h, do you see at the end of the first
paragrap h where it refers to Real Propertie s, LLC, as
the buyer?

25

3

4
5
6
7
8

26

propertie s that you were selling in there was Riverside
lot 1B; correct?

3

4

MR. SMITH: To which I object, Judge. Nowhere in
this documen t does this purchase agreeme nt convey real
property . It only conveys ownersh ip interest in Real

7

Homes, LLC. So I object to the fonn of the question .
It misstate s the content of the documen t currently in

9

5
6

8

MR. SMITH: Is he back on the warrantie s?
MR. BECKER: I'm on page 1, Mr. Smith.
THE COURT: No. This is the -- under the
witnesse s.
MR. BECKER: Whereas .
THE COURT: Whereas . Not the first paragrap h but
the 5,_oeond. It Is the mutual desire of the parties

10

hereto that seller shall sell to the buyer all of the
ownersh ip interest and all right, title, and interest in
and to all real property owned by Real Homes, UC, as

11

set forth in Exhibit A attached hereto.

MR. BECKER: My response is Mr. Sallaz confirme d
that Exhibit 41 was the agreeme nt he executed , and this

12
13

was the full and complete copy.

14

15

BY MR. BECKER:

16

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, what's your
objection ? Because it looks like to me that on page 1

All right. I'm going to overrule the
objection . Because at a minimum I think there's at
least some ambigu!t y here that I've got to sort through.

16

17

of Exhibit 41 --

18

MR. SMITH: What that documen t purports to do is
sell the ownersh ip interest of 5al!az and Trefren to the
buyer, being Real Homes, LLC. That's what it does. It

Q. Now, Mr. Sallaz, one of the parcels you
induded in this agreeme nt was Riverside lot 18;
correct?

20

does not convey any real property interest.

21

MR. BECKER: I'm looking at paragrap h 3,
Your lfonor..

lot lB was sold on January 6, 2006; rorrect? To Real

22

Propertie s?

9

10
11
12

13

14
15

1::
. 21

22
23

evidence as Exhibit 41.
THE COURT: Mr. Becker, your response ?

24

THE COURT: Right.

25

MR. BECKER: On page 1.

27

17
18
19

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Now, you daim that that was

that Riverside

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Now, presentiy that's your ex-wife's house;

f
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1

A. Parnon?

1

Q.

2

Q.

That's your ex-wife's house?

2

3

A.

Well, it's Renee's house.

3

4

Q.

Okay. Now -

4

A. Oh, down at the very bottom?
Q. Yes.
A. Yeah.

Well, I guess -

5

Q.

There's no question before you, Mr. Sallaz.

6

5
6
7

8

9

10

Q.

Now, on this -- in connectio n with this
trcmsactio n, you received some money from my client;
correct?

7

A.

Okay.

initials and Millis

Ande-sor."s initials; correct?

8

9

Do you see where it says DJS/MA?

A.

That's what I would think.

Q.

And you see this letter is enclosing some

document s with it. Do you see that?

11

Welf, I got - let's see. He gave me five
g,and as a prepay. That's the only money that I can

11

12

rememb er ever getting.

12

Q. And then there's some pages behind this
letter. Why don't you rake a minute to flip through

13

those and see that.

13

MR. BECKER: Can we hand the witness Exhibit 39.

14
15

{Exhibit handed to the witness.)
Q.

Mr. Sallaz, I've just handed you an April 4,

17

2006, letter, again on your letterhead . Do you see

18

that?

20

A. Yes.
Q.

16

A. Which one?

17

Q.

A.

Well, yeah.

19

Q.

And in the lower left comer, again, we have

20

DJS/MA? Do you see that?

22

23

A.

Where's that at?

Q.

In the lower left. In the middle, middle of

the page.

25

A.

Do you recall writing this letter?
Exhibit 39.

MR. SMITH: Well, for the record, there's not less
than four letters reflected in Exhibit 39. So if he can
be more specific in laying a foundation which letter

21

he's referring to.

22

BY MR. BECKER:

23

Q. Mr. Sallaz, you wrote this letter -THE COURT: Now, just a second. I -- Mir. Smith is
correct. So make sure you make reference to which

24
What's your question ?

Yes.

15

18

19

24

A.

14

BY MR. BECKER:

16

21

10

25

29

1

30

2

fetter and the date, Mr. Becker, for clarity of the
record, please.

2

3

BY MR. BECKER:

A.

1

Well, we had -- we were dealing with two

attorney s.

3

Q.

Jill Holinka and Kevin Dinius?

Do you recall writing the April 4, 2006,

4

A.

Very likely.

5

letter which encloses the document s behind that?

5

Q.

6
7

A. No, I don't rememb er it. I see it here, but I
don't remembe r it.

7

A.

8

Q.

4

Q.

6

And do you recall requesting what the total
payoff amount was for the Saxton note?

No, but I'm sure I did.

8

Q.

9

Rennell?

9

10

A.

10

Does the number $63,4-02.8 2 sound familiar?
Well, that'd be -- that'd be right- real
dose. And obviousl y when he sent this,. i.t was the

11
12
13
14

No, I don't rememb er It. I certainly could
have done it

17

A.

11

exact amount.

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

But I -- you asked me if I remembe r it:. I

13

Q. Let's tum to page 3, a January 6, 2006,
letter, again on your letterhead . Do you see that?

14

A.

Yeah.

Well, let's tum to the second page, then. Do

15

Q.

The same day as the other two -

you recall on January 6, 2006, you were in negotiatio ns
regarding a foreclosure ?

16

don't.

i5
t6

You don't remembe r sending this letter to Jim

Q.

17

A.

Whateve r. Yes.

18

A.

Yeah.

i8

Q.

There's a signeture

19

Q.

Okay. You were in negotiatio ns with the

19

A.

Ido.

w

attorney for Saxton Fruit Farms; correct?

!1

A.
Q.
A.

'.4

them.

Yeah.
that was White Peterson?

'Neil, there was two of them, but he was one of

20

rm sorry.

As the previous letter; correct?

that page. Do you see

that7

21

Q.

Is that your signat1_;re?

22

A.

I'm sure it is.

23

Q.

And do you see where you're demandin g what the
of price is
Saxton note in

cugene r-.;1ce, m a1., v. uenrus .:>c..

..,

A. Yeah, I see that right here .

1

exhibits with hi

2

Q.

2

3

A.

WeUr no.

3

MR. SMITH: Well, the truth is he's trying to have
him testify from the document before it's admitted into

4

Q.

Did you pay off that amount?

4

evidence.

5

A. Roy Rice paid off that amount buying the

6

rm sure I

did.

property.

7

Q.

8

Do you recall doing that?

let's look at the last page of that exhibit.

Q.

11

objection. Because when you said -- your last question,
what was the amount of the check for. So that's
testifying from the document as opposed to laying the
foundation for the document So sustain the objection.

9

How much is that check for?

10

A. The same amount they told us it was.
Q. And you agree you received that from my

12

THE COURT: Right. I'm going to sustain the

6

8

A. I do.

110

5

7

Do you see the dollar amount on that cashier's check?

9

o lay that foundation.

BY MR. BECKER:

11

Q.

12

page 4?

Do you recall this cashiers check that's on

13

client?

13

14

MR. SMITH: Judge, let me inquire. Are we laying
a foundation, or are we going to testify from Exhibit

14

Q.

Do you recall a cashier's check was sent --

15

A.

Sure.

No. 39? I would object to the line of question until
it's admitted. Or are we just laying foundation? What

16

17

17

Q. -- to Saxton?
A. Sure.

18

are we doing?

18

Q. Yes?

15
16

19
20

MR. BECKER: And, Your Honor, I understand that

19

A. Yes. I absolutely remember it. Rice had

20

given It to me to deliver to this attorney for his
purchase of the properties. And I don't know who

I'm going a little -- to be a little more thorough on
some of these, but I think Mr. Sallaz is demonstratin g

21

some difficulty here.

22

24

And so part of laying the foundation on
fetters with exhibits, I think, based on the answers

24

25

I've gotten thus far, I need to go through some of these

25

21

22
23

A. Well, I don·t recall it, but here it is.

23

delivered the check for him. Maybe he did. But that's
what was done at everybody's agreement.
MR. BECKER: I

33

1
2

34

MR. SMITH: No objection to the admission of
Exhibit 39.

1
2

MR. LONGETEIG: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. You may inquire.

THE COURT: Mr. Longeteig?

4

MR. LONGETEIG: No objection.

4

5

THE COURT: All right. Exhibit 39 admitted.

5

7
8
9

10

11
12

(Exhibit 39 admitted.)

6

MR. BECKER: Let's hand the witness Exhibits 149
to 152.
MR. SMITH: You want Exhibits 149 through 152?
MR. BECKER: Yeah. They're all quitclaim deeds.

exhibits out now?

3

3

6

move for the admission of

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 39.

BY MR. BECKER:

Q. Do you see Exhibit 149 in front of you,
Mr. Sallaz?

7

A. I do.

8

Q.

What is that?

9
10

A.

It appears to be a quitclaim deed from Gfenn

Trefren.

I think he's referring with his client to see
if we can eliminate some paperwork, to see if we can

11

Q.

And what's the date of that quitclaim deed?

12

A.

January 6, '06.

13

Q. And who is the grantor?

13

either agree on something or use their version if they

14
15

prefer.

14

A. Welf, Glenn Trefren.

(Exhibits handed to the witness.)

15

Q.

And who's the grantee?

16

MR. BECKER: So we're going to use our exhibits,
Mr. Smith?

16

A.

Real Properties.

17

Q. LLC?

18

MR. SMITH: Let's work from yours initially.

18

A. Yeah.

19

MR. BECKER: Okay.

19

17

20

BY MR. BECKER:

20

21

Q.

22

THE COURT: Let's wait until they get all of the

Mr. Sallaz --

I t.'link they're still working on th2t.

23

LONGETEIG: One more to go,
COURT:

right. I think -- have we

35

21
22

the

24
25

Q. And in the witneSs statement there, do you see
where it refers to 714 Smith Avenue?

A.

Yeah.

Q_

And that was one of the properties that you

contend was owned

Real Hornes?

Yeah.
Real

LLC;

11/21/20 13
1
A.
Q.
2
3

4
5

Yes.

1

On January 6, 2006?

2

A. That•s the same date.

l

And on the next page there, we have a notary
stamp. Do you see that?

6

Ido.

6

7

7
8

9

a

A.

And what's the name on that notary stamp?
Notary public for Idaho.

9

Q.

Whose name?

10

A.

Oh. Minis Anderson .

11
12

13
14
15

16
17

18

19
20

21

22
23
24
25

1

4

10

Q. Do you see on the front page of this document
where it stamps that it's recorded?
A. Ido.

11

12

recorder's office. It rould come in as a business
record if, in fact, there was a foundation laid that
this is somebody' s business record. Also they could lay
further foundation to that effect.

MR. BECKER: You can take -- we don't need those
exhibits anymore if that's how Mr. Sallaz is going to
handle the situation.
MR. SMITH: I can't -- I couldn't understan d you
or hear you.
MR. BECKER: I said Mr. Sallaz does not need to -we can move on from those exhibits.

13

Q. And what's the date on that? Is it March 2,
2006?

MR. SMITH: Oh.

14

BY MR. BECKER:

15

Q. Mr. Sallaz, you instructed my clients to sue
you, Mr. Trefren, and Renee; correct?

A.

16

17

A.

Q. Do you recall this quitdaim deed?

18

MR. BECKER: can we hand the witness Exhibit 1.
(Exhibit handed to the witness.)

Well, it's a little blurry, but I think that's
E"ight. Mine's a little blurry.

A. Well, I don't recall it.
Q. Do you have any reason to believe that Glenn
Trefren did not execute this quitdaim deed?

19
20

BY MR. BECKER:

Q. Mr. Sallaz, I'm handing you a January 8, 2009,
22 letter, again on your letterhead. Do you see that?
21

A. Not at all.
MR. BECKER: Move for the admission of 149.
MR. SMITH: The document as such, Judge, is not a
certified copy of a recordation with the Canyon County

No. Absolutel y not correct.

23

A. I do.

24

Q. Is that your letterhead?

25

A. It is.

37
Q. And turning to the second page, do you see a

38
1
2

l

A. Yes.

If Mr. Becker is -- reflecting upon what I
just said, is insistent that it be admitted -- if you

3

want it in --

4

Q. Is that your signature?
A. Absolutel y.

4

2

5
6

7
8
9

signature?

5

MR. BECKER: Move for the admission of Plaintiffs'
Exhibit No. 1.

7

MR. SMITH: Unless they can demonstra te that this
is somebody 's business record, it contains hearsay, and

9

6

8

MR. BECKER: I do.

IBE COURT: Well, it doesn't have to be qualified
as a business record. Yeah. He's moved the admission.
Mr. Sallaz has testified that that's his signature. And
it's on his letterhead. It could be an admission of a
party. It coufd come in under that. And so I'm going
to admit Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1.

10

therefore I'm going to object to the admission of

10

11

Exhibit 1.

11

12

MR. BECKER: Your Honor, this is -THE COURT: He's acknowled ged that that's his
signature and --

12

As far as the other, you know, ethical issues,
that's something that really is separate and apart,

13

Mr. Becker. That's your choice.

13
14

15
16
17
18
19

14

MR. SMITH: He indeed does. I don't see the
relevancy -- the question is did he encourage this suit

15

to be filed. So if we want to get into the suit being
fifed, we're going to open the door that, in fact,

17

16

18

2.0

Mr. Becker and Mr. Runft were the attorneys for
Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Rice and, if necessary, Mr. Trefren.

20

!1

I'm trying to keep the door somewhat from becoming ajar.

21

!2

So I think it's irrelevzmt to the Count V.
If this court wants to let it in, I can only

22

~3

!4

!5

say you've expanded the context of this
let the court first
if

So I'll

MR. BECKER: I don't -TrlE COURT: Because I don't necessarily -- i know
there was an issue earlier on in this. But I haven't
been aware of any other things since that time, and so
I'm not in a position to really sort it out. Okay.

19

23

(Exhibit 1
BY MR. BECKER:

Q.

Now, Mr. Sallaz, this -So it's <3dmitted?

THE COURT: It is admitted.
BY MR. BECKER:

1::ugene race, et al., v. uenrns :sa1,
at, case No. CV-LUU!J-11355
1 Do you see where it says in the last two-line paragraph
1
A. Okay. Let's 2

3

4
5

there, both Trefren and myself are willing and
supporting defendants and stand ready to participate to
the max? Do you see that?

A. I sure do.

6

And you wrote

A

7
8

9
10
11

12
13
14
15

16
17
18

correct?

You bet.

Q. Okay. Now, the main target of this lawsuit
that you instructed Mr. Rice to file was --

Q. Okay.

5

A. I've been invited.

8
9

MR. SMITH: Now, wait a moment. I'm going to
object to the form of that question. But, firstly, "the
main target of this lawsuit." He hasn't defined a

11
12

lawsuit. Secondly, he instructed Mr. Rice to file. So
I'm going to object to the form of the question as a

14

compound question. It's assuming facts yet not in
evidence.

16

10

13
15

THE COURT: Sustained.

17

21

What's your next question?

23

4

7

20
22

3

Q. And we're in a lawsuit today; correct?
A. Of course.

6

BY MR. BECKER:
Q. We're here in a lawsuit today; correct?
A. I deny that it's a valuable one.

19

2

Q. We're in a courtroom today. Correct,

Mr. Sallaz?

24

A.

25

Q. I do.

18
19
20

21
22
23

Absolutely. Don't you know that?

Q. And Renee Baird

rm sure she was.
Q. And you're a party to this lawsuit; correct?
A. Well, yeah. But I need to explain that.
A.

Q. When there's a question in front of you,
perhaps you can.

A. If I get a good question£

MR. BECKER: Can we hand the witness Exhibit 102.
(Exhibit handed to the witness.)

MR. BECKER: This could be the wrong one. I
apologize.
MR. SMITH: The wrong one?
MR. BECKER: Yeah. I'm sorry. We have a few
affidavits in this case.
Yeah. The exhibit's labeled wrong, and I
apologize to the court and to opposing counsel.

may prefer to have in the record of this case, it might
be appropriate then for me to stipulate to the admission
of Exhibit 71 concerning Mr. Sallaz's initial concern

41

42

1

2

2

4

Q. Mr. Sallaz, I've handed you an affidavit of
Dennis J. Sallaz in support of motion to disqualify
J. Kahle Becker from further representatio n of

5

plaintiffs. Do you see that?

7
8
9

Q. And on the page 6 of that document there's a
signature. Do you see that?

A. Yes.
Q. Is that your signature?

A. Yes.

13

5
6

10
12

3
4

A. I do.

11

Q. And do you see the signature below that where
it says Keli M. Walts?

14

A. Yes.

15

Q.

16

A.

7

Is she an employee at your law office?
She is.

17

Q. She's a notary? She's a notary?

A. Yes.

about the representatio n of Mr. Kahle in this case
ongoing and the continuing ongoing representatio n.

So because it's already been made earlier in a
form of a motion in this case, we have no objection to

8

it being made now an exhibit in the evidence presented

9

to the court.

10
11

THE COURT: Mr. Longeteig?

12

THE COURT: Exhibit 71 admitted.

MR. LONGETEIG: No objection.

13
14

18

15
16

17
18
19

(Exhibit 71 admitted.)
BY MR. BECKER:

Q. Let's tum to page 3 of Exhibit 71,
Mr. Sallaz.

A. Got it.
MR. SMITH: Page what?

19

Q.

Do you recall making this affidavit?

20

A.

Yeah. I recall when we did it.

20

MR. SMITH: In the affidavit?

MR. BECKER: Okay. Move for the admission of
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 71.

21

MR. BECKER: Yes.

21
22

This is, Your Honor, becoming an issue
the representati on of Mr. Becker 1n
purposes of what I believe

ru answer it right

immediatel y.

can we hand the witness Exhibit 71.
(Exhibit handed to the witness.)

BY MR. BECKER:

6

party to this lawsuit at

one time; correct?

24
25

1
3

11!21r.l013

Sallaz

22

MR. BECKER: Page 3.

MR. SMITH:
BY MR. BECKER:

Do you see the --

second-to-th e-last

read the

11/21/20 13
1

Mr. Sallaz, on page 3?

5

6
7

10

5

A. I do. 134?

8

Q. Yes.
A. Yeah.
Q. And these are discovery responses provided by

10
11

A. Of course. Plus a lot of other things.

12

13

MR. BECKER: Let's hand the witness Exhibit 134.
You can keep that affidavit in support of the

13

16
17
18

15
16

MR. BECKER: 134 is in, I believe. It is not
admitted yet?

18

THE COURT: Sue, is 134 in?

17

A. I'm su,e this is -- this is what I had.
Q. And you signed it under oath?
A. :rm sure I did.

21

21

but you sustained the objection.

22

24

MR. LONGETEIG: I thought it's already in.
THE COURT: There was a motion to admit it,

. 25

Q. If you'd like to take a minute to do so,
please go right ahead.

19

22

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

A. That's what it fooks like.
Q. In this case; correct?
A. That's what it looks like.
Q. Do you have any reason to believe it's not?
A. Well, I haven't looked at every page.

20

THE CLERK: No. You sustained the objection. You
sustained the objection. They moved to admit earlier,

23

you; correct?

14

motion to disqualify. We'll be coming back to it.
MR. LONGETEIG: 134 is already in?

19
20

Do you have that in front of you, Mr. Sallaz?

7
9

used in preparing the complaint?

14

MR. SMITH: All right. We have it.
BY MR. BEC.<ER:

6

12

15

TI-IE COURT: At that point.

4

Q. Can you please respond to the question?
A. I thought I did.
Q. Did you assist with providing facts that were

9

11

3

were used in preparing a complaint; correct?
A. We!lr I expand that to include many, many
Mr. Runft filed this action with your
You wo,ked on it diligently .

8

objection to it, and I sustained the objection.
MR. LONGETEIG: Okay.

2

Okay. You agree that you provided facts that

3

4

1

A. I remembe r it well.

2

23
24
25

Q. And Scott Gatewood was your attorney of
record; correct?

A. Well, I'm not sure about that. Yeah. I saw
that in here .

45
1
2

46

Q. You've also had other attorneys of record in
this case; correct?

1

Q. Have Ray Schild?

2

A. Yes.

3

A. I'm sure I have.

3

Q.

4

Q. Well, Mr. Smith is sitting here right now?

4

7?

5

MR. SMIDi: In this exhibit?
MR. BECKER: In this exhibit.
BY MR. BECKER:

5

A.

6
8

Q. He's your attorney of record; correct?
A. I'm sure he is.
Q. Is that a yes or no?

8

9

A. Yes or no?

9

7

10

11
12

I'm sure he is.

MR. LONGETEIG: I thought he said yes.
TI-IE COURT: All right. Well, Mr. Longeteig.
BY MR. BECKER:

6
7

10
11
12

Now, if we could tum to interrogat ory number

Q. Do you see that at the bottom of page 5? And
then the answer continues on to page 6.
A. It does.
Q. It asks for any communic ations you've had with
plaintiffs.

13

Q. He's your attorney of record; correct?

13

A. It's what?

14

TI-IE COURT: We'll wait for you to

14

Q. It asks for any communic ations you've had.
A. Yeah.

i5
16
17
18

19

20

was that an

objection?
MR. LONGETEIG: No.
TilE COURT: Okay.
MR. LONGETEIG: Observatio n.
MR. BECKER: Thank you.

?1

THE COURT: I'm sure that's -- I'm not sure that
that's permitted under the rules, but whatever.

~2

BY MR. BECKER:

~3

Ycu also had Ray Schild as an attorney of
record in this case; correct?

!4

Q.

Did!

15
16

Q. Do you see that? Okay.
17
Now, in your supplemen ted answer, you state
18 that you have numerous
you've h;:id numerous and
19 ongoing communica tion with
his
20 John Runft and Kahle Becker, concerning all facts and
issues in this case as well as the pleadings filed
Do you see that?

A.

Yeah.

Do you agree

Eugene Rice, et at, v. Dennis 5a..
1

at, Case No. GV2009-11355

statement.

2

1

The next sentence begins, defendant provided

Q.

11lT~1TL013

Exhibit 134.

2

THE WITNESS: Where's that at?

3

both of plaintiffs' attorneys in both person and via

3

4

telephone conversations with information regarding the

4

to the admission of the filing of the response to

5

requests for productions or for interrogatories. They

MR_ SMITH: Once again, as I did before, I object

5

issues involved in this litigation, both prior to this

6

action having been filed and up to the point where they

6

can e.xamine from them, but they're not, as

7

breached their agreement with defendants and filed the

7

document

8

motion to dismiss.

8

9

Do you agree with that statement?

A. I didn't find it in here. What -- where

10

ii
12

15

is

A.

It's the next sentence in that same

Q.

Do you agree with the full supplemented answer

17

to interrogatory number 7 as it's reflected on page 6
of-A.

Yeah. I absolutely confirm everything in this

20

answer. And it should be another three or four pages

21

long.

22

24
25

13

Oh, okay, Absolutely. Did you say do I admit

18

23

12

that or - what are you asking?

19

r

have before, to its admission as such.
Q.

16

rm going -- I have no problem having him

Mr. Sallaz, but I've got to continue my objection, as

supplemented answer to interrogatory number 7 on page 6.

14

So

cross-examine or examine as an adverse witness

that?

13

a

basically they're hearsay.

Q.

And, again, you're referring to Plaintiffs'

Exhibit 134?

I sure am.

A.

MR. BECKER: Move for the admission of Plaintiffs'

THE COURT: Sustained_
BY MR. BECKER:

14

Q.

15

A.

I have it

16

Q.

And that is, again, an affidavit in support of

let's tum to Exhibit 71.

17

rr.otion to disqualify J. Kahle Becker from further

18

representation of plaintiffs?

19

A.

It sure is.

20

Q.

Can I have you tum to page 5?

21

A.

22

Well, there's a whole bunch of pages here.
Page 5 of - the first page 5?

23

Q.

24

A.

25

I only have one page 5, Mr. Sallaz.
Well, I have one right in front of me.

Affidavit. Page 5.

49

50

1

Q.

Affidavit of Dennis J. Sallaz, page 5?

1

everybody. I don't know who all was involved in their

2

A.

Yeah.

2

- in their fraud.

3

Q.

And do you see the third paragraph therB?

3

Q.

You contend the settlement was a fraud?

4

A.

Yes.

4

A.

Absolutely.

Q.

It says, in reviewing the discovery requests

5

Q_

And you contend that you should ilave had input

5
6

of Mr. Becker, I found numerous interrogatories and

6

7

requests for admission directly related to the specific

1

8

information I provided to them in meetings I had with

8

what I needed to have the information of, fmm my

9

Mr. Becker and -- I'm sorry

9

attorney. It was done before he ever called me. Then

10

he apologized because she - Rice had double-crossed

10

Mr. Runft and Mr. Becker

over the year we were working together?

in that settlement?

A.

More than that. Much more than - to stop is

11

A.

I certainly remember every bit of it.

11

him. And he was really sick about it, and he was

12

Q.

And you agree with that statement?

12

13

A.

Yes. And more. This is brief.

13

getting out of the case, taking you with him. That's
exactly what he tofd me.

14

Q.

You understand my dients have settled with

14

15

16

Renee Baird; correct?

15

A.

MR. BECKER: I'd move to strike that statement as
hearsay.

17

I found out after it happened, after he told
me that he was getting out of the case with you because

18

of the terrible breach of all - all of the rules and

18

the question asked, and he doesn't like the answer he

19

regulations of attorney actions.

19

got. But it's not hearsay_ It's

20

dialogue about what he was told about the settlement.

20

21

Q.

You understand my clients settled with Renee

Baird; yes?

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Okay. You understand they settled with Real

25

Homes, LLC; correct?

A.

THE WITNESS: I'll bet you do. It's --

17

MR. SMITH: Well, it's not-- it's a response to

21

22

24

16

I think they wern
51

with

THE COURT: Okay_ I'm granting the motion to

22

strike_ It's not relevant.

23

BY MR. BECKER:

24

25

response to a

Q.

let's tum to

can tum to page 13.

52

go back

Exhibit 134. If
are

11/21/2013

Eugene Rice, et al., v. Dennis

1

THE COURT: What exhibit are you on now?

1

2

MR. BECKER: 134. These are Dennis Sal!az's

2

3
4

responses to plaintiffs' first set of

4

5

to be responses to requests for admission inducted in

5

6

there as welL

6

7

BY MR. BECKER:

7

8

9

Q.
A.

13
14

Q.

Q.
A.

Q.

I told you I can't answer that question

because I really don't know. There's so damned many
documents filed and counter-doc uments and - I don't

counterdaim asserted by you against my dients night

17
18
19

now.

r should be.

But you'll have to ask my

this case?

Then let's go on.

Q.

Do you agree with that?

20

A.

What did I just tell you? I don't know. And

21

that's a fact.

22

A. I signed so

many documents in this case that I

-- it certainly could be there.
Are you suing Renee Baird in this case right

I'll reprE:Sent to you that there is no

Q.

A.

Do you recall signing a counterclaim?

22

Q.

counterdaim my dients?

16

Verification of a counterclaim against my dients in

24

Sitting here right now, are you able Ito say

Well, do you feel you're suing my clients in

21

23

Q.

know.

attorney if I am.

20

WeHr I certainly thought rve sued her
these cases. It's still pem!ing, going en. So if it's
specific to this ca~ you'd have to ask my attorney.

14
15

this case?

18

19

13

I don't know that one way or the other,
frankly. Ask my attorney.

Have you signed any crn.m1ten:ianms against

A.

12

A.

Q.

A.

11

There's no counterclaim presently before the

Weli# I thought I was.

definitively whether Olf not you are suing mrnugh a

10

court, is there, on your behalf?

16
17

I don't have a due if I did or didn't. I

A.

Renee Baird at this point in this rase?

8

9

assume I -- I assume I would have.

12

15

Mr. Sailaz, you never filed a counterclaim in

this action; correct?

10

11

25

3

interrogatorie s, requests for production. There appear

And you're an attorney of 40 years?

Q.

24

A. I'm a defendant sitting here with my attorneys
taking care of me. And they've taken good care of me.

25

And I'm not sure of everything they have done.

23

53

1
2

Q.

et al., Case No. CY.2000-11855

now?

54

Well, that's what attorneys do is they take

1

care of their clients; right?

2

property.

Q. And that was given under oath?

3

A.

3

A.

What?

4

don't do that.

4

Q.

That admission.

5

Q.

It's unfortunate when that happens.

5

A.

:r signed it,.

6

A.

I felt that unfortune for three or four years
now with you and your coun!er-atto rney.

6

Q.

Under oath.

7

A.

We've talked about that Of course it was

7
8
9

Q.

That's the name of the game. Some attorneys

Turning to page 13 of Exhibit 134, there's a

8

request for admission number 15. Do you see that?

10

A.

I sure do. Did you say 17?

11

Q.

12
13
14
15

9

didn't I?

under oath.
MR. BECKER: Your Honor, rd move for the limited

10

admission of Exhibit 134 regarding the specific answers

I said 15.

11

that were provided in the discovery responses.

A.

Oh, excuse me.

12

Q.

It's at the top of page 13.

13

my objection as it has been. I see nothing different

A

Yeah, I have it here.

14

where we're at. The rules of discovery haven't changed.

Q.

And the request for admission states, admit

15

The rules of evidence haven't changed.

MR. SMirn: With all due respect, I will continue

16

Real Properties, LLC, expended $63,402.82 to prevent the

16

THE COURT: Right.

17

foreclosure of 5580 [sic] Riverside Road, Canyon County,

17

MR. SMirn: He can cross-examin e him all cay long

18
19

Idaho. Do you see that?

18

on the document, go through each one if he wishes_ I

A.

I certainly do.

19

guess in that sense he can try to get it in.

20

Q.

Do you see your response?

20

not otherwise going to get it into this rec.,m:I.

he's

21

A.

I certainly do.

21

THE COURT: Sust.-ained.

22

Q.

And it says admitted?

22

MR~ BECKER: \Ve have no further questions for

23

A.

Yeah.

23

24

Q.

Do you agree with that?

24

Su,e. He

25

25

it so he could buy

witness.
THE COURT:

1
2

3

4

t al., Case No. CV2009- 11855
of Mr. Sallaz in our case in chief. I do not desire to
at this point, as you say, to cross-ex amine him. He was
called as an adverse witness in this case. I reserve my
to examine him in my direct examina tion --

5

THE COURT: All right. I'll permit that.
MR. SMITH: -- in our case in chief --

6

7

THE COURT: I'll pe1mlt that.
MR. SMITH: - after the plaintiff rests their

8
~9

10
11

12
13

case.
THE COURT: I'll permit that. So, Mr. Sallaz, you
may step down.
THE WITNESS : Thank you, Your Honor.
(The witness left the stand.)

14

15

(End of requeste d portion of proceedi ng.)

16
17

18
19
20

21
22

23
24
25
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REPORT ER•s CERTIF ICATE

STATE OF

DAHO

}
ss.

COUNTY OF CANYON

I,

Kll'I'HER INE J.

KLEMET SON,

RPR,

CSR flc436r

one

of the duly appoin ted qualif ied and acting offici al
report ers a£ the Third Judici al Distri ct of the State of
Idaho,

do hereby certif y that I

report ed in shorth and

the eviden ce and procee dings adduce d in the above and
forego ing cause,

and that I therea fter transc ribed said

shorth and notes into typew riting and that the within and
forego ing pages consti tute a full,

true and correc t copy

of the transc ript of said eviden ce and to the best of my
abilit y and accord ing to my shorth and notes consis ting
of pages 1 throug h 58,

inclus ive.

IN WITNES S WHEREOF,

I

have hereun to set my

hand this 25th day of Novemb er 2013.

KATHER INE
lodged with me this
2013.
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk

J:-

KLEMET SON,
day

of

By:

------------

58

Deputy .

RPR, CSR #436

E hibit

I 000 South Roosevelt Street
Post Office Box 8956 Boise ID 23707
De@is J. Sallaz
G, Scott Gatevvood.

8,

L.Runft
Rmm&
1020 Vif. l'vfa.iin St, Ste. 400
.Boise, JD 83 702
RiceJohn:
our

secor:l.d

he's doing much

we discussed

a

your help badly.

The

a pmtnershi p to

and I

up

land

went onfm·

I

my

a

one: of her brain

to

reset on a 30
rmd ina

I
and pay

U}pon

of tht<;;

He didn't agree to this deal

day

the

when

paid the foreclosure

took title to the property. I reported this emergency sale to the divorce court and we went on with
the divorce proceedings.

Roy went to work on the properties in order to sell and Renee filed the enclosed Lis Pendem;,
clouding the Title.

A year or so later, the divorce court acknowledged that Real Homes was a community asset
and decided she should have it but acknowledged that it had already been sold to a good faith buyer
at a fair p1ice and he couldn't do anything about it. What he was thinking has been a real myste1y

to Bevis and myseff as it was totally jibberish. Anyway, Roy has $90,000.00 plus in mortgage
payments and somewhere around $50,000.00 to $60,000.00 in construction jmprovcmcnts and he
really needs to sell.

Both T rcfrcn and myselfare willing and supporting Defendants and stand ready to participate
to the max.
Please review and I know you can proceed with your magic.
Thanks,

DJS/kw

Enclosures

1.

Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest jn Real Homes, Inc. dated 01/06/2006
All LLC Interest
Ail 4 Land Parcels

2.

Property Deeds dated O1/06/2006

3.

D .L. Evans Bank Latter
Confirm s payoff of foreclosure with cashier's check dated 01/06/2006

4.

Real Homes Annual Report- Sallaz & Trefren Owners

5.

Lis Pendens- Renee Baird dated 07/25/2006

6.

Articles of Real Properties, LLC dated 01/06/2006- Roy Rice
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THIS INDE NTU RE, Made this& !: day o f ~ , ,
2006, between GLEN
TREF REN, a single man, and as sole Owner, M e m
~ r of Tradesman
Contractors Const ructio n LLC, of Boise, Idaho, "Gran tor", and
REAL PROP ERTI ES, LLC
"Gran tee";
WITN ESSE TH that the said grantor does by these presents
remise, release, and
forever QUIT CLAI M unto the said grantee, and to its heirs and
assigns all of that certain
lot, piece, or parcel of land, situate, lying and being in Caldw
ell, Coun ty of Canyon, State o
Idaho, comm only know n as 15580 Riverside Road, Caldwell,
Idaho 83605, and more
particularly descri bed on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made
a part hereof.
Toget her with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments,
and appurtenances
thereu nto belon ging or in anywise appertaining, the reversion
and reversions, remainder and
remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD , All and singular the said premi
ses, together with the
appurtenances, unto the grantee, and to its heirs and assigns
forever.
IN WITN ESS WHE REOF , The said granto r has hereunto set
his hand and seal the
day and year first above written.

./ £ .L ~ ·- ·

GLEN TR EFR EN ~man and as

State of Idaho
\ "c
Sole Owne r, Memb er and Mana ger of
County of ~anyon J vv. • •
.
Trade
sman Contractors Construction
I hereby certify that the foregoing ~n~trument 1s ~,,,,•""'"'•,,t:
'
a true and correct copy of the original as the,~'\'(;. 0 F / D..</ ,LC
' ,~,
same appears inlAhis o/lce..
....\ \'"- ~o&u·~'f-"J'-;>.·~ 'Yo·:..~
, «-?
"'"' . ,
"0 I I i_q0
DATED f· 1
"
.; I \ {! ,-,L!:J,.. !.
£: C'J 0°0
r ~0
\
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District a:iurt f
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County of Ada

Jiz_

On this
d a y c 4 ~ o 6 , before me, a Notary Public in
and for said
State, personally appe arf(~ I_;E N tJkE ~RE N , know
n to me to be the perso n whos e name is
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
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EXHIBIT

A portion. of the So uth
we st Qu

art er of the No rth eas t Qu
Range 3 West of the Boise
art er of Section 17, To
wn shi p 3 No rth ,
Meridian, Canyon County,
Idaho an d is more particula
as follows:
rly described
CO MM EN CI NG at the
No rth we st corner of sai
d So uth we st Qu art er of
the No rth eas t Qu art er;

thence

South 0°35'14" West alo
ng the West boundary
Northeast Quarter a distan
of said Southwest Quart
ce of 745.15 feet; thence
er of the
North 89°45'51" East pa
ral
lel with the North boun
Section 17 a distance of 40
dary of the Northeast Qu
.00 feet to the TRUE POIN
srter of said
T OF BEGINNING; thenc
No rth 89 °4 5'5 1" East pa
e
co
nti
nuing
ral lel with sai d North bo
un da ry a distance of2 49
South 0°35'14" West paral
.00
fee
t; thence
lel with the West bounda
Northeast Quarter a distan
ry of said Southwest Qu art
ce of 180.00 feet; thence
er of the
·
South 89 °4 5'5 1" West pa
ral
lel
wi
th
the North bo un da ry of sai
distance of249.00 feet; the
d Northeast Quarter a
nce
North 0°35' 14" East paral
lel with the West boundar
Northeruit Quarter a distan
,y of said Southwest Quart
ce of 180.00 feet to the TR
er of the
UE POINT OF BEGINNIN
G.

PARCELZA
A portion of the Southwe
st Quarter of the Northeas
t Quarter of Section 17. To
Range 3 West of the Boise
wnship 3 North.
Meridian, Canyon County,
as follows:
Idaho and is more particula
rly descn'bed
COMMENCING at the No
rthwest corn.er of said So
uthwest Quarter of the No
thence
rtheast Quarter;
South 0°35'14'' West alo
ng the West bllun.ruuy
Northeast Quarter a distan
of said South.west Quart
ce of 745 .15 feet; thence
er of the
North 89°45' 51" East pa
ral
lel
wi
t the North boundary of the
Section 17 a distance of 40
Northeast Quarter of said
.00 feet; thence
South 0°35•14" West paral
lel with the West bounda
Northeast Quarter a distance
ry of said Southwest Quart
of 180.00 feet to the TRUE
er of the
POINT OF BEGINNING;
North 89°45'51" West pa
the
nc
e
ral
lel
wi th the North bounda.
dis tan ce of 152.50 feet;
ty of said Northeast Quart
thence
er a
South 0°35'14" West paral
lel
with the West boundary of
Northeast Quarter a distan
said Southwest Quarter of
ce of 302.80 feet; thence
the
South 89°39'25" West pa
ral
lel
wi
th
the
So
uth
boundary of said Southwe
Northeast Quarter a distan
st Quarter of the
ce of 152.50 feet; thence

•I
\

No rth 0°3 5' 14" Eas t par alle l
Northeast Qu arte r a
of3 03. 09

!:he We st boundary of sai d Sou
thwest Quarter
the TRUE POINT OF BEGIN

tUNG.

A por tion of the Southwest Qu
arte r of the North.east Quarte
r of Section 17, Township 3
Ran ge 3 We st of the Boise Me
North,
ridian, Canyon County, Idaho
and is mo re particularly describ
as follows:
ed

COMMEN'CING at the Northwe
st comer of sai d Southwest Qu
arter of the·Northeast Quarte
thence
r;
Sou th 0°3 5' 14" West along
the We st boundary of said Sou
No

rtheast Quarter a distance of7
thwest Quarter of the
45. 15 feet; thence
No rth 89° 45' 51" East paralle
·
l with the No rth boundary of
the Northeast Quarter of said
Section 17 a distance of 40.00
feet; thence
Sou th 0"3 5'1 4.. We st paralle
l with the We st boundary of
said Southwest Quarter of the
Northeast Quarter a distance of
180.00 feet; thence
No rth 89° 45' 51" Eas t paralle
l wifu the No rth boundary of.
distance of 152.50 fee t to the
sai d Northeast Qu arte r a
TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING;
thence continuing
No rth 89° 45' 51" Eas t paralle
l with sai d No rth boundary a
distance of 363.32 feet to a
poi nt on the centerline of the
Bu rris Canal; thence
Sou th 45° 39' 48" We st along
said centerline a distance of 434
.92 feet; thence
South 89° 39' 25" West paralle
l with the Sou th boundary of
sard Southwest Quarter of the
Northeast Quarter a distance of5
5.35 feet; thence
No rth OQ35'14" Eas t parallel
wit h the We st boundary of
said Southwest Qu arte r of the
No rth eas t Qu arte r a distance
.
of302.80 feet to the TR UE PO
INT OF BEGINNING.
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THIS INDENTURE, Mad e thi s~ day
o f ~ 2006, betw een GLE N
TRE FRE N, a sing le man, and as sole Own
er,
of Trad esm an
Con tractors Con stru ctio n LLC, of Boise,
Idaho, "Gr ante r'', and REA L PRO PER TIE
S, LLC
" Grantee";

Mem~;~~! ~i gjr

WITNESSE TH that the said grantor does by
these presents rem ise, release, and
forever QU ITC LAI M unto the said gran
tee, and to its heirs and assigns all of that
certain
lot, piece, or parc el of land, situate, lying
and being in Caldwell, Cou nty of Canyon
, State o
Idaho, com mon ly kno wn as 15580 Rive
rside Road, Caldwell, Idaho 83605, and
more
particularly desc ribe d on Exhibit "A" atta
ched hereto and made a part hereof.
Tog ethe r with all and singular the tenemen
ts, hereditaments, and appurtenances
ther eun to belo ngin g or in anywise appertain
ing, the reversion and reversions, remaind
er and
remainders, rents, issues and profits ther
eof.
TO HA VE AN D TO HO LD, All and sing
ular the said premises, together with the
app urte nan ces, unto the grantee, and to its
heirs and assigns forever.
IN WIT NES S WH ERE OF, The said gran
tor has hereunto set his hand and seal the
day and year first abo ve written.

·~ = ~·.
GLE N TR EF RE

N~ ma n and as
State of Idaho
}
Sole Owner, Mem ber and Man ager of
County of Canyon
ss.
Tradesm an Contractors Construction
I hereby certify that the forego ing instrument
is ., • ,•"" "''• ,,kL C
a true and correct copy of the original as
'
the ...,•\ c. 0 F ID,c./ 1 · ,~
same appears.in;this o/lce.
1
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,
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I
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,
'
J
"·
~
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·.
...... -~ . ' .
.... .., • 0 V I / I _9 Y
DATED
',
ll \
()t :)
5' f,:) 0°0
r ~Q~
CHRIS)AMAMOTO, Clerk of the District cyuct
~
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County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

On thi s£ d a y ~ 0 6 , before me,
a Notary Public in and for said
State, personally app ear~ LEN ~~R EN , know
n to me to be the person whos e name is
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.

.

\

EXHIBIT

A po rti on of the So uth
we st Quarter of the No
rth ea st Quarter of Secti
Ra ng e 3 W es t of the
on 17, To wn sh ip 3 No
Bo ise Meridian, Ca ny
rth ,
on County, Id ah o an d
as follows:
is more pa rti cu lar ly de
scr ibe d
CO M M EN CI NG at the
No rth we st corner of
sa id Southwest Quart
the nc e
er of the No rth ea st Qu
arter;
So uth 0° 35 '14 " W es
t along the W es t bo
Northeast Quarter a distan
undary of sa id So uth
we st Qu art er of the
ce of 745.15 feet; thence
No rth 89 °4 5'5 1" Ea st
pa
ral
lel with the No rth boun
Se cti on 17 a distance
dary of the No rth ea st Qw
of 40.00 fee t to the TR
trter of sa id
lJE PO IN T OF BEGINN
No rth 89 °4 5'5 1" East
ING; the nc e co nti nu ing
parallel with sa id No rth
boundary a distance of
South. 0° 35 '14 " W es t
24 9.0 0 feet; the nc e
parallel wi th the W es
No rth ea st Qu art er a dis
t boundary of said So
uth we st Quarter of the
tance of 180.00 feet; the
nc e ·
Sou.th 89 °4 5'5 1" W es
t
pa
ral
lel
wi
th
the No rth bo un da ry
dis tan ce of 24 9.0 0 fee
of said No rth ea st Qu
t; the nc e
art er a
No rth 0° 35 '14 " Ea st
parallel with the W es
t bounda.r,y of sa id So
No rth ea st Qu art er a dis
uth we st Quarter of the
tance of 180.00 feet to
the TR UE PO IN T OF
BEGlNNJNG.

PA RC EL ZA
A po rti on of th. e South
west Quarter of the No
rth ea st Qu art er of Secti
Ra ng ~ 3 W es t of the
on 17, To wn sh ip 3 No
Bo ise Meridian, Ca ny
rth .
on
County, Ida ho an d is
as follows:
more pa rti cu lar ly de sc
no ed
CO M M EN CI NG at the
No rth we st co me r of sa
id So uth we st Quarter
the nc e
of the North.east Quart
er;
So ut h 0° 35 '14 '' W es
t along the W es t boU
Northea.st Quarter a distan
D.dary of sa id So uth
we st Qu art er of the
ce of 745 .15 feet; the nc e
No rth 89 °4 5'5 1" East
parallel wit the No rth
Se cti on 17 a distance
boundary of the North
of 40 .00 feet; the nc e
east Qu art er of sa id
So uth 0° 35 ' 14'' W es t
pa
ral
lel
wi
th the W es
No rth ea st Qu art er a dis
tance of 180.00 feet to the t boundary of sa id Southwest Quarter of the
TR UE PO IN T OF BE
No rth 89 °4 5'5 1" W es
GINNING; the nc e
t parallel wi th the No
dis tan ce of 152.50 fee
rth boundary of said
t; thence
No rth ea st Qu art er a
So uth 0" 35 ' 14" W es t
parallel wi th the W es
t bo un da ry of sa id So
No rth ea st Qu art er a dis
uthwest Quarter of the
tance of 30 2.8 0 feet; the
nc
e
So uth 89°39 '25 " W es
t parallel with the So uth
Northeast Quarter a distan
bo un da ry of sai d South
west Qu art er of the
ce of 152.50 feet; thence

II

,\

\

North 0°35' 14"
Northeast
a '""'"'=''"

the We st bou nda ry of said Sou
thwest Qu arte r
to

TRUE

BEGINNING.

I

I\

'

A por tion of the Southwest Qu
arter of the Nort.heast Qu arte
r of Section 17, Township 3
Ran ge 3 We st of the Boise Me
North.
ridian, Canyon County, Idaho
and is more particularly describ
as follows:
ed
CO MM EN CIN G at the Northw
est comer of said Southwest Qu
arter of the No rth eas t Quarte
r;
Sou th 0°3 5' 14" West along
the We st bou nda ry of said
Northeast Qu arte r a distance
Southwest Quarter of the
of 745.15 feet; thence
No rth 89° 45' 51" East paralle
·
l with the No rth boundary of
the Northeast Qu arte r of said
Section 17 a distance of 40.00
feet; thence
Sou th 0°3 5'1 4" We st paralle
l with the We st bou nda ry of
said Southwest Qu arte r of the
Northeast Qu arte r a distance
of 180.00 feet; thence
No rth 89° 45' 51" Eas t paralle
l with the No rth bounda.cy of.
distance of 152.50 feet to the TR
sai d Northeast Quarter a
UE POINT OF BEGINNING; the
nce
con
tinuing
North 89° 45' 51" East parallel wit
h said North boundary a disU111c
poi nt on the cen terl ine of the
e of 363.32 feet to a
Burris Canal; thence
Sou th 45° 39' 48" West along
said centerline a distance of 434.92
feet; thence
South 89°39'25" West paralle
l with the South. boundary of said
Southwest Quarter of the
Northeast Quarter a distance of 55.
35 feet; thence
North 0°3 5'1 4" Eas t parallel with
. the We st bou nda ry of said Sou
thwest Qu arte r of the:
No rth eas t Qu arte r a distance of3
02. 80 feet to the TR UE PO INT
OF BE GIN Nm G.

thence
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THIS INDE NTUR E, Made this_{ ;,_ d~y o ~ ;006, between
GLEN
TREFREN, a single man, and as Co-Owner, Mem hdM ii/a.g er of
REAL HOMES, LL ,
of Boise, Idaho, "Grantor", and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, "Gran
tee";

WITN ESSE TH that the said grantor does by these presents remise,
release, and
forever QUIT CLAI M unto the said grantee, and to its heirs and assign
s all of that certain
lot, piece, or parcel of land, situate, lying and being in Caldwell, Count
y of Canyon, State o
Idaho, commonly known as 15580 Riverside Road, Caldwell, Idaho
83605 , and more
particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part
hereof.
Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments, and appurt
enances
thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, the reversion and revers
ions, remainder and
remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, All and singular the said premises, togeth
er with the
appurtenances, unto the grantee, and to its heirs and assigns forever.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The said grantor has hereunto set his hand
and seal the
day and year first above written.

~~-

GLEN TREFREN,Angkmanand as

Co.Owner, Memb er and Manager of
REAL HOMES, LLC
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of Ada

) ss.
)

y:;

On this
day of
before me, a Notary Public in and for said
State, personally appeare d
FREN , known to me to be the person whose name is
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
IN WITNE SS WHERE OF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal,
the day and year in this certificate first above writt e~n.
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EXHIBIT

A po rti on of the So
uthwest Qu ar ter of th
e Northeast Qu art er
Ra ng e 3 W es t of the
of Se cti on 17. To wn
Bo ise M er id ian , Ca.ny
sh ip 3 No rth .
on County, Id ah o an
as follows:
d is mo re particularly
described
CO M M EN CI NG at
the No rth we st corner
of said Southwest Qu
ar ter of th e No rth ea
st Quarter;
So ut h 0° 35 '14 " W es
t
alo
ng
the
W es t boundary of
No rth ea st Quarter a
sa id So uth we st Qu
distance of 74 5. 15 fee
arter of the
t; thence
North 89 °4 5'5 1" Ea st
pa
ra
lle
l
wi
th the North boundary
Section 17 a distance of
of th e Nortliel:'.St Quart
40.00 feet to the TRUE
er of said
POINT OF BEGINN.[N
No rth 89°45 '51 " Ea
'G; thence continuing
st pa ra lle l wi th sa id
North bo un da ry a dis
So ut h 0° 35 '14 " W es
tan ce of 24 9 .00 feet;
t pa ra lle l wi th th e W
thence
Northeast Quarter a dis
est boundary of sa id
So uth we st Quarter of
tance of 180.00 feet; the
th e
nc
e
·
So ut h 89 °4 5'5 1" W
es t pa ra lle l wi th the
di sta nc e of 249.00 fee
North bo un da ry of
t; thence
sa id No rth ea st Qu art
er a
North 0° 35 ' 14" Ea st pa
ra
lle l with th e West bo
Northeast Quarter a dis
undar,y of sa id So uth
tance of 180.00 feet to
we st Quarter of th e
the TRUE POINT OF
thence

BEGINNING.

PARCEL2A
A po rti on of the So
uthwest

Range 3 West of the Bo Qu ar ter of the Northeast Quarter of Se cti on
ise Meridian, Canyon
17, To wn sh ip 3 No rth
,
County, Idaho and is mo
as follows:
re particularly described
CO M M EN CI NG at
the Northwest CQJ.Uer
of said Southwest Quart
er of the Northeast Qu
arter;
So ut h 0¢35'14'' W es
t alo ng the W es t
North.east Qu art er a dis
boundary of sa id So
ut hw es t Quarter of
tance of 74 5. 15 feet; the
the
nce
No rth 89 °4 5'5 1" Ea
st
pa
ra
lle l wi t th e NorJi bo
Section 17 a di.stance
undary of th e No rth
of 40.00 feet; th en ce
ea st Qu art er of sa id
So ut h 0 1135•14" W es
t
pa
ra
lle l wi th the W es t bo
Northeast Quarter a dis
undary of sa id So uth
tance of 180.00 feet to
we st Quarter of the
the TRUE POINT OF
No rth 89 °4 5'5 1" W
BE
GI
NN
es
ING; thence
t
pa
ra lle l wi th the North
di sta nc e of 152.50 fee
bo un da ry of sa id No
t; the nc e
rth ea st Quarter a.
So ut h 0° 35 '14 " W es
t
pa
ra
lle l wi th th e W es t bo
No rth ea st Qu art er a
undary of sa id So uth
distance of 30 2. 80 fee
we st Quarter of th e
t; thence
South 89 °3 9'2 5" W es t
pa
ra lle l with the South
No rth ea st Quarter a
. bo un da ry of sa id So
distance of 152.50 feet;
uth we st Quarter of th
thence
e

thence

No.rah 0"'35' 14" East parallel with
the West bo'l.llldary of said Southw
Northeast Quarter a
est Quarter of the
303.09
to the TRUE POINT
BEGINNING.
A por tion of the Sou thw est Qua
rter of the Northeast Qu arte r of
Sec tion 17, Tow:ri.sh.ip 3 Nor th,
Ran ge 3 We st of the Boi se Me ridi
an, Canyon County, Ida ho and is
more particularly des crib ed
as follows:

COMMENCING at the Northwest
comer of said Southwest Quai.-ter
of the·Northeast Qua rter ;
thence
South 0°35'14" West along the
West boundary of said Southwest
Northeast Qua rter a distance of 745
Quarter of the
.15 feet; thence
·
North 89°45'51" East parallel with
the North boundary of the Northea
Section 17 a distance of 40.00 feet;
st Quarter of said
thence
South 0°35'14" We st parallel with
the West boundary of said Southw
Northeast Quarter a distance of 180
est Quarter of the
.00 feet; thence
North 89°45'51" East parallel with
the North bol.llldaty of_ said Northea
distance of 152.50 feet to the TRUE
st Quarter a
POINT OF BEGINNING; thence con
tinuing
North 89°45'51.. East parallel with
said North boundary a distance of
point on the centerline of the Burris
363.32 feet to a
Can.al; thence
South 45°39'48 .. West along said cen
terline a distance of 434.92 feet; then
ce
South 89°39'25" West parallel wit
h the South boundary of said Southw
Northeast Quarter a distance of 55.3
est Quarter of the
5 feet; thencb
North 0°35'14" East parallel with
the West boundary of said Southw
est Quarter of the
~ortheast Quarter a distance of 302
.80 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEG
INl:-flli"G;.
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QUIT CLA I·

THIS INDENTURE, Ma~e this/: , ·d~
TREF REN, a single man, and as sole Owner , Mem rand
ager ofTrad esma.n
Contra ctors Constr uction LLC, of Boise, Idaho, "Gran tor", and REAL
PROP ERTIE S, LLC
"Gran tee";
WITN ESSE TH that the said granto r does by these presen ts remise
, release, and
foreve r QUIT CLAI M unto the said grantee, and to its heirs and assign
s all of that certain
lot, piece, or parcel of land, situate, lying and being in Namp a, Count
y of Canyo n, State of
Idaho, comm only known as 714 Smith A venue, Namp a, Idaho 83651
, and more particularly
descri bed on Exhib it "A'' attache d hereto and made a part hereof.
Togeth er with all and singul ar the tenem ents, heredi tamen ts, and
appurt enance s
thereu nto belong ing or in anywi se appert aining , the revers ion and
revers ions, remain der and
remain ders, rents, issues and profits thereof.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD , All and singul ar the said premis es,
togeth er with the
appurt enance s, unto the grante e, and to its heirs and assign s foreve
r.
IN WITN ESS WHER EOF, The said granto r has hereun to set his
hand and seal the
day and year first above written.

_
gL_~
GLEN TREFREN, As"e man

St e of Idaho

}

and as
Sole Owner , Memb er and Manag er of
Trades man Contra ctors Constr uction ,
LLC

ss.

Co nty of Canyon
I h reby certify !hat the foregoing instrument is ,,<>""''•,,
a t e and correct copy of the original as,tJ;ii1~ OF / O,q '~.,~
Sa e appeq.rS in}lhis9~fce.
~ ,,••rr5'~~-"~ lyQ~.,,."
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By

IS YAMAMOTO, Cl~rk of the Oistr.fct CO!'.irt
,,;'..,tnd Ex~Offici@'Recorder ; ·tr
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) ss.

County of Ada

)

_J,,_

On this
day of · ~,;, ,·, SQ.6, before me, a
Notary Pub lic and for said
State, personally app eare d
EN 'L FREN , kno wn to me to be the
pers on who se nam e is
subscribed to the within instrument, and
ack now ledg ed to me that he exe cute d
the same.
IN WIT NES S WH ERE OF, I have here
unto set my hand and affi xed my official
seal,
the day and year in this certificate first
ag~~RWMtten
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INDE NTUR E, Made thisifl~ daf of
: : : ~, 2006, between GLEN
ITRE FREN , a single man, and as Co-Owner, Memb er d M
ager of REAL HOM ES, LL ,
of Boise, Idaho, "Gran tor", and REAL PROP ERTI ES, LLC,
"Grantee";
\VITN ESSE TH that the said grantor does by these presents
remise, release, and
forever QUIT CLAI M unto the said grantee, and to its heirs and
assigns all of that certain
lot, piece, or parcel of land, situate, lying and being in Namp
a, County of Canyon, State of
Idaho , commonly know n as 714 Smith Aven ue, Nampa, Idaho
, and more particularly
described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof
.
Toget her with all and singu lar the tenements, hereditaments,
and appurtenances
thereu nto belonging or in anywise appertaining, the reversion
and reversions, remai nder and
remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof.
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD , All and singu lar the said premi
ses, togeth er with the
appurtenances, unto the grantee, and to its heirs and assigns
forever.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The said grantor has hereunto set his
hand and seal the
day and year first above written.

.L IL .~ = ~

GLEN T R E F ~ man and as
Co-Owner, Memb er and Mana ger of
REAL HOM ES, LLC

State of Idaho
), ss.
County of Canyon J

I hereby certify that the foregoing instrument is
original as the
same appears~·· this office_. _
,i,i'' uo"~•;,,,Q
DATED , l !c-X// ln\<7
,..,,~, -,S
r- ID;~,
I ! . c; /....,V \'..,J1
~~ -\I'- 09 •00Q~ .</,<, "",,.
CHR1S)r:'.1MAMQJd,"C1~fk of the District Gou~.,;; 0 / 0 UN;}_ . >'o \
a_~d tt>_i Off~I~ Recorder
5A :
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By c/\/t./ \.-f/1t ./.A_- ,.,. ,. ----... h( :;
t 1:( :.
D8puty

a true and correct cogy of the
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ss.

On this

_ie__

day of ~ ~ 0 6 , before me, a
Notary Public in and
said
State,
app eare d ~ R E N , kno wn to
me
to
be
the
pers
on
who
se nam e is
subscribed to the within Lnstrnment, and
acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
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VERNON K. S:'\.HTH

SEP 2 3 2012

:H LnY

1900 \Y. :\bin
hfah,,
Te!epher :e: (20;n 3~5-1E5
Facsim1: e: {203) 345-1 i29
E-mail: Yksti-,"-.:-: ii~..-e-~t)m

t),l.{PJSTOPHER D. RiCH, Clerk.
By JERI HEATON
DEFt.Y'f.,,.,

A.ttorm:'"· fo:- Den:1is .L Sallaz
i:\' THf DiSTRIC T COl"RT OF THE FOt RHI JUDICIA L DISTRIC T OF

THE ST:.\TE OF IDAHO, l:'{ Ai'\D FOR THE COU:'i"TY OF ADA

DE\!NlS J. SAU.
)
}

CO.\lPL .\!NT FOR AN
li'iDEPE I\DE:t\T ACTION TO
OBT. .\JN RELIEF FROM A
.JCDG:\I ENT

)
)

)

RE>iEE L rnrn.D-S ALL-\Z

)
)

)

Class A

fee:

S96.00

CO\!ES NO\V. the above named Plainrif!~ Dennis J. SallaL (hereinaft er rderred to as
'"Sallaz" \

oy ;.mJ

1h,ough counsel of Vernon K. Smith, as and for stating claims against the

Defendan t, Rene.: L Raird-Sallaz,
lndep~nder~t

(hereinaft er rderred to ;:1s ''Baird''), in [he nature of an

to obtain relief from a judgrnenL and therefore plec.ds and alleges as follows:
I.
NATURE OF THE ACTION

L

is DI1 independ ent action .for relief fron1 ali rn.atters pre'\ziously adj'udicat ed in the

proceedin g enti:_le:d, Renee L Boird-Sallaz v Damis J Sallaz, Fourth. District, Ada County Case No
04-01075

COMPLA IN1 -PAGE 1

final

entered on Januarv

2012 (hereinafter, "Idaho

IS

powers

;}S

an

action within 1he equitabl e

the court.

PARTIE S

;

AK all times rele\-ant hereto_ t3ain1 ,xas and is a resident of Boise~ ~-\da County:::
Idaho .

.H;RISD ICTiO;' { At\D VE:'fUE
cl-.

JurisJic, i'-,n is proner 1n chis Coun pu.rsu:mt h1 LC ~ l 705 ~md the ::1:nount
m

controve rsy exceeds [he jurisdict ionai minimu m limirs of this Court of S l 0,000.00
.
::,_

Venu~ is proper in AJa Coum:·- Idaho pl,rsuant to ~md by virrne of LC.§ 5-404.

G£:"iER AL ALLEG ATION S
6.

The parties were purporte dly marrie<l in ihe State of Oregon on July 4, 1996

(hereir:a fier, "'the Oregon marriage .=).

7.

Following their marriage in Oregon, rhe parties remmed to the state of Idaho where

they lived <luring the entire course of the a!lege<l mamage includin g up through
the date when
divorce proceedi ngs \Vere commen ced on :'. fay 2 7, 2004, ;:md ernry of a decree granting
a divorce on

July 28, 2005_
8.

£:\s a consequ ence of th~ parties:: chosen legal domicile

\Vi thin

the state of Idaho:" all

property that they 2cquired after the date of iheir m:rniage while residing wirhin the
state of Idaho
was presume d to be commun ity property . LC. § 32-906.
9.

The Defenda nt Baird was solely responsi ble for all the arrangem ents for the Oregon

marr1age .

COMP LAINT -PAGE 2

W.

showed Piainti ffSaibz some marriag e dccuu1ems she said sh:
h~r home stare

Sallaza H

lice-nse.

Later sh;;.; told

Piainiiff

SaHaz bdie'- d bcT.

of ''Rick \Vill;:mf", who was hccnse<l m Ore_§.on w solemn ize ~urnag
es and w.kc care of the

requfrc d permirs , licenses ;:mu certific ates.
!2~

There is no record thnt any marr~age license requ~sr ;.)r n1~rr!ilge !!cens~
'..Vas ever

signed by Rick \ViHarcL ihe person ,.yi,o alkged iy solemn ized ihe marri;1 ge.
or signed by any of his
wimcss es or filed or recorde d in the public records of the srnte of Oregon
or any Coumy within the
0

State.

!3.

There is no record that Rick Wilb.n.L the individ ual idenfai ed to Dennis Sallaz,
and

who claimed he had the authori ty to solemn ize the parties· alleged marriag
e in the Stare of Oregon ,
had &Ty vaiid pcnnit, license, or authori ty of any kin<l m solemn ize marriag
es v,:ithin the State of
Oregon_
l 4.

./u lhe time t~~t the Pbintif fSaHaz entered into his marriag e vows wirh Baird,

he was

led to bdiev,:: 1hat the per~on 1.Yho solemn ized ~he marria~e was vested Witil
the required authori ty
under Oregon I~P.V and that the required formaJiries to validate rhe rnarriag
e under that State~s la\V

were being follo\'';ed by Defend ant B2ird or this Rick \Villard, includi ng
aU matters require d :in

-PAG E3

15.

upon

mm
the r;cquired
BairJ haJ nm

void ab ini1io
16.

Phim iff Sa!bz , he no\;,.-

know s rhm d,c Dd:Cndant BairJ ~now ingly wd intcnt
ionaii y 2cred so as w avoid the requi red
ef that mana ge license with ihe
appro priak pubiic record:; ofric~ i,1 the state of Orego
n.
,
l,-

The state of On:::gon does nor recognize comm on law
marriage_

iS.

fhe state of Oreg on does not recognize the putat ive marri
age doctrine.

19.

Since Janua ry !, 1996 the stare of !Jaho has not reco~
,nized the cre2ti on of new

comm on ta,.v marfr1ges.
20.

The state of Idaho does not rccogniZe ,he putati ve marri
:ige dorni ne.

21 _

in the al1sci1ce of the good fhith ofbl1th pa:ties; no marri

age arises under Oreg on la\~~

as a result nf rhe partie s' failur e w comp ly v:ith the
sra;.utory reqmren1ents for so!em nizin g a

marri age in ~h:1t state.
22.

Bec:mse the partie s' marri age \Vas not '.1-lid

Orego n hw, lh:u marri age was not

valid u11der kbho h1,.v_ LC §

existe nce of a recog nized , ex tam mr,ni age, is a prere quisit
e to foe exerc ise of
1f ri:c parties are not

COw IPLA !NT

the court has no

to

2-L

!hem a divorc e.
fo. the

a

no

in respc:ct w :iny proper ty or incom;:: rha[ they acquire d after their
alleged
juiv .:L I 996 rnarriagc. ~.1J1 ;~cquircd

proper ty of =2"ith::r

25

0!~e

of the p~1rr!cs.

fn a divorc e procee ding :1 cou,t h;:;::; no jun:::dic(ion 10 com pd one:
party to convey any

portion of his scpa,J. te propcn y to rhc ,Ftl<::r rmny. PrinJ.!.le .-. Pringle
:, l 09 fdaho l 026. [ 023-29 , 7 l 2
P2d 727]2. cJ-TiU (Ct..-\p p.1985 !.

16_

.:\s a direct conseq uence of Lhc kno,vlng ~H1d intenr? ontd act~ of the Def~nd
ant Baird_

which consu,trn:: fraud upon ihc courL in initiati ng ,:;nd pursui
ng rhc fJaho divorc e action as

identif ied in p::1,~1gr.::iph l of this ct1rnpi;1inL :1::: baseu upon her earlier
knO\\!ng ~mJ intenti onal aces

of induci ng the Plainti ff Sallaz to unkno ,\ ingiy enter into a sham Orego
n marria ge lhat was void ab
initio this Coun should grant the P!ainii ff Sallaz the relief further
requcs red by this compl aint.
0

COUN TO;\E

DECL ARAT ORY RELI EF-T HE PART IES' OREGOi'i\:L-\R RIAGE \VAS VOID AB INITI O
/'t
_,.

The Plainti ff Sallaz herehy incorpo rates all the pnor allegat ions and

factuat statem ents

made in (his compi aint into this cause of J.c1ion.
28.

Under the Idaho Dccb.rC.tt0ry Judgm;;;nts s·\cL LC.§ l0-1201 er seq.
rhis Court h2s
0

the al1thor ity to dcte1T nine if the parries 1..\.-i~re ever legall_::" rn:irric:c!
ur1der Oregon i::i\v. i.lnd to provid e

furthe,- rer
29.

The Defond;.'-nt Baird m~:.c:e 2. represe ,,tation of fact that Ric~ \Vilbrd
v,as author ized

COM PLAI NT-

5

to solemnize:
that the: {)reg.on rnJrri:ige licens e
had

c,xnpk,c::<l an<l filed in the Orcg,) n pt:blic rcco,d.s. ·,, hen
in foct th:n i1<.:vcr occum.:<l.

COC 'iTTW O
DECL AR.-\ TORY RELI EF THE ACTJO:"iS OF THE
DfFE NDA: '\'T BAJR D COXS TiTLT F, FR,\U D CPO;'\
THE COUR T

made in this comp bim into rhis cause
36.

~fhe I)efCndant Baird . as the PL.-1intiffin the p~rt~es~ Idaho divorc
c3.ction: based that

::md. obtain ed rdief in rha.t actil)l1 .
Proceed ing uom1'
.

-

a repres entati on of fact of a valid

Oregon marria ge, ,Yhich in fact was void ab inirio.
37.

The De fend:mt BairJ ' s !:epre sentm ions conce mi ng

validi ty of the partie s' Orego n

marria ge were fulse.

33~

~rf1e Dcfend~1.nt Baird~ s repres entati ons conce rning the "~.::1.1Id
ity of the partie

s Orego n

marri::1ge ' . vere rna:er ial to the on-go ing legal statEs of the partie
s during the aHegc<l existe nce of that

marriage" as to cornm uniry property

PAG E6

the allege d existe nce of that

marr iage , and

39.

3S

to the

the part ies'

The Defond:mt Bair d

in the Idah o divo rce proc eedi ng for the

that the rq:x esen tatio ns that she mad e conc
ernin g the

form ation and exis tenc e of the Oreg on marr
i:-ige \':ere false.
40.

The De frnd ant Bair d inten ded thar the Pbim

i ff Sa!! az wou ld act upon , ami rely upon ,

her false represcm~uions conc erni ng the Oreg
on marr iage in the m~umer cont emp lated , such
wou ld acce pr the pn::sumption of com mun ity

prop erty rhat aros e unde r Idah o law, am.I the

that he

subs eque nt

divis ion of th::u com mun ity prop erty in the
Idah o divo rce actio n.
4L

The Plai ntiff Sall az ,vas, ar all time s relev ant
to this actio n, igno rant of the falsi ty of

repr esen tatio ns mad e by the Dde ndan r Bair
d.
42.

The Plai ntiff Sall az did rely upon the factu al

rep,e sema tions conc erni ng ihe exis tenc e

of the part ies' Oreg on marr iage , and as
base d upon the appa rent conf orm ity of
the marr iage
cere mon y with Oreg on law, and Bair d's pres

ume d com plian ce ,vii:h the othe r requ irem ents

of Oreg on

law in crea ting a valid Oreg on marr iage , he
had a righ t to rely upon thos e repr esen tatio
ns.

43.

As a resu lt of the Plai.rniff Sall az's relia
nce upon the Defe ndan i. Bair d's false

repr esen tatio ns he has been cons eque ntly
and prox imat ely injur ed as a resu lt of the
subs eque nt
divo rce actio n bet,.veen the part ies as a resu
lt of the a"v:ud of aHeged com mun ity prop
erty to Bair d
that in the abse nce of a valid and enfo rcea
bk marr iage wou ld not be com mun ity prop
erty and to

which she wou ld not otberv.tise be entit led, and
to whic h Sall az wou ld be entitied_
COU NTT HRE £
THE PLA INT JFF SAL LAZ IS ENT ITL ED
TO HAYE ALL .JUDGJVIENTS
E1'f TER ED IN THE I\\_,_1{.TIES' DIV ORC
E PRO CEE DIN G VAC ATE D
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44_
aH tlhe prio r alle gati ons and factllml
made

stat eme nts

this

further rdi ef thar is necessary or pro
per.
46.

_ § W-1208.

The aci:ions of the DeknJa,_11[

div orc e dec ree , and<li"'ision ofco

afm ud upo n

mmunit_y prn pat y, as bas ed upo n

cou a in obt ain ing a

a sha m Ore gon marr:iage tha nva s

voi d ab init io.
47 _

As a con seq uen ce of the acricms
of ihe

Def ell! dwr Bai rd, ihis Cou rt sho
uld vac ate all

jud gm ent s eot ere J in the div orc e
acti on, Rr:nee L Bai rd- Sal laz v Den
nis J. SalfrJ:::, Fou rth Dis tric t.
Ada Cou my Cas e No CV -DR 04010 75 ~t inch ,din g all ;nv ard s
of com mu ruty pm per ty to the
Def end ant Baird_
AT TO RN EY FEE S
48 _

Sal laz has bee n req uire d to _retain

this Thi rd Par ty Com pla int aga inst
and cos ts of suit inc urre d thereby

ilie serv ices ofund ersi gne d cou nse

l in o:rder to brin g

Bai rd at1.d he is entitlled to .rec ove
T his rea son abk atto rne y fees

_ pursuai-:1t to the app lica ble pro visi
ons ofld aho

faw_ ind udi ng but

not lim ited to, Idaho Cod e§§ 12121 , 12- 123 , and Ida ho Rul es of
Civ il Pro ced ure Rul e 54_
\VH ER EFO RE , Sal laz pra ys for
a ju<lgme,it aga inst Bai rd as foll ows
:
1.

For Jud gm ent aga inst the Def end

ant Bai rd ded arin g th.e par ties ' Ore

gon mar riag e to

be voi d ab init io.
For Jud gm ent aga inst lhe Def end

ant Bai rd ded a.ri, .,g

she com mit ted. frau d upon

the cou rt in the filin g and pur suit
of the Ida ho diYorce acti on, inc
lud ing obt ain ing an a"vard of
propert'J-

CO I\'1 PLA I1'I J'-P AG E 8

Fo r an ord er vac ati ng all

Fo r

).

reasonable

For suc h oth er rel ief as

Co un may dee m ·

DE MA ND FO R .JURY TR
JA1-

Sal laz hereby dem and s a jur
y ffial pur~~~mrT~i<hi-.o Ru
les of Civil Pm-;;ectITTe.~ule
38(

_____,,. ~

'//

Da t< dt hi s,* 4J ay of Se

p: ~O l2 .

;

b).

~)
!

J

)
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ST AT E OF TDAHO )
Co un ty of

Dennis J~ Sal

\

)

Be ing firs[

S\\-orn, upon oat h, dep ose
s and says:

Th at 1 arn the plain ti ff in the
abo ve em itk d maEer. Th
at I hav e rea d the: abo ve

arid for ego ing
Co mp lai n!, kno,·v- the ccm
em s the reo f an d bci icn ~ th-t
S[aremenrs the rei n con tai ned
to be tru e an d
cor rec t to the bes t of my kno
w!e<lg
c and belief_

/I

Subscribed an d sworn to bef
ore me thi s

p(" ?"/ l

!

',,

/o ..---day of September, 20 I2_

~-71"~

No tm yP ub iic for lda no
Re sid ing at Bo ise
My Co mm iss ion Ex pir es:
_/t.~'0--

CO M PL AJ NT -P AG E 10

_-.J_~____
y c2_(J.
_Y(__
~ _

, hibit F

Re

.IV ED

00 --- -~ :-= --- --

SEP 2 8 2012
IN TH ~9J i~~

UI

//:

S(C ~.u. _ __

1 3 2012
99l1kT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTNOV
OF

CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH.
By MARTHA LYKE

OF

RENEE L. BAIRD-SALLAZ

(S'\fiV

)

)

Civil No. CV DR 04-0I075 D

)
)

vs.

DENNIS J. SALLAZ,
Dekn danU Appe Uant

)
)

ORD ER SUS PEN DIN G APP EAL

~

)
)

)

I'dIS MATIER havin g been prese nted to the ourt
on the moti on of the Appellant, and the
Cour t being fully 2dvis ed,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
All further proce edin o on this appeal, including all pend
ing briefing schedules

are suspended

Du M~ . ~ ~- 't) ~:~L~~~
V~+,V\.b ~ (ttd :-o~ C 1 ~ ~t ,e-> w.~ ~ ~
@_+ llV" '1
DA TE D\ M- ~" { 1-e>tJ-.
~ ~ \ J c ,..t:rJ.,;"i \) ~Ml~~

until furth erord eroft ·scou rt.

r;-!'f;::~,-·

~ - Sh'r,lu,,-,
Seni or Distr ict Judg e

ORDER

CLERJ<:'S CER TIFI CAT E OF :\'fA JLIN G
one
SUSPENDii''l'G
reco rd in this cau..<:e in enve lope s addr essed as
foHmvs:

K. S?\.HTH
Atto rney at Law
1900 W. Main Streer
Boise=- Idah o 8370 2
Tele phon e: (208) 345-1 125
Facs imile : (208) 345- I 129
E-m ail: vksh::xll@iive.com

/

u_s_ Mail,
Facsimi!e

~A<OT ""''°'

prepaid

Oveimigh! Mail

Hand Delivery
- Electrnnic Deli very

Rene e Baird
1558 4 Riverside Road
Cald well , ID 83607

Matt hew T Chri stens en
Ai'JG SThI AN JOH NSO N
3649 N. Lakeharbor Lane
Bois e, Idah o 83703
Tele phon e: 208- 384- 8588
Facs imile :
208- 853- 0] 17
Ema il:
mtc@am~stman.com
Atto rney for Chap ter 7 Bankruptcy Trus tee -

/

United State s Mail

/

U.S. }daiJ, post age prep aid
Facs imile
Over nigh t Mail
Hand Deli very
Elec troni c Deli very

Jerem y J _Gug ino

Chri stop her D_ Rich
CLE RK OF THE COlJ RT

~ ~ · · -

Dep wy Cler k

ORD ER SUS PEN DIN G

PAG E2

r

,

Exhibit G

VERi ~ON K. SMIT H
Attorn ey at Law

Telep hone: 208-3 45-11 25
Facsim ile: 208-3 45-I 129
Email: vksla w~liv e.com
ISB# 1365
Attorn ey for the Defen dant
Denni s J. Sallaz

IN THE DIST RICT COLTRT OF TIIE FOUR TII JUDIC IAL

DIST RICf OF

TIIE STAT E OF IDAH O, 1N AND FOR THE COUN TY OF
ADA

f

RENE E L. BAIR D,

)
)
Plaint i:ff/Re spond ent
)
)
JERE MY J. GUGI NO, CHAP TER 7
)
BANK RUPT CY TRUS TEE FOR THE·
)
BANK RUPT CY ESTA TE OF RENE E L. )
BAIR D,
)
)
Interv enor/R espon dent,
)
)
VS.
)
)
DENN IS J. SALL AZ,
)
)
)
Defen dant/Appel lant.
)

Case No. CV DR 04 01075 D

i\+-~l'
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Class: L.4
Fee: $109. 00

TO: THE ABOV E NAM ED RESP ONDE NTS, RENE E L. BAIR

J. GUG INO the Chap ter 7 Bank ruptc y Trn'st ee for the Bankr
and the Bankr uptcy

OF APPE AL

1~
/

D Pro Se and, JERE MY

uptcy Estate ofRENE E L. BAIR D,

.,,.,L=.,·~u, 3649 N_ Lake harbo r Lane , Bois e,Ida

l.

ho 83 703, and the Cler Jrnfthe abov e-ent itled cour

t.

The abov e name d appellant,, Denn is J. Salla z, appe
als again st the abov e-nam ed

respo nden ts to the Idaho Supr eme Cour t from the
Mem orand um Decision,, Orde r and Appe llate
Judg ment enter ed in the above-entitled actio n on

July 1, 2013, the Hono rable Kath ryn A Stick le~

Seni or Distr ict Judg e, presi dmg, and all interl ocuto
ry or :final judgm ents relate d to that Appe

llate

Judg ment , as prov ided by Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)
(I)-

2.

Toat theab ove- name dapp ellan thasa right toapp ealto

the judg ment s or order s described in parag raph 1

theid ahoS upre meC ourt, and

abov e is an appealable order unde r and pursu ant

to Rule I I(a)(2 ).
3.

A preli mina ry state ment of the issue on appeal whic

h the appellant inten ds to asser t

in the appe al; prov ided, any such list of issues on appe
al shall not prevent the appe llant :from
asser ting other issue s on appea l:
a.

Did a valid marr iage exist whic h veste d subje ct matte
r jurisd iction in the magi strate
cour t for the purp ose of grant ing a divor ce and divid
ing "com muni ty prop erty? "

4.

Has an order been entered seali ng all or any portion

of the recor d? No.

If so, what porti on? None.
5.

Is a repo rter's transcript reque sted? No.

6_

fu. lieu ofthe Stand ard Reco rd prov ided unde r lA.R

28(b )(l), the Appe llant reque sts only the follo wing

on this appe al.
a.

Register of Actions;

NOT ICE OF APP EAL -PA GE2

. 28(b), and as prov ided by IA.R _

docu ment s to be inclu ded in the clerk ,s recor d

b.

Sugg estio n of Bank ruptc y (6i26/12).

C.

Susp ensio n of App eal (7/24/12).
d.

Orde r Reco gniz ing Bankruptcy Auto mati c Sta.y
and Suspending App eal
(8/21 /12).

e.

Veri fied Petit ion to Intervene (Christensen for Gugi

f.

App ellan t's Resp onse to Motion to Intervene (9/24

g.

Noti ce of the Lifti ng of the Bankruptcy Automati

h.

App ellan t's Moti on for Suspension of the Appe

1.

Affi davi t of Denn is J. Sallaz (9/28/12).

J.

App ellan t's Mem oran dum in Support of Moti
on to Suspend Appeal
(9/28/12).

k.

Noti ce of Serv ice (10/23/12).

I.

Orde r Susp endi ng App eal Denied (11/13/12).

m.

Orde r Lifti ng App eal Suspension (11/14/12).

n.

App ellan t's Brie f (12/12/12).

o.

Resp onde nt's Brie f (01/18/13).

p.

Inter veno r's Bne f on Appe al (01/18/13).

q.

Noti ce of Hear ing on Verified Petition to Intervene

q.

App ellan t's Join t Repl y Brie f (2/11/13).

s.

Requ est for Judi cial Notice; Memorandum
of Points and Authorities
(2/20/13).

t.

Orde r Gran ting Petit ion to Intervene (2/22/13).

u.

Memorandum.Decision, Order, and AppeUate Judg

NOT ICE OFA PPE AL- PAG E3

no) (9/24/12).

/12).

c Stay (9/28/I2).

al (9/28/I2).

. ( 1/25/13).

ment --.Alf:rrmed. (7/1/ 13).

7.

I certify:
a copy

appeal

on

a

transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Name and address: None.

(b)

That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been
paid the

estima ted fee for prepar ation of the report er's transcript.

(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk,s reconl has been

(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursua

paid

nt to Rule

20, I.A.R.

Dated this

B-mday of August, 2013.

Verno n K. Smith
Attorney for the Appellant
Dennis J_ Sallaz

/
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVI CE

8~

I
That on
day of August, 2013, I
to
a true
and correct copy of the foregoi ng NO nCE OF APPEA L to the followi ng in
the manner describ ed
below:

Renee L. Baird
Respon dent Pro Se
15584 Riverside Road
Caldwe ll, Idaho 83607
(Phone & Email IAR. 17(d) & 20)

L

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Facsim ile
Overnight Mail
Hand Deliver y
Electro nic Deliver y

Respon dent Pro Se

Matthe w T. Christe nsen
Attorne y at Law
ANGS TMAN JOHNS ON
3649 N. Lakeha rbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
Teleph one:
208-38 4-8588

Facsimile:

208-853-0117

Email:

mtc(@,angstman.com

L

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Facsim ile
Overni ght Mail
Hand Deliver y
Electro nic Deliver y

Attorne y for the Intervenor/Respondent
Jeremy J. Gugino, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
<:tee
For The Bankruptcy Estate ofRenee L. Baird

)

NOTIC E

5

